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Abstract 
This thesis examines the economic situation in Syria during the 1980's 
and 1990's and assesses the reasoning behind the introduction of Investment 
Law No. 10. It discusses the validity of the general assumption that 
Investment Law No. I 0 marked the first step in the opening-up of the Syrian 
economy. It firstly examines the structure of the Syrian state to ascertain 
whether the regime would have any particular interest in promoting such 
legislation apart from a general wish to increase the economic well-being of 
its population, placing the discussion of investment vehicles within a more 
general economic framework. It then places the economic and political 
situation in Syria at the time of the introduction of the legislation within its 
particular political and economic historical context and then examines the 
legislation and its actual implementation and operation in detail to try to 
obtain an accurate picture of projects operating under Investment Law No 10. 
This is of particular relevance as prior to this study no overarching view of the 
actual implementation of Investment Law No 10 has been attempted. The 
wider economic picture in Syria is then scrutinized to evaluate the overall 
economic situation for investment projects operating under Investment Law 
No. 10. In conclusion, the links between economics and politics in Syria are 
examined in order to establish the actual motives and reasoning of the regime 
in introducing this particular piece of legislation. 
Acknowledgements 
My grateful thanks are due to all those individuals, in the Syrian Arab Republic and 
elsewhere, who gave so freely and willingly of their time during the period of research. 
Due to the nature of the research, it is impossible to single out anyone for individual 
mention, however rest assured that my sincere thanks and thoughts are with you. In the 
United Kingdom, my thanks must go to my supervisor Dr Emma Murphy who with 
patience and good humour criticised, encouraged and guided me through the minefield of 
PhD research. Additional thanks go to Professor Timothy Niblock and Dr Gareth 
Stansfield for unquestioning support and friendship. The research was made possible by a 
grant from the Economic and Social Research Council and I am particularly grateful to Ms 
Jill Maslem of that institution. 
Declaration 
I confirm that no part of the material offered has previously been submitted by me for a 
degree in this or any other university. If material has been generated though joint work, 
my independent contribution has been clearly indicated. In all other cases material from the 
work of others has been acknowledged and quotations and paraphrases suitably indicated. 
Contents 
Acknowledgements 
Contents 
List of Illustrations 
Introduction 
1. The Syrian State 
1.1. 
1.2. 
1.3. 
1.4. 
1.4.1. 
1.4.2. 
1.5. 
1.5.1. 
1.5.2. 
1.5.3. 
1.6. 
Introduction 
Overview 
State Structure 
Class Structure and Power 
Working Class- Rural and Urban 
The Bourgeoisie 
Control and Participation 
Parliament 
Progressive National Front 
Popular Organisations 
Conclusion 
2. Developments in Syria and the Ba'ath 
2.1. Introduction 
2.2. Syrian Politics: Pre Ba'ath 1946-53 
2.3. The Ba'ath in Politics 1954-63 and the UAR 
2.4. The Ba'ath in Power 1963-70 
2.5. Policy and Performance under Assad 1970-80 
2.6. The Years of Crisis and Survival: Syria from 1980-90 
2.7. An Interlude: Syria in 1990-91 
2.8. Ambition or Stagnation: Syria after 1991 
2. 9. Conclusion 
3. Investment Law No 10 
3.1 
3.2. 
3.3. 
3.4. 
3.5. 
3.6. 
3.7. 
3.7.1 
3.7.2 
3.7.3 
3.7.4 
3.7.5 
3.8. 
3.9. 
Introduction 
Background and Introduction of the Law 
Specific Articles of Investment Law No 10 
Application Procedure for a Project under Investment Law No 10 
Achievements of Investment Law No 10 
Implementation of Projects under Investment Law No 10 
Problems within Investment Law No 10 
Project differentiation 
Geographical differentiation 
Limited periods of tax exemption 
Lack of a 'One-Stop Shop' 
Unseen changes and conditionalities 
Conditionalities in Investment Law No 1 0 
Conclusion 
p 1 
p3 
p4 
p 24 
p 25 
p 28 
p 33 
p 37 
p 39 
p44 
p 45 
p 47 
p 51 
p 55 
p 57 
p 58 
p 63 
p 66 
p 74 
p 82 
p 93 
p 95 
p 100 
p 101 
p 102 
p 106 
p 111 
p 114 
p 117 
p 123 
p 125 
p 128 
p 130 
p 131 
p 133 
p 135 
p lM 
4. Overall Factors for Investment in Syria 
4.1. 
4.2. 
4.2.1 
4.2.2 
4.2.3 
4.3 
4.4 
4.4.1 
4.4.2 
4.4.3 
4.5. 
4.6 
4.7 
Introduction 
Political Risk 
Levels of corruption 
Levels of violence 
Interest Groups 
External Factors -Political and Economic 
Economic Risk 
Reform attempts 
Population Growth 
Capital 
Attitude of the Syrian State towards FDI 
Aim of Investment 
Conclusion 
5. Politics and the Economy in Syria 
5.1 
5.2 
5.2.1 
5.2.2 
5.3 
5.3.1 
5.3.2 
5.4 
Introduction 
Economic and Political Background to the Law 
Capital Advantages 
The Economy of Emotions 
The short-term role of Investment Law No. 10 
Ability for Criticism of the Economy 
Support for Investment Law No. 10 within the regime 
Conclusion 
Conclusion 
Appendix 1: The Syrian Cabinet in March 2000 
Appendix 2: Investment Law No.1 0 of 1991 
Appendix 3: Order No.7 and later amendments 
Appendix 4: Executive Instructions No. 6 
Appendix 5: Free Trade Zones in the SAR 
Bibliography 
Interview Subjects 
2 
p 145 
p 146 
p 148 
p 149 
p 151 
p 154 
p 158 
p 162 
p 166 
p 169 
p 172 
p 175 
p 177 
p 179 
p 180 
p 183 
p 187 
p 191 
p 192 
p 196 
p 200 
p 204 
p 217 
p 218 
p 231 
p 254 
p 262 
p 264 
p 272 
Illustrations 
Figure 1: Pre-Reform Distribution of Land Ownership p 67 
Figure 2: Post-Reform Distribution of Land Ownership p 69 
Figure 3: Change in Agrarian Classes 1960-1970 p 70 
Figure 4: Foreign Reserves of Syria 1983-1993 p 89 
Figure 5: GDP in Syria 1983-1990 p 89 
Figure 6: Crude Oil Production in Syria 1983-1991 p 90 
Figure 7: Balance of Trade 1983-1993 p 92 
Figure 8: Governmental Decision-making p 105 
Figure 9: Approval Procedure for Investment Projects p 112 
Figure 10: Project Data for Investment Law No 10 p 114 
Figure 11: Legal Ownership of Investment Projects p 115 
Figure 12: Projects operating under Investment Law No 10 p 117 
Figure 13: Projects approved, but not operating under p 120 
Investment Law No 10 
3 
Introduction 
1. The Ontological Position 
1.1 Economic Operational Reality of Investment Law No. 10 
From the start of the operational work on the thesis it was clear that it 
was necessary to examine the operation of companies under Investment Law 
No. 10, the actual framework of legislation and the execution of legislation in 
the creation of companies operating under the framework of Investment Law 
No. 10, then to examine the opinions of the legislation, experiences of the 
legislation and the overall patterns and frameworks that emerge from the 
operation of the legislation 
1.2 What Represents Evidence? 
Evidence for answering the research question was provided by 
interview data, by external and internal economic data, by primary sources 
inside the Syrian Arab Republic, and secondary academic sources. 
1.3 With Which Topic is the Research Concerned? 
The research is concerned with the actual operation of Investment Law 
No. 10 in Syria and the reasoning behind its introduction. 
1.4 Research Questions 
A series of questions were formulated to provide a framework for the 
development ofthe thesis. 
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1. What was the political-economic situation in Syria at the point 
of introduction of Investment Law No. 1 0? 
2. Why did the regime introduce Investment Law No. 10 at that 
time and in that form? 
3. How has the view of Investment Law No. 10 changed since 
that time among domestic and international investors? 
4. What influence has the political system had on the operation of 
Investment Law No. 1 0? 
5. How did the research question change with the developing 
analysis of the topic over the duration of the thesis ? 
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---------- ---- -- -- --
2. Research Methodology 
2.1 Data Sources and Methods of Data Generation 
Data sources for this project can be split into four areas; individual 
interviews inside and outside Syria, official documents relating to legislation 
and the legislative document itself, private or commercial documentation 
relating to the operation of companies under Investment Law No. 10 and 
academic commentaries on Investment Law No. 10 and the economic 
structure of Syria. The research question could only be answered if a variety 
of sources of evidence were examined. These included interviews with 
Company Managers and Directors of companies operating under Investment 
Law No. 10, the examination of legal and executive documents pertaining to 
Investment Law No.1 0, a critical examination of the legislative measures 
taken by the Syrian government, a series of interviews conducted with those 
affected by the legislation and with those interested in the validity of the 
legislation and overall an analysis of the qualitative and quantitative data 
collected. The particular issues with individual interviews in Syria were that a 
number of interviewees requested anonymity before being interviewed. That 
in itself presented difficulties, as this option had to be given to all 
interviewees if they requested it also. In the case of government employees 
interviewed in an official capacity, anonymity was not an option, nor was it 
expected or requested with interviews taking place outside the Syrian Arab 
Republic. The particular issue interviews raise is that an over-reliance on 
interview material alone could lead to an imbalance regarding the validity of 
the research. To counter that point, the researcher made sure that material was 
clearly identified as originating from an interviewee and that if possible the 
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content of the interview and the information was cross-referenced with 
another interviewee. To facilitate this all interviews followed a pattern of 
questions adhered to in interviews. A exemplar pattern is set out below: 
1. Name of company/ organisation 
2. Sector of operation in Syria 
3. Role of organisation regarding Investment Law No 10 
4. Role of company regarding Investment Law No 10 
5. If company was investing under Investment Law No 10, why had this 
been chosen over any other legislative framework (such as Tourism or 
Agriculture) ? 
6. If company was not investing under Investment Law No 10, why not ? 
7. What advantages or disadvantages had the company experienced with 
regard to Investment Law No 10 ? 
8. What other experiences had the company found particularly difficult or 
easy regarding the investment situation in Syria ? 
9. What had motivated the company to invest in Syria in the first place 
rather than other similar countries such as Egypt or Jordan? 
10. What in the opinion of the interviewee had motivated the Syrian 
government to pass such legislation ? 
11. Would the company have invested in Syria without the legislation 
being in place ? 
The above questions were not necessarily adhered to narrowly in the 
above order. In addition, if the interviewee was a journalist concerned with the 
legislation or a representative of a government agency or academic, the 
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questions were by necessity amended to reflect their particular circumstances 
and situation. The advantage of choosing a semi-structured or flexible 
approach rather than a fully structured or fully unstructured approach to the 
conduct of the interviews was that it allowed a degree of flexibility during the 
conduct of the interviews (in some cases triggering a repeat interview if all 
areas were not covered in the initial interview) and it also allowed a deviation 
from the original pattern if it was deemed appropriate. In all cases however 
the interviewee was questioned at length regarding Investment Law No 10, 
and in particular its operation. The particular concern the researcher had was 
to gather a representative sample of interviews from a wide range as possible 
from all sectors of the Syrian economy. The interview is probably the most 
commonly used tool in social research, but the interviewer was concerned to 
avoid a one-sided approach which could show bias. 1 As the interviews were 
all conducted by one researcher, the additional issue of consistent bias had to 
be addressed.2 In this respect, awareness of the possibility of bias lead the 
researcher to develop deliberately open questions in order to avoid a 'leading' 
question- a particular problem in interviews.3 One example of this approach 
was the deliberate inclusion of the advantages/disadvantages question 
regarding Investment Law No 10. If the interviewee was of the opinion that 
Investment Law No 10 had advantages (if they were the Minister tasked with 
its operation eg) this question allowed a detailed discussion of the merits of 
Investment Law No 10 to develop. If it was a businessman who had decided 
that Investment Law No 10 had too many disadvantages (the Middle East 
1 Researching Society and Culture, ed. Seale C, London 1998, p 203 
2 Doing Your Research Project, Bell J, OUP, Maidenhead 1999, p 139 
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Area Manager of Siemens eg) it allowed an equally detailed discussion of the 
disadvantages to develop. In addition to the actual information content 
received during the interviews themselves, the researcher was eager to discern 
in which areas of questioning interviewees were willing to engage in detailed 
discussion and which areas they possibly wished to avoid. According to 
Pritchard, the interview as a social event in its own right is worthy of 
observation4 and the semi-formal structure of the interviews allowed the 
researcher to adopt the interview according to the reactions of the interviewee 
to particular aspects of the questioning process. As this approach is closer to 
the concept of the 'depth' interview5, this allowed the researcher a greater 
degree of flexibility during the interview itself. The researcher could intensifY 
his questioning on a particular area of interest to the interviewee, or could, 
according to the wishes of the interviewee, discuss different aspects of 
Investment Law No 10. The advantages of this approach are obvious; 
An interview is a complicated, shifting social process occurring 
between two individual human beings, which can never be exactly replicated. 
There cannot be definite rules about the use of open-ended questions, leading 
and loaded questions, disagreements with respondents and so on [ ... ] What is 
crucial is that researchers choose their actions with a self-conscious awareness 
of why they are making them.6 
The way in which the interviewee provided the information (or not) 
could also provide information. A reluctance on the part of an interviewee to 
discuss a particularly sensitive area of Investment Law No 10 could manifest 
itself in tone of voice, facial expression or hesitation that written responses to 
a questionnaire would simply conceal. A response in a semi-structured 
3 Doing Your Research Project, Bell J, OUP, Maidenhead 1999, p 140 
4 Researching Society and Culture, ed. Seale C, London 1998, p 204 
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interview (unlike a questionnaire response) can be further developed and 
clarified whilst the researcher had to avoid alienating or antagonizing the 
interviewee by insisting on continuing a line of questioning the interviewee 
was reluctant to continue. 
Selection of the 35 interviewees was made on the basis of the criteria 
that all sides relevant to the issue needed to be interviewed. This meant that 
the SBI themselves, Syrian private investors, foreign investors both in Syria 
and abroad, academic observers in Syria, political representatives, and 
interested foreign observers all needed to be contacted in order to ascertain 
whether they wished to be interviewed. The format took the form of an 
introductory letter stating the aim of the research, and setting out a proposed 
interview time and date. Interviews were generally conducted at the 
interviewee's workplace, although in some cases the interviewee suggested an 
alternative venue. 
Access to interviewees was granted in the vast majority of cases 
without difficulty. A number of Syrian officials were eager to discuss the 
operation of the Investment Law in detail and in depth. A number of private 
investors in Syria set parameters of confidentiality. To ensure the sample of 
interviews was representative the researcher secured interviews with all of the 
parties involved in the operation of the Investment Law (in particular the 
ministry and agencies charged with the operation of the Law) as well as with a 
cross sample of foreign and Syrian investors in Syria. This cross sample was 
5 Researching Society and Culture, ed. Seale C, London 1998, p 205 
6 Researching Society and Culture, ed. Seale C, London 1998, p 206 
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constricted by virtue of the fact that only a small group of foreign investors 
were operational in Syria under Investment Law No 10. To gain access to the 
larger group of Syrian investors operating under Investment Law No 10, the 
researcher concentrated on the areas of tourism, pharmaceutical products, and 
apparel. 
The languages the interviews were conducted in were English, French 
and German. In one case an interview was conducted in Arabic with the 
assistance of a translator from the British Embassy in Damascus. 
2.2 What Information Can These Sources Provide? 
These sources can provide personal and subjective assessments of the 
impact of Investment Law No. 10, the formal and official frameworks for 
legislation as a basis for interpretation i.e. how the law should work and what 
its aims should be, anecdotal evidence and specific examples of operational 
realities of Investment Law No. 10, and an overview and discussion of the 
Syrian economy and its political interface. They can also provide a wider 
interpretation of the economic situation in Syria according to the individuals 
most concerned with the operation of the law. 
2.3 Type of Research Methodology 
As the instruments used to assess the validity and operation of 
Investment Law No 1 0 are essentially that of economic risk assessment, the 
thesis is essentially that of a standard economic assessment rather than a 
political economy assessment. 
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3. General Remarks 
After decades of indifference from 1991 onwards Syria began to 
appear on the list of possible countries for Western investors. The Syrian 
government under President Hafez al-Assad had passed Investment Law No. 
10, apparently allowing a certain degree of economic freedom. Private 
investors, both Syrian and foreign, were allowed to begin to invest in a 
number of previously state-controlled economic sectors. The official aim of 
the Syrian Arab Republic in introducing Investment Law No. 10 was to 
encourage investment in "economic and social development projects"7. Many 
foreign and domestic observers began to view Syria as a worthwhile, or at 
least interesting, area for consideration and saw the apparent opening-up of 
the economy as a first step towards further reforms within the Syrian 
economy. Indeed, Syria, according to a number of foreign sources as late as 
1996 "has been going through a period of cautious, but continuous economic 
reform"8• Syria was seen as being able to "further modernise its economy 
[ .... ], liberalise foreign exchange regulations and fulfil its repayment 
obligations towards its Western creditors"9, following the current path of 
reform. The view of Western analysts of the infitah or 'opening process' that 
had begun in 1986 and culminated in 1991 with Investment Law No. 10, was 
that this was the beginning of a gradual and incremental reform process which 
would ultimately lead to further economic liberalisation and 
7SAR, Investment Law No. 10, article 3 
8 Bankgesellschaft Berlin, Country Report Syria, March 1996, p. 19 
9 Bankgesellschaft Berlin, Country Report Syria, March 1996, p. 19 
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commercialisation of the Syrian economy, culminating in the establishment of 
a fundamentally open, free-market economy. Commentators outside Syria 
were overwhelmingly positive about the direction events were taking. Opinion 
in the media was initially very optimistic: "Syrian business makes a 
comeback"10, as "applications for foreign investment flow into the Prime 
Minister's office" 11 - typical comments from financial journalists. In 
academia, reactions were more measured but authorities such as Hopfinger 
and Boekler asserted that "Syria is de facto exchanging the model of a 
centrally planned economy for that of a free market." 12 With Investment Law 
No. 10, the Syrian government had apparently given the signal for the country 
to follow a new path of pragmatic, cautious development, moving towards 
liberalisation throughout the 1990's. Heydemann in particular argued that 
Syria's policy of economic reform had been an "implicit stabilisation 
package" 13 , allowing Hafez al-Assad to take political considerations into 
account when deliberating on a course of action for Syria into the 1990's and 
beyond, without the necessity of recourse to the International Monetary Fund 
or the World Bank. In 1988 Lawson had already identified three stages of 
development in Syria, firstly the relaxation of state control between 1969-
1981; secondly the reassertion of central direction between 1981-1985, and 
thirdly controlled liberalisation between 1985-1987. 14 Although Lawson's 
10 MEED, 20 May 1994 
11 Marlowe, L, Freer Economy Pays Syria Bid Dividends: The flow of investment that has 
followed reform, Financial Times 5 November 1992 
12 Hopfinger H and Bokler M, Step by Step to an Open Economic System: Syria sets a course 
for Liberalization, in British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies (1996) 23 (2) p. 183 
13 Heydemann, S, The Political Logic of Economic Rationality: Selective Stabilisation in 
Syria in Barkey, H ( ed), The Politics of Economic Reform in the Middle East ,New York, St 
Martins Press 1992, p. 17 
14 Lawson, F, Political-Economic Trends in Ba 'athist Syria: a re-interpretation, in Orient, 
Vol29, No 4, December 1988, pp. 579 
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article predated Investment Law No. 10, most observers in 1991 agreed that 
the new legislation seemed to fit his assessment of a gradualist approach 
towards liberalisation. Coverage of Syria by international economic observers 
seemed initially optimistic15 and prompted a wave of interest amongst 
academics. 16 Foreign investment was supposed to solve Syria's acute foreign-
exchange crisis of the early 1990's by encouraging the influx of foreign 
capital to the domestic economy. The official intention of Syria in introducing 
Investment Law No. 10 was to attempt to tap into the large funds available to 
the expatriate Syrian community abroad and encourage these funds to be 
invested in Syria. 17 However, in plain language, this gradualist approach has 
simply not materialised. A decade after the introduction of Investment Law 
No 10, no other major changes in the legal, economic or financial structure of 
the Syrian economy have occurred. The only further liberalisation measures 
that the government has since undertaken have been the gradual economic 
rapprochement with the European Union, the implementation of a number of 
minor amendments to Investment Law No. 10, and the continual tweaking of 
the official exchange rates. Although "Investment Law No. 10 of 1991 did 
succeed in attracting increased flows of private Syrian funds from abroad in 
the first halfofthe 1990's" 18, it nevertheless seems to have fallen short ofthe 
high expectations with which its arrival was greeted in 1991. Moreover, it 
15 MEED 20 May 1994 
16 Polling, S., Investment Lmv No 10: Which Future for the Private Sector ? in Kienle, E., 
Contemporary Syria , London, British Academic Press, 1994. See also Hinnebush, R., Syria: 
The politics of economic liberalization, in Third World Quarterly, Vol 18, No 2 (1997), pp 
249-265, and Hopfinger, H. and Bockler, M., Step by Step to an Open Economic System: 
Syria sets a course for Liberalization, in British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies (1996) 23 
(2) pp 183-202 
17 Interview 8, Damascus, 13th March 1998 
18 David Butter, Syria turns over a new leaf, MEED 5 September 1997, p 4 
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"has become painfully apparent that the economic system is not geared up to 
sustain any serious private investment programme."19 Generally, attracting 
foreign or expatriate private investment is accepted to be only one of a series 
of inter-related measures in a policy of economic liberalisation. To sustain a 
sufficient and adequate level of private investment, further steps beyond an 
Investment Law must be taken. An Investment Law by itself is not sufficient 
to attract long-term and sustained investment. Nevertheless, the Syrian 
government seemed to assume that Investment Law No. 10 was indeed 
enough to attract investors. Syria was apparently following a course of 
extreme caution (perhaps understandably) given the painful example of the 
Russian Federation from 1991. The expectation and impression of foreign 
commentators was that Investment Law No. 10 marked the first step in a 
carefully-thought-out plan to liberalise the economy and to bring Syria into 
the mainstream of developing liberalising economies. This however does not 
seem to have occurred. 
19 David Butter, Syria turns over a new leaf, MEED 5 September 1997, p 4 
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4. Unique Features 
A number of unique features distinguish the Syrian Arab Republic 
from other economies in transition. These features should be considered when 
trying to formulate an opinion of the achievements of Syria during this period. 
The usual sources of economic data and knowledge are economic figures 
covering the various aspects of an economy. When examining the Syrian case 
these figures have to be treated with caution at best, and in extremis 
disregarded. The Syrian economy is split along a basic faultline - the official 
economy and the black (or unofficial) one. Reliable sources within Syria put 
the size of the black economy at least 30% of the official one. Unemployment 
figures, inflation figures, GDP, growth estimates and other figures from 
official Syrian sources are unreliable and often bear no relation to economic 
reality. Figures from international organizations such as the World Bank are 
frequently no more reliable, as they are often based on the statistics produced 
and supplied by the Syrian authorities themselves. Economic forecasting, at 
best an inexact science, is thus reduced to the level of guesswork. A number 
of scholars, both Syrian and foreign, have drawn attention to the fact that 
Syrian statistical data, as published by Syria's Central Bureau of Statistics 
(CBS), and that of various Ministries and Government Agencies, are often 
inaccurate, sometimes contradictory, incomplete, or retrospectively corrected 
or amended. The comparative lack of data of course reflects reality. For 
example, there can be no official or real data on smuggling between Syria and 
Lebanon, and if smuggling is extensive, then the official figures for foreign 
trade will not reflect the true picture. Lack of data in such a particular case 
will by necessity then reflect a particular problem rather than constitute one 
16 
and from the lack of data certain inferences can then be drawn. Data on social 
developments within Syria are particularly patchy and weak. Agricultural 
census data and official statistics on employment do not represent an accurate 
picture of the rural and urban situation. There is no accurate data on the 
distribution of wealth, income or the taxation situation. The issue of the lack 
of accurate data should not however lead to the assumption that no relevant 
statements concerning Syria's development or situation can be attempted. 
The assumption that if more figures and data were available, a deeper 
and more accurate understanding of the Syrian economy could be achieved 
represents a too simplistic belief in statistical figures. Statistical data can help 
us interpret social, political and economic realities, but they cannot fully 
represent or explain societal processes. It has to be emphasized that all 
available data has to be handled with care. This includes data from 
international sources including World Bank and IMF figures, as well as data 
from private commercial sources. An additional issue worth bearing in mind 
when assessing the value of official Syrian data, in particular when it reflects 
apparent achievements of the regime, is the simple fact that economic research 
in Syria is directly linked to politics. The ruling regime under first President 
Hafez al-Assad and his successor Bashar al-Assad is all-pervasive and exerts 
pressure in all areas of life, including the economic one. The actual constraints 
on private investment within Syria are extremely complex and difficult to 
determine. The limits on the bureaucracy's ability to determine the outcome of 
foreign investment plans or proposals are not clearly defined at all and are 
often subjectively interpreted in favour of the status quo. Independent control 
17 
of the bureaucracy by an independent authority is impossible and impractical, 
whilst internal controls are non-existent. Given the fact that the state apparatus 
is guarding its status quo, the question of private investment must be treated 
with caution. Investment by the private sector is not omnipresent, in fact it is 
confined to those areas where the state system is not present. State-controlled 
firms do not compete on an equal basis with private firms; rather they 
continue to inhabit a monopolistic position within the state economic 
structure. In addition, in areas where private firms do operate, the majority are 
owned by individuals with close political/economic interests in the state 
system, and thus with a disincentive 'to support wholesale reforms20. There are 
some notable exceptions, in particular the long-established Sunni trading 
families (although most of these have also developed a useful modus vivendi 
with the regime). Privatization of state firms or the creation of shareholder 
companies (as practiced in the Russian Federation since 1991) are still out of 
the question. The government intends to continue to control the "commanding 
heights of the economy"21 ; and to allow the private sector to operate within 
the strict frameworks of the state's choosing. The reduction of the 
involvement of the state in economic affairs can be ruled out for the 
foreseeable future. The policy of the government is to continue to control the 
strategic areas of the economy, whilst allowing the private sector a limited 
amount of room to manoeuvre within clearly defined parameters. In this sense, 
a problematical and instable economic status quo is achieved and the amount 
of flexible forward planning can be considered negligible. The question of 
20 One example is Riyad Seif, owner of an Adidas manufacturing company under licence, yet 
at the same time a member of the People's Assembly. 
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economic priorities is a delicate one, and obviously one that carries with it a 
great deal of political interpretation, but it is fair to say that "the economy is 
about fourth on the list of the govemments' priorities at the moment".22 Part 
of the problem is the almost obsessive control the regime exerts over the 
economic sphere, let alone the political area. Criticism of govemment 
economic policy is allowed within clearly understood limits but criticism of 
the regime's (as opposed to govemment's) economic direction is 
automatically seen as putative political criticism. This can be attributed to a 
mentality carried over from the socialist ideology of the Ba'ath Party, in 
which economic policy is not seen as a way of increasing the prosperity of the 
state and its population, but is seen as a tool to further the political interests of 
the regime. If the regime is serious about reform, then legislation since 1986 
should have shown a concerted and determined drive towards a 
comprehensive package aimed at opening up the economy. But if the economy 
is a low priority, then the regime would naturally prefer incremental change 
and a slow controlled transition to a market economy. 
Paradoxically, the authoritarian nature and the stability of the regime, 
the absence of a critical political opposition and a stable non-political 
structure can be positive attractions for investors. However to attract 
substantial investment, more drastic economic reforms are needed, but 
economic reforms that drive Syria towards an open economic structure will 
increase the pressure on the disadvantaged and poor in Syrian society. This in 
21 Hafez al-Assad, Speech to the Popular Congress of the Ba'ath Party, 1996 
22 Interview 1, Damascus 1Oth May 1998 
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turn will widen the wealth gap already evident in Syria23 and could lead to the 
re-emergence of a viable political opposition. Even if Syrians are disenchanted 
with the current state of affairs and their political leadership, it could be said 
that it is "better the devil you know"24 if they look to examples of recent 
internecine conflict (the former Yugoslavia or, much closer to home, the 
Lebanon civil war) arising out of allowing minority groups to express 
ideologies deviating from the norm. In addition, the civil war in Algeria and 
the continuing conflict m other Arab nations send clear signals to the 
disenchanted of Syria m that despite struggling with the regtme, the 
alternative of Islamic opposition parties or parties based along overtly 
sectarian lines are not attractive scenarios either. The regime is thus faced 
with the welcome prospect of having no concerted opposition group to 
contend with. The only real organized resistance within Syria came from the 
Muslim Brotherhood, which was crushed effectively in Hama in 1982. The 
regime is reasonably secure for the foreseeable future in terms of control and 
containment of unrest. The current economic situation for Syrians remains 
acute and difficult, in particular with the added uncertainty of a relatively 
young and inexperienced President, with the prospects for future prosperity 
and advancement uncertain. 
23 Interview 3, Damascus 17th February 1998: "The society is corrupt, Damascus is ridden 
with suspicion and people like us go hungry, whilst the government spends the people's oil 
wealth." 
24 Interview 2, Damascus 30th January 1998 
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5. The Aim of the Research 
The aim of this thesis is to examine the economic situation in Syria 
during the 1980's and 1990's and to assess the reasoning behind the 
introduction of Investment Law No. 10. 
The aim of the research into Investment Law No. 10 is as follows: 
to assertain whether Investment Law No. 10 was essentially an attempt to 
assuage and pacify elements of the Syrian military and economic structure 
close to the President (in particular those tribal networks of Alawi origin and 
the wider family structures of the leading elite; in particular the second 
generation) and to examine critically the still commonly held international 
assumption that Investment Law No. 10 was the first step in the liberalisation 
of the Syrian economy; to thus put forward the argument that the enactment of 
Investment Law No. 10 was not a long-term economic strategy to attract 
external investment but in contrast a short-term expedient initiated by specific 
interest groups within the regime. These subgroups will be shown to have 
been motivated by the need to legitimise their foreign business interests. 
This thesis will postulate that the limited economic liberalisation effects of 
Investment Law No.1 0 are merely a side benefit to regime supporters within 
the Syrian economy who were able to extend their business interests and were 
therefore able and willing to provide increased support for the regime. 
Finally, the actual motives of the regime in Syria had to be examined and 
established in order to understand why this particular legislation was 
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introduced at this particular time. The hypothesis of this thesis provides a 
diametrically opposed argument to the general western view of Investment 
Law No. 10 as an initial step in a programme of economic liberalisation in the 
Syrian Arab Republic. 
This thesis is therefore divided into the following sections: Chapter 
One deals with the theoretical background to the economic and political 
composition of the current Syrian state in order to place Investment Law No. 
10 within an economic and political framework. Chapter Two offers a concise 
overview of internal political and economic development in Syria from 1953 
to 1991 in order to provide a historical background to the political and 
economic situation that existed at the point of Investment Law No. 10 being 
introduced. Chapter Three follows on from this in addressing the 
implementation of Investment Law No. 10 itself, including its actual 
introduction, the workings of the various bodies set up as a result of the 
legislation, and the experiences of various parties operating within the 
boundaries of the legislation. Chapter Four deals with the broader economic 
framework and outlook for the Syrian economy, taking into consideration both 
internal and external factors. In conclusion, Chapter 5 examines the links 
between politics and the economy regarding Investment Law No 10 and offers 
an assessment of the efficiency and effectiveness of the legislation, as well as 
a considered insight into the motives behind its introduction. 
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This study relies both on scholarly literature on Syria, and as much as 
possible on primary source material from the country. These include 
newspapers and pamphlets, commentaries and legislative documents, 
published and unpublished statistical material and a series of interviews 
conducted with politicians, officials, unionists, workers, investors, managers 
and a number of other individuals, conducted over the period October 1995 to 
June 1998. As a rule, the statistics and the data supplied in this project 
analysis should be regarded as representing approximate values and as 
representing tendencies, rather than absolute values. Where possible official 
Syrian figures have been cross-checked with international data or data from 
other sources, however this (as shown above) is not a guarantee of absolute 
accuracy. The system of transliteration in this study follows the format used 
by the International Journal of Middle East Studies. Well-known personal 
names are presented as they generally appear in English usage. 
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Chapter One: The Syrian State 
1.1. Introduction 
The composition of the Syrian state is of utmost importance in trying to 
ascertain the reasons for the introduction of Investment Law No 10. To be able to 
make an informed judgement on the actual motivation of the regime in introducing 
the legislation, we first need to examine the relationship of the various power 
structures within the Syrian state to each other. This first chapter will therefore focus 
on a structural analysis of the economic, social and political system of Syria. This 
approach will reflect the notion that these aspects are mutually interdependent and in 
principle are equally important for an understanding of the socio-economic and 
political dynamics of Syria. 
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1.2. Overview 
Syrian political and economic structures have undergone tremendous changes 
smce 1963, the year the Ba'ath Party came to power, and in particular since the 
assumption of power by the Correctionist Movement under Hafez al-Assad in 1970. 
The reality of Syria in the 1990's can hardly be grasped utilising the categories and 
concepts prevalent for the pre-Ba'athist or even early Ba'athist period. Syria is no 
longer the basically rural country, ruled by a small elite of landowners that it was after 
independence. There is no longer a 'struggle for Syria' between political opponents as 
there was in the turbulent 1950's 1, nor does Syria exhibit the characteristics of the 
unstable political system it had during the first years of the Ba'ath Party rule (until 
1970). It has over the years evolved into a system of considerable stability and 
complexity. This chapter will attempt to address and define the current interpretations 
of these complex political and economic structures within contemporary Syria. The 
study of Syria and its political changes offers an example of a political entity in which 
external political influences have certainly had some effect upon domestic policy 
considerations. Although policy and political changes within Syria have to be viewed 
as primarily resulting from the interaction of internal forces within the state, rather 
than arising directly from international actors or events, the changing international 
environment, in particular the Arab-Israeli Peace Process and the collapse of the 
Soviet Union, has no doubt had a major influence on the economic and political 
environment of Syria. The influence of these external factors however should not be 
over-estimated, and oversimplifications which directly link Syria's economic changes 
since 1991 to a changing international and regional environment without the 
1 V.Perthes, Political Economy of Syria Under Assad, London 1997, pI 
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involvement of other factors should be avoided.2 That is not to imply that Syria is 
immune to the political and economic influence of the outside world, but it is clear 
that changes during the decade under discussion have been driven by domestic 
considerations as well as international ones. International economic considerations 
however have formed a part only of the motivating factors behind the introduction of 
new legislation. However there has been less direct foreign influence over the reform 
process itself than in comparable countries. The relative independence of Syria's 
supposed reform program from external forces has even lead Lawson in turn to doubt 
the validity of the explanations for Egypt's infitah simply in terms of external 
pressure.3 This perceived independence is certainly a simplification of the Syrian 
case, just as the purely external pressure argument might be an over-generalization of 
the Egyptian case. To stay with the Egyptian case for a moment, the pressure 
international actors, in particular the World Bank and IMF have exerted upon 
Egyptian policy-makers to adjust their country's economic policy in line with World 
Bank and IMF policy is well documented.4 The absence of similar pressure on Syrian 
policy-makers points to the singularity of the Syrian example, given the fact that 
otherwise Syria shares many socio-economic and political characteristics with other 
similar states in the region. A high level of political independence in the decision-
making process also applies to other policy fields apart from the purely economic one. 
The absence of any substantive foreign interference has allowed the Syrian regime to 
carry out small incremental changes to the economic structure and, whilst 
2 Examples are; F. Chipaux, Attendant des progres dans les negociations avec Israel: La Syrie a 
amorce une timide liberalisation, Le Monde, 3 March 1993, W.E. Schmidt, In a Region full ofwar, 
Syrians think of peace, International Herald Tribune, 28 June 1993 
3 F.Lawson, External versus Internal Pressures for Liberalization in Syria and Iraq, Journal of Arab 
Affairs, Vol 11 (1992), no I, p 31 
4 see for example R. Springborg, Mubarak's Egypt: Fragmentation of the Political Order, Boulder, 
Westview Press, 1989 
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implementing a policy of economic adjustments and changes, Syria's rulers have been 
able to maintain a tight grip on the levers of political power. Syria's high level of 
independence has led - to the surprise of many foreign observers - to the regime 
surviving dramatic changes in the international environment, including the loss of her 
foremost former foreign ally, the Soviet Union, periods of acute regional isolation, 
and severe economic crisis. It can therefore be argued that the motivation for 
introducing Investment Law No 10 arose primarily from domestic considerations and 
only secondary from international events. Of course the economic and social 
condition of the Syrian state was subject to external influences, in particular the state 
ofthe oil economies and the issue of regional and international stability. 
27 
L3. §tate §tnnctmre 
The Syrian state is often quoted as an almost classic example of an 
autocratic/populist state and this concept is well-established in the literature. Van 
Dam, Ma'oz, Kienle, Perthes, Hinnebush and Polling5, amongst others, have all 
contributed to the debate, but the overall and consensual view of the political 
framework of Syria is that it shows all the hallmarks of being a authoritarian/populist 
state, although the basis of authority is disputed.6 Following Hinnebush's classic 
definition, there are two main characteristics which define and distinguish an 
authoritarian/populist state: 
a) the establishment of an authoritarian/populist regime and, in order to consolidate 
the new political order, a populist revolution from above incorporating the 
development of traditionalist Leninist political structures incorporating and eo-opting 
the rural population, and 
b) the consolidation of a semi-patrimonial regime via the emergence of a dominant 
leader figure, using a mixture of kin and client networks to control and exert power.7 
In effect this produces a presidential-style quasi-monarchy controlling the 
military apparatus, the political system and the bureaucratic structure of the state. 
Authoritarian/populist government implies following a populist line in opposing 
5 see for example R.A. Hinnebush, Authoritarian Power and State Formation in Ba'athist Syria, 
Westview Press, Oxford, 1990, E.Kienle (ed), Contemporary Syria, British Academic Press, London, 
1994, M.Ma'oz & A.Yaniv (eds), Syria under Asad:Domestic Constraints and Regional Risks, Croon 
Helm, London, 1986, V.Perthes, The Political Economy of Syria under Asad, I.B.Tauris, London, 1995 
6 Olson and Pipes see the basis of power in Syria rooted in the traditional clan-based system of the 
Alawi, whilst Hinnebush has argued that the regime has been able to develop other, broader forms of 
support. R.W.Oison, The Ba'ath and Syria: 1947-1982, Kingston Press, New Jersey, 1982, D.Pipes, 
The Alawi Capture of Power in Syria, Middle East Studies, Vol 25, No 4, 1989, R.A. Hinnebush, 
op.Cit. 
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previously dominant societal groups and developing a structure to orgamse and 
channel the support of previously disadvantaged social groups. This in turn results in 
the creation of a Leninist-type single-party political system and the emergence of a 
mixed militaristic/political state formed and influenced by its populist roots. The 
regime in question then has to further develop its own political organisation to eo-opt 
the existing institutions of the state and then to establish a degree of mass support 
within the existing structures and social classes. In maturity the system will enter a 
more conservative, post-populist phase where the ruling elite will attempt to seek a 
measure of accommodation with the previous social elite and might adopt limited 
liberalisation measures to re-open political access for the previously dominant 
classes.8 The combination of a radical coup by the Ba'athist Party in 1963, in the 
aforementioned sense a revolution from above, and a degree of popular revolt from 
below in Syria can be seen as a typical road towards the establishment of such a 
regime. However, to survive, the regime must go beyond the simple attainment of 
power and must establish further durable avenues of legitimation. Legitimation in turn 
is however essentially the consent (either explicit or implied) of the population or 
sectors of it. This consent, as Hinnebush has argued, can be achieved in various ways: 
via personal or primordial loyalties to the leadership; via the ideology of the political 
party; or via the imposition of bureaucratic legality.9 The second approach, utilising 
ideology as a means of gaining legitimacy is one which necessitates the establishment 
of avenues of popular participation in order for the population to take part in the 
political process in accordance with the populist slogans of the Party. Taking the step 
7 R.A. Hinnebush, Authoritarian Power and State Formation in Ba'athist Svria, Westview Press, 
Oxford, 1990, p ix 
8 ibid, p 14 
9 ibid, p 9 
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towards bureaucratic control of the state, single political party dominance in both 
practice and ideology is thus the key to consolidation of power, as the Party is the 
only vehicle suitable for maintaining ideological cohesion within the elite. And it is 
also the only instrument capable of achieving mass mobilisation and control of the 
state based on ideology. 10 If Syria can be cast as an authoritarian/populist state, then 
the growth and development of the Ba'ath Party in Syria will by necessity be mirrored 
by the growth and development of instruments of mass mobilisation and participation. 
This theory has been clearly supported in practice by the political development of the 
peasantry and rural population in the Syrian countryside. Olson has described the 
'Ba'ath tendency to rely most heavily on the development of a rural support base' 11 
and further has correctly described the traditional policy of the Ba'ath Party as being 
'aimed at bolstering the small and middle peasants in order to increase their 
independence[ ... ] with the aim of forging them into a firm base ofregime support.' 12 
Historically, Ba'ath Party and Peasant Union branches were introduced unequally 
across Syria, and Olson persuasively argues that this introduction came first to areas 
where the second land reform of 1964 (after 1958) had been successful in order to 
make sure that the newly enfranchised peasantry would accept these new structures of 
political mobilisation and political control without dissent. 13 Ba'ath Party branches 
and cells formed the national structure of the Party, reaching from local village or 
neighbourhood level up through regional associations to provincial administrations 
and then to the national command of the Ba'ath Party in Damascus. The Peasants 
Union (the General Federation of Peasants)14 is formally an independent body (but in 
10 ibid, p 12 
11 R.W. Olson, The Ba'ath and Syria 1947-1982, Kingston Press, New Jersey 1982, p 51-52 
12 ibid, p 53 
13 ibid, p 58 
14 ibid, p 58 
30 
-------- ----
reality is controlled by the state, concemmg itself with the facilitation of credit 
arrangements, seeds, the supply of fertiliser etc.) and serves as a politicising agent for 
those of the rural population who are not Ba'ath Party members. Hinnebush raises the 
interesting point in his discussion of the Peasants Union that although the strict 
ideological framework does limit the political relevance and topicality of any debate 
held under its auspices, these local rural groups do nevertheless constitute an avenue 
for members to air their views, and that these meetings and councils constitute a form 
of political debate that has direct influence on the decisions of the leadership. These 
decisions can then be scrutinised at local command level and if needed can be 
criticised and amended again. 15 Olson, in contrast, sees these institutions rather as a 
form of mass participation welcomed as long as the local imput remains on a factual 
rather than ideologicallevel. 16 This degree of difference in opinion does not however 
distract from the fact that a semi-populist framework in the Ba'ath Party and Peasant 
Union structures does exist and is utilised by the regime to maintain and supply a high 
measure of support. In terms of the rural political structure then, Syria certainly 
fulfils the requirements of an authoritarian state structure with a degree of populism 
attached. 
This political structure is mirrored to a certain degree in the political structure 
and command functions in the urban areas of Syria as well. Personal or tribal loyalty 
ties also play a role in the establishment of consent, as does the gradual imposition of 
bureaucratic legality. 17 However, the party machine remains in theory the most 
important avenue towards the retention and expansion of power. Single party control 
15 R.A. Hinnebush, op. Cit., p 205 
16 R.W. Olson, op. Cit., p 58 
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in both ideology and practical execution (or in the case of Syria, the control of the 
National Popular Front - a grouping of proxy parties under the control of the Ba'ath) 
has thus been the real key to the retention of power by the Ba' ath in Syria. On the one 
hand the Ba'ath was the only available method of maintaining a 'revolutionary 
cohesion' within the elite, and on the other hand the Ba'ath was also the only political 
instrument capable of achieving mass mobilisation and maintaining ideological 
control over the Syrian population. 18 Tribal and personal loyalties by themselves 
would have simply not been powerful enough to maintain the level of control 
necessary, although Pipes has argued that the structure of the Syrian state is simply a 
means for the sectarian domination of Syria by the Alawi - Assad's tribal group -
disregarding the above formalised avenues of control completely and stressing the use 
of traditional personal/tribal loyalties within and outside the formal Party structure as 
a means of popular (tribal) influence. 19 This argumentation should not be seen as 
monocausal however. It should be noted that elements of ideology, tribal and personal 
loyalties and bureaucratic legitimacy all play a part in legitimising the Syrian regime. 
17 R.A. Hinnebush, op. Cit., p 9 
18 R.A. Hinnebush, op. Cit., p 12 
19 D.Pipes, The Alawi Capture of Power in Syria, MES, vol 25, no 4 (1989) 
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1.4. Class Structure and Power 
It is now generally accepted in the relevant literature that the concept of social 
classes is a necessary one to study the social structures of the Arab world.20 Models 
that deny or relegate the existence of classes and the importance of class conflict as an 
element in historical development would be unsuitable in understanding the social 
reality and internal dynamics of Syria, although terms used to describe class conflicts 
in Europe may well have to be re-defined in a Syrian context.21 As essentially 
economically related variables, classes are defined by labour and property relations. 
However, in Arab societies in particular, non-class variables also play a role in 
placing an individual in a particular area of influence within society. These can 
include the individual's family status, occupation, regional, tribal or confessional 
affiliations, which all play a part in determining to what extent an individual will be 
able to have access to political power, and to what extent the individual will be able to 
exercise influence.22 These additional variables giving possible access to influence or 
power are not class-based variables with formal horizontal structures making up the 
traditional layers of a class-based society. They are instead vertical formations or 
groupings which can be present in all classes of society and cut acoss class barriers. 
Bill and Springborg have argued that these groups, 
"dominate the vertical dimension of stratification as family, friendship, ethnic, 
religious, professional, recreational and political groups and cliques exist in a state of 
continual interaction. "23 
20 S.K.Farsoun & L.Hajjar, The Contemporary Sociology of the Middle East, in H.Sharabi (ed), 
Theory, Politics and the Arab World- Critical Responses, London, Routledge, 1990 
21 The term 'proletariat' e.g., used without further definition and applied to the Syrian working class 
could be inaccurate, as its European meaning would imply that the members of this class do not own 
any property at all. ln the Syrian case this could very well be incorrect. 
22 V. Perthes, The Political Economy of Syria under Assad, London, lB Tauris, p 10 
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These various vertical groups in turn can be distinguished from one another by 
their categories, that of formal and informal groups.24 Bill and Springborg have 
clearly set out the differences between these groupings25 which in the case of formal 
groups can range from trade unions or political parties to military units. Informal 
groups by contrast can include kith and kinship groups as well as cliques or factions 
within formal groups themselves.26 They have argued convincingly that the dominant 
societal structure in the Arab World has been the informal group. 27 Geertz in turn has 
succinctly condensed it as follows: 
"Structure after structure - family, village, clan, class, sect, army, party, elite, 
state - turns out when more narrowly looked at to be an ad hoc constellation of 
miniature systems of power, a cloud of unstable micropolitics, which compete, ally, 
gather strength, and very soon overextended, fragment again."28 
Owen has raised the important issue that in authoritarian societies, informal 
groups need to be either controlled or assimilated by the regime using personal, ethnic 
or group affiliations29 , whilst organised groups in existence at the time the regime 
takes power need to be either destroyed or taken over. 30 
The analysis of these fragmented class and group structures in Arab societies 
in particular is further complicated by the fact that pre-capitalist forms of production 
continue to exist alongside capitalist and socialist ones, and it is indeed far from clear 
that these pre-capitalist forms will be replaced by purely capitalist ones as these 
23 J .A.Bill & R.Springborg, Politics in the Middle East, HarperCollins, New York, 1994, p 84 
24 ibid, p 85 
25 ibid, p 86 
26 ibid, p 86 
27 ibid, p 88 
28 C. Geertz, In Search of North Africa, New York Review of Books 16, 1971, p 20 
29 R.Owen, State, Power & Politics in the Making of the Modern Middle East, Routledge, London, 
1992, p 38 
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societies develop. As an example, individual members of the same family group can 
very well work in the civil service, run a smallholding on the outskirts of a city, 
moonlight as taxi-drivers and collect rent from owned land. In these cases you simply 
cannot use the definition of Western class, although a vertical informal group analysis 
based on a family group will accurately describe the situation. In particular, it has 
been difficult for scholars working on states like Syria, Iraq or Libya, who have all 
followed state-capitalist development paths initiated by particular group-based elites 
of rural or lower middle class origin, to define a new ruling class. During the 1960's 
and 1970's, the concept of a developing petite bourgeoisie was prevalent in the 
literature.31 However, in recent years the term 'bureaucratic bourgeoisie' has become 
more widespread. This concept, although debatable32 , mirrors the establishment of a 
ruling elite, controlling the means of coercion and a major part of the means of 
production in interventionist or state-capitalist developing countries. This elite cannot, 
however, simply be explained as a bureaucratic elite governing simply for the good of 
the state. 33 Whatever the character of this emerging state bourgeoisie, it seems clear 
that in Syria, as elsewhere in the region, the specific socio-economic and political 
interests of the ruling group have shaped the direction of the economic development 
of the state. To understand the motives behind economic policy in Syria, we also need 
to examine the interests of this group and its interaction with other social strata in 
Syria. It would be reasonable to assume that this interaction would include attempts 
by the ruling group to influence, pre-empt or encompass other societal groups within 
30 ibid,_p 38 
31 see in particular M. Halpern, The Politics of Social Change in the Middle East and North Africa, 
Princeton, PUP, 1963, pp 51-78 
32 J. Waterbury, Twilight of the State Bourgeoisie?, IJMES, Vol23 (1991), pp 1-17 
33 Hinnebush in particular, although avoiding an idealisation of the Syrian elite, does seem to view their 
activities as driven by reasons of state rather than their own social interests. See in particular R.A. 
Hinnebush, op.Cit., p 324 
35 
Syria. However Syria traditionally has been a comparatively closed society since the 
assumption of power by the Ba'ath Party in 1963, and this, combined with the 
traditional polarisation of the Middle East along East-West lines had led Western 
analysts, and in particular economic analysts and commentators, to write off Syria as 
difficult and unknown territory. This was aggravated by the fact that the Syrian 
government itself was at times unwilling to offer any assistance to researchers and 
indeed was very reluctant to supply imperial data useful to a deeper political analysis 
of the Ba'ath Party and the wider state structure of Syria in general. Nevertheless, as 
the Syrian Arab Republic has matured over the years since 1963, it has been possible 
for a number of studies on Syria to offer insights into the structure and composition of 
the Syrian state, notwithstanding difficulties and frustrations experienced by 
researchers. 
36 
1.4.1. The Working Class- Rural and Urban 
Traditionally, the working-class in Syria has been predominantly rural. 
Following the Land Reform Acts of 195834 initiated by the new UAR government 
with much fanfare, little in fact changed with regard to the position of the vast 
majority of the peasantry, with implementation of the land reform almost being non-
existent, less than 5% of the land subject to reform actually being distributed, in all to 
about 5000 families. 35 However, the further measures taken by the Ba'ath regime after 
1963 constructed a firm alliance between the peasantry and the new elites of the 
Ba'ath. In particular, the actual implementation of land reform measures (discussed in 
detail in Chapter Two), stripped the old oligarchic landed elites in Syria of most of 
their power, whilst simultaneously linking peasant loyalties to the new regime. In 
effect, the regime made a bargain with the peasantry, linking state power to the 
welfare of the peasantry: in return for removing their old dependency structures and 
providing a new, higher level of welfare, the Ba'ath called upon the peasantry to 
assume a new dependency on the state, to support state institutions and to provide 
manpower for the armed forces and for the bureaucracy. Peasant compliance with this 
arrangement has been a major factor in the traditional historical stability of the 
Ba'athist regime. Salame has characterised this agreement as being a political 
covenant (mithaq siyasi) 36 between peasants and state, leading to peasant 
identification with, and support for, the regime. However, the support that the 
peasantry gave to the regime should not be seen as a blanket approval, nor should the 
34 Law 134, SAR, 4 May 1958, was still based on traditional approaches to sharecropping, although it 
did introduce a certain amount of redress for peasants and considerably improved the general position 
of the peasantry vis-a-vis the landlord. 
35 D.Waldner, State Building and Late Development, New York, CUP 1999, p 81 
37 
land reform measures initiated in 1963 and beyond be hailed as an unmitigated 
success. In fact, according to Perthes, only 446,000 hectares of the 1,5 million 
hectares expropriated land, together with 432,000 hectares of existing state land were 
distributed to the peasantry in the course of the Land Reform Acts. 37 What was not 
distributed either remained state property, was allocated to co-operatives and state 
farms or came under the control of other public sector establishments. Approximately 
180,000 families remained landless labourers even after the reforms. 38 Although land 
reform measures had provided the mass of the peasantry with land, other problems 
remained. Machinery to work the land was in short supply, irrigation systems were 
expensive, fertiliser and seeds had to be bought from state outlets, and crops had to be 
planted according to government regulations. Pricing structures of rural commodities 
were set by the government and historically have not kept in step with rising living 
costs or inflation. 39 Nevertheless, the peasantry has remained one of the pillars of the 
Ba'athist regime and policy decisions are still shaped by rural considerations. 
36 G.Salame, Al-Mujtama'wa al-Dawla fi al-Mashriq al-Arabi, Beirut, Centre for the Study of Arab 
Unity, 1987, p 191 
37 V. Perthes, The Political Economy of Syria under Assad, London, IB Tauris 1995, p 81 
38 ibid, p 81 
39 Indeed, a common sight in Syrian towns are peasants who sell their privately produced vegetables 
from their private plots in order to supplement their state-controlled payments for their state-regulated 
main crops. 
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1.4.2 The Bourgeoisie 
The academic discussion about the character and basis of the Syrian Ba' athist 
regime has often focused, during the 1970's in particular, on the middle classes or the 
bourgeoisie, at times obscuring a clear conceptualisation of this class by the actual 
breadth of the concept employed. Regarding the importance Arab societies attach to 
the independence of occupational position in identifying social standing 40, it is 
necessary to draw a clear dividing line between the wage-eammg and the self-
employed middle classes. 
The latter, comprised of small merchants with their own shops, small 
industrialists, craftsmen and self-employed professionals, can really be described as 
the quintessential petite bourgeoisie of Syria. This class has been able to hold its own 
despite the growth of a salaried middle class. Generally it can be said that although 
the numbers of industries or production units of this self-employed class have grown 
steadily throughout the 1970's and 1980's 41 , the actual size of production units has 
remained at a fairly low level. Perthes has conclusively demonstrated that; 
"middle class entrepreneurs in Syria tend to refrain from enlarging their 
establishments above a certain size. This may be out of fear that any expansion would 
cause difficulties with the bureaucracy, or arouse the envy of those in power; or it 
could be from simple consideration of the labour and social security regulation that 
apply to bigger establishrnents."42 
Generally, this traditional petite bourgeoisie was seen as the opposition for the 
new groupings around the Ba'ath Party, although Longuenesse at the end of the 
1970's asserted that this class, far from being constrained by the Ba' ath assumption of 
40 H. Barakat, The Arab World, UCP, London, 1993, p 86 
41 V. Perthes, op.Cit, p 101-102 
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power, had actually expanded. She concluded that the growth of this class during the 
1960's and 1970's had transformed its members from regime opponents to regime 
supporters.43 Her assumption of this class expansion still holds in the 1990's and 
beyond, but her conclusion that expansion went hand-in-hand with support for the 
regime has been disputed by other authorities. The 'old' Syrian bourgeoisie, in 
particular its traditional urban core, remains for the most part staunchly conservative. 
Local traders and craftsmen often still fill roles in neighbourhood mosques, and 
indeed still form a very traditional core of businesses. These small businesses share, 
despite often slightly divergent economic interests, the ideological view of the 
traditional bourgeoisie that state involvement in the economy should be minimised. 
Historically, this petite, overwhelmingly Sunni, bourgeoisie' had been very suspicious 
of Hafez al-Assad and the Ba'athist regime, seeing the establishment of, in their eyes, 
a minority, tribal-dominated dictatorship that goes hand-in-hand with sweeping 
nationalisations, as a force to be strongly opposed. Assad's support for the Maronite 
Lebanese Christians in 1976 and his support for Iran during the Iran-Iraq War did 
nothing to lessen the impression that the regime remains anti-Sunni.44 During the 
Hama uprising in 1982 it was thought that in parallel with the boycott of trade, the 
Islamists also received a certain amount of financial support from individuals from 
this class. This traditional opposition may _have however diminished gradually over 
the period of time Assad had been in power. Perthes argues convincingly that 
42 V. Perthes,op.Cit., p 102 
43 Longuenesse, The Class Nature of the State in Syria. Contribution to an analysis, ME RIP Reports, 
Vol4, (May 1979), No 77, pp 3-11 
44 This opposition to the regime has often been imaginative. In the 1990 Gulf War against Iraq, a 
number of Syrian towns saw expressions of opposition to the Syrian support for the Allied coalition. In 
one instance stray dogs were painted with Assad's name on one flank and US President Bush's name 
on the other and then released to roam the streets of Deir-a-Zur. According to an eyewitness, the 
inhabitants experienced 'great joy' at seeing the Muchaberat trying to round up the dogs. Interview 7, 
Damascus, I st April 1998 
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"[whilst] Assad has certainly been able to win support amongst the newer 
segments of this petite bourgeoisie, [ ... ] it has not yet developed into a stable basis of 
the regime. [ ... ] Inasmuch, however, as it's members are doing well economically, as 
there does not seem to be any alternative to the regime in power, and as this regime 
secures political stability, this class no longer poses a threat to Assad and his 
leadership. "45 
The distinction between positive support for the regime advocated by 
Longuenesse and the 'wait and see' attitude attributed to this class by Perthes is 
important if the stability of the Syrian regime is to be understood. A clear theoretical 
and political difference exists between positive support for a regime and passive 
acquiescence to its existence. The difficulty lies in distinguishing between the two in 
a non-critical situation, and, moreover, in a situation where political loyalties and 
affiliations cannot be openly admitted should they deviate from the established norm 
or official line. In this sense, the continued support for the regime must be dependent 
upon its positive appeal to loyalty and on its image of durability in equal measures. 
Part of the problem is that the class of the bourgeoisie in Syria has been expanded and 
enlarged in differing directions since 1970. The numbers of the traditional petite 
bourgeoisie have been joined by the large ranks of the salaried employees of the state 
bureaucracies who are dependent upon the state for their livelihood. From 1970 to 
1991, the number of waged state employees in Syria grew from just 160,000 to over 
640,000, representing, if their families are included, almost 17 % of the population.46 
This new class certainly forms a new part of the middle class, but is also part of its 
fragmentation, as the prime focus of class loyalty is the state, rather than fellow 
members of the petite bourgeoisie. By expanding the public sector and the 
bureaucracy of Syria, the regime after 1970 was able to draw on a new large pool of 
supporters, often drawn from rural or disadvantaged backgrounds. On the other hand 
45 V. Perthes, The Political Economy of Syria under Assad, London, 18 Tauris, p I 04 
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the above traditional bourgeoisie was not forgotten in "Syria's dual track policy"47 as 
by encouraging economic expansion and concurrent state expansion, as Hinnebush 
puts it, the regime was acting 
"to the advantage of both [the Ba'ath's] traditional populist constituency [the 
rural poor] and of others who, benefiting from liberalisation or work abroad, were 
partly eo-opted by the regime."48 
The state thus became the focus for the formation of a 'new' bourgeoisie, or in 
Hinnebush's words, "a state bourgeoisie".49 This new bourgeoisie is made up of 
disparate elements of former petite bourgeoisie or working class origin, engaged in a 
different number of occupations. What is common to this class however is the new 
and close relationship that it has formed with the state. This should not be seen as a 
replacement for the old traditional bourgeoisie, but should rather be seen as a 
counterweight to the trading petite bourgeoisie. Again, the barriers between the 
different levels of the bourgeoisie are theoretically clear, but in practice often diffuse. 
For example, a number of traditional bourgeois families and clans operate in close eo-
operation with the regime, a not at all uncommon phenomenon. Hinnebush gives the 
example of the Shallah family, whose head, Badr ad-Din al-Shallah, now head of the 
Damascus Chamber of Commerce, was instrumental in keeping the Damascus souk 
open during the Islamist troubles, and who presides over a diversified industrial and 
manufacturing complex of companies.50 We should then put aside the notion of 
regime support being localised in specific areas or sectors of the bourgeoisie. 
Traditional, petite and 'state' bourgeoisie have all in a sense learnt to live with the 
46 ibid, p 106 
47 R.A.Hinnebush, Syria, in T.Niblock & E.Murphy (eds), Economic and Political Liberalization in the 
Middle East, British Academic Press, London, 1993, p 184 
48 ibid, p 184 
49 ibid, p 184 
50 ibid, p 192 
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regime. Support for the regime in Syria thus seems to be too complex to simply define 
in terms of a single social class, regional or ethnic origin - it would be inaccurate to 
describe them, as Faksh has done, as simply being "regional (Latakian), sectarian-
minoritarian (Alawis) and rural (poor)".51 Rather it should be seen as a complex web 
of interconnectivity, linking various strands of interested groups together. If any 
particular common interest lies at the heart of these disparite groups, it could be 
defined as the interest in the maintenance of the status quo, or, if that were not 
possible, the continued maintenance of the position of the particular group within the 
regime structure. 
51 M.A. Faksh, The Alawi Community of Syria, MES, pp 133- 153 
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1.5 Control and Participation 
According to the regime, Syria's democracy manifests itself through the 
Parliament, the Progressive National Front (PNF), and the popular (or mass) 
organisations. These organisations structure and define the areas of power and 
influence that exist between the regime sphere and the private sphere of family and 
home. This political gap of influence is covered and filled by both civil organisations 
(such as unions) and political units (such as the PNF or Parliament). Although the 
regime has undoubtedly sought to control and comprehensively infiltrate these various 
organisations and structures, it should be noted that they occupy a certain ambivalent 
role within the overall structure of Syrian society and certainly should be seen as 
separate entities in their own right. They are therefore worthy of particular attention. 
Their formal and actual role can often be distinct from each other and they can act as 
two-way conduits between the regime and the wider Syrian population. They are 
indeed often used as indirect and sometimes unsubtle instruments of political control 
by the regime in cases where it has been deemed impolitic to broadcast the direct 
interest of the regime, but they can also act, as Perthes puts it, "in varying degrees, as 
channels of interest participation"52and a sounding-board between the population and 
the regime. 
52 V. Perthes, The Political Economy of Syria under Assad, London, IB Tauris, 1997, p 162 
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1.5.1 Parliament 
Syria's Parliament or People's Council is still essentially more a consultative 
council than a sovereign or independent policy-making body. Pre-Ba'ath 
parliamentary democracy was not reinstated by the Correctionist Movement in 1970. 
Although As sad did appoint a formal Parliament in 1971 to replace the Ba' ath-
inspired 'National Council' of 196553 , it still mirrored that 'National Council' by 
essentially comprising representatives from the Party leadership, the military, unions, 
and professional organisations. The only new addition to the framework was the 
inclusion of the PNF, representatives of religious groups and Commercial Chamber 
representatives as distinct blocs within Parliament. Parliamentary elections were first 
held in 1973 and have generally been held every 4 years since. Voting patterns over 
the years have generally given no indication that electoral rigging or voter 
manipulation on a wide scale has been carried out.54 Desired election outcomes are 
determined rather by the restricted choice of candidates presented for election in the 
first place. The PNF generally agrees the division of seats between the members of 
the individual Front parties before the election, and then after the election allocates 
them accordingly. Political parties not belonging to the PNF are not allowed to 
participate in elections. Outside the formal structure of the PNF individuals may stand 
for Parliament under their own name, however if individuals are not well-connected 
with the regime, they stand little hope of winning a seat in Parliament. 55 The 
percentage of 'independent' Members of Parliament has varied greatly from 
Parliament to Parliament, ranging from one-third to one-fifth of all seats. In all 
53 ibid, p 166 
54 One exception to this rule applies: Elections in 1981 were generally seen to have been manipulated 
on a major scale. Interview 4, Damascus, 7th May 1998 
55 In 1973 4 openly appositional candidates succeeded in gaining seats in Parliament; this was unusual 
and remained a one-off. 
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elections however, PNF members of Parliament have held an absolute majority. Thus 
it comes as no surprise that the initiator for legislation is in all cases the government. 
The level of debate and participation does tend to vary widely according to the nature 
of legislation being discussed. 56 However, it should be mentioned in this context that 
the Syrian Parliament does play an important role within the power-broking and 
manoeuvring of Syrian politics. In this arena the minority of 'independents' come into 
their own. As the regime and the government should be seen as distinct from one 
another, the regime often uses particular Parliamentarians to criticise and comment on 
Government incentives, initiatives and legislation. Debate has on occasion been lively 
and heated - in particular if it concerns economic issues. Syrian Parliamentary 
procedure in particular can be illuminating; although a debate on major political 
issues has never taken place, detailed economic discussion on the impact of economic 
reform is nevertheless frequent. The regime is not shy in using Parliament and its 
members as informal sounding-boards and conduits for information it would rather 
transmit in an informal way. Indeed, criticism of Governmental performance is often 
tolerated and public interest in these debates is often high. The formal role of 
Parliament is important and should not be underestimated. In particular, the regime 
puts great emphasis on fulfilling the formal and legal prerequisites set down in the 
constitution. 57 Following the death of Hafez al-Assad, it remains to be seen whether 
Parliament will assume a more active role in policy formulation, although it can be 
assumed that this is unlikely in the short-term. 
56 Indeed, Parliament participation records are often patchy and attendance is generally low. Interview 
2, Damascus, 20th April 1998 
57 One recent example of this was the death of Assad in June 2000. On the very day of his unexpected 
death Parliament was summoned to amend the constitution to allow Bashar ai-Assad to succeed to the 
Presidency (by changing the minimum age of Presidency from 40 to 34). 
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1.5.2 The Progressive National Front (JPNF) 
The PNF was established in 1972 to join all Ba'athist and allied political 
forces into a broad political coalition. Its aim was to achieve a "greater measure of 
cohesion and unity" and thus offer a strong resistance against "the Zionist enemy."58 
Together with the Ba'ath Party, the following five political parties make up the PNF: 
the Arab Socialist Union (a Nassarist group initially regarding itself as a Syrian 
branch of the Egyptian party of the same name), the Movement of Socialist Unionists 
(a unitary socialist party formed after Syria left the UAR in 1961), the Democratic 
Socialist Union Party (a offshoot of the former, founded in 1964), the Arab Socialist 
Movement (founded in 1964 as a Ba'athist splinter group), and the Syrian Communist 
Party (which split in 1986 after an internal quarrel, and which now has two separate 
wings represented in Parliament). Essentially, although the formation of the PNF was 
portrayed as a unifying force against external political enemies, the real reasons for 
the formation of this political bloc were two domestic considerations. The first was 
the fact that in 1971 the Ba'ath under Assad needed to neutralise possible competing 
political forces occupying essentially similar political ground (so as to forestall the 
emergence of any competing political forces outside any coalition). Opposition parties 
diametrically opposed to the Ba'ath (conservative and land-owning parties in 
particular) had already been effectively emasculated and destroyed by seven years of 
radical Ba'ath rule. Assad now had to make sure of the loyalty of parties occupying 
the political spectrum closer to him. The PNF effectively gave the appearance of a 
power-sharing coalition between brotherly Arab socialist parties, whilst still 
maintaining the political dominance of the Ba'ath. Members of competing political 
parties saw the PNF justifiably as an opportunity to participate in a degree of political 
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power without the need for potentially damaging political internecine conflict so 
characteristic of Syrian domestic politics between 1963 and 1970. The Ba'ath under 
As sad saw it as a means of pre-empting any possible competition and neutralising any 
potential political threat. The second domestic consideration was the fact that Assad's 
political base within the Ba'ath Party itself was still comparatively narrow and he 
needed to broaden his appeal to parties and political factions outside the confines of 
the Ba'ath itself. In forming the PNF, he also was able to give the appearance of 
attempting to form a national inclusive coalition of progressive parties, a tactic that 
appealed to Syrians weary of almost two decades of internecine strife and political 
uncertainty. A coincidental advantage of this policy has been that Assad was able to 
depict his regime and government as formally pluralist, rather than monolithic. 
Of all the PNF parties, the Communists traditionally have been the most 
outspoken and also the one party which has shown the highest degree of 
independence from the Ba'ath in terms of policy. They voiced vocal opposition 
against the initial involvement of foreign oil companies in Syria in 1974, and voted 
against sending Syrian troops to Lebanon in 1976. During the last years ofthe 1970's 
the leadership of the Communist Party had to fend off repeated demands from rank-
and-file members to leave the PNF59 and although the Party eventually stood by the 
regime in its struggle with the Islamists in the period between 1981 and 1982, it 
nevertheless criticised the excessive use of force and the suppression of civil rights 
during the uprising. As protest the Communists withdrew from the Parliamentary 
elections in 1981 and stood on a platform of their own; as a result none of their 
58 Presidential Decree No 35/22 May 1971 
59 Interview 11 ,Damascus 2nd May 1998 
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candidates were able to secure seats.60 However, this outspoken criticism of the 
regime does point to the fact that the political structure in Syria is not quite as 
monolithic and inflexible as it might seem at first glance to a foreign observer. The 
Communist Party then re-joined the PNF platform for the 1986 elections and in 1990, 
both wings of the SCP having joined the PNF, each were assigned 4 seats each, a 
pattern which repeated itself in 1994. Feisal Bakdash and Yusuf Faisal lead the 
(proto )Stalinist and reformist wings of the Party respectively. In 1991, at the 
introduction of Investment Law No 10, Bakdash' s faction voted against the 
legislation, whilst Faisal's faction supported it.61 On a number of other occasions the 
Communists in general have opposed the blatant misuse and corruption within Syrian 
society and have been one of the most vocal supporters of the anti-corruption drive 
initiated by Bashar al-Assad (with the backing of his father) in early 2000. 
The Arab Socialist Union (ASU) split into two in 1980, one wing associating 
itself closely with the Ba'ath, the other dropping into semi-obscurity and almost-
illegality. The other parties are in effect, in the words of Perthes, "Assadist"62 and 
effectively play only minor roles in Parliamentary and political life; indeed their 
continued existence could be attributed to the late President's zeal of not maintaining 
an obviously monolithic rubber-stamp Parliament. 
Overall however, the PNF continues to serve as a metaphorical fig leaf for the 
Ba'ath to cover the obvious dominance it commands in Parliament. Indeed the odd 
60 The elections of 1981 and the failure of Communist candidates to secure seats in these elections are 
most probably the one major incident of overt fraud in the history of post-1970 election patterns. 
61 Interview 11, Damascus 2"d May 1998 
62 V. Perthes, The Political Economy of Syria under Assad, London, IB Tauris, 1997, p 164 
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maverick dissenter and occasional criticism by Communist MP's only serve to 
highlight the near abject loyalty MP's of all factions within the PNF have historically 
shown towards Assad and his regime. 
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1.5.3. The Popular Organisations 
The formalised control of political life effected by the establishment of the 
PNF has been mirrored since 1970 by the concurrent establishment of populist 
organisations to carry out the tasks of mobilisation, representation and control of the 
Syrian population. Existing organisations were transformed and new organisations 
were created. These organisations are intended to cover those politically active 
members of society who for reasons of their own are not covered by Ba'ath or PNF 
Party membership. As part of the Ba'athist drive to corporatise political life within 
Syria, these organisations cover the entire spectrum of public life within the state 
system. The Peasant Union and the various Trade Unions are the most obvious and 
most important of these mass organisations. These organisations do not compete 
against each other for membership; rather they individually cover specific sectors of 
public and professional life. They in effect carry out a purely functional role and 
serve to deliberately fragment any independent class identities or loyalties. Their 
structure mirrors the autocratic nature of the regime structure and their officials and 
leaders are not elected, but tend to be appointed by the regime. They do carry out a 
dual role of representing the official Party face to the majority of the population, and 
also serve as the population's representatives towards the regime. In addition, these 
organisations (especially the trade unions) often carry out social services for, and offer 
subsidies to their individual members. In particular, the Revolutionary Youth 
Organisation (RYO) and the Student's Union have in the past acted more as 
instruments of the regime than true representatives of student bodies. There have been 
examples where student cadres were utilised as police reservists63 and where 
members of the RYO have been trusted to ensure that, the President's motorcade was 
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properly applauded during his drive through the Souk al-Hamadiyyeh to Eid prayers 
at the Omayyad Mosque.64 
The General Federation of Trade Unions (GFTU)65 essentially covers all 
public sector employees; in the private sector, union membership is said to be around 
44%66 , although this figure could very well be lower, as a substantial proportion of 
private sector employees, in particular in small firms, do not feature on any official 
records at all. Union membership therefore tends to be more common in larger firms 
that operate within the legal economy, and overall private sector employees make up 
at the very most only 20% of trade union membership.67 The unions under the 
umbrella of the GFTU have since 1970 been largely neutralised by the regime, by the 
time-honoured method of appointing compliant and loyal apparatchiks to positions of 
leadership within the unions. 
However, the unions within the GFTU still fulfil a number of important roles. 
The first is the social one: a number of unions run their own savings and hardship 
funds, paying out small amounts of money to members (and their families) in the case 
of accidents, impoverishment or bereavement. This could well be seen as a form of 
indirect patronage and control. In addition, unions overall in Syria run 3 hospitals, 25 
63 In particular during 1982, when the regime was intent on crushing any sign of dissent outside Ham a. 
64 In one particular incident in 1998 shopkeepers were persuaded to open their shops at 4am in advance 
of the arrival of the Presidential motorcade and then to line the main street of the Souk applauding the 
Presidential motorcade as it drove past - an event broadcast subsequently on Syrian television. 
Observed by author. 
65 
al-lttihad a!- 'am m li-niqabat a!- 'ummal 
66 V. Perthes, The Political Economy of Syria under Assad, London, IB Tauris,1997, p 172 
67 Public sector workers are automatically unionised, almost without exception, on occasion they do not 
even have to apply for membership. Interview 11, Damascus, 2nd May 1998 
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health centres and over 90 pharmacies.68 Services here at these centres are heavily 
subsidised by the unions and provide good quality healthcare and pharmaceuticals to 
workers (and their families) at extremely low rates. The importance of this cannot be 
under-estimated. In a society where state welfare systems are virtually non-existent, 
the availability of a healthcare system open to workers and their families is a powerful 
incentive to join the unions. As well as healthcare, unions also provide creche and 
kindergarten facilities, libraries, social clubs, cinemas, and even a number of public 
restaurants.69 These facilities are generally subsidised and provide, in comparison 
with state-run establishments, excellent value for money for those large sectors of 
society who cannot afford the private sector facilities enjoyed by the wealthy. But 
again these obvious benefits can be seen as a form of patronage, a way of assuring the 
loyalty of workers to the regime. 
The second role the unions fulfil is that of popular agitator for the regime. The 
'mass' demonstrations seen often in Syria to mark official celebrations or events are 
stage-managed carefully and the bulk of demonstrators are drawn from the organised 
ranks of state employees. These 'populist expressions of the people's will' 70 are 
designed to show external commentators the depth of loyalty the regime commands. 
That is not to say that populist demonstrations need always be stage-managed; the 
example of public grief and mourning at the death of Hafez al-Assad in Damascus 
probably combined a measure of both public management and genuine grief, mixed 
with uncertainty about the future. At the same time these demonstrations were 
68 Interview 12, Aleppo, 12th May 1998 
69 The Union of State Security employees (a euphemism for the security services) runs an excellent 
restaurant on ai-Jala'a Avenue in Central Damascus. 
70 Interview 12, Aleppo, 121h May 1998 
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carefully managed to show popular support for the chosen successor, Bashar al-
Assad. 
The third role unions fulfil is that of providing a political and ideological link 
or conduit to the regime. Political seminars and meetings before Ba'ath Party 
Congresses serve as sounding boards for the regime to assess and formulate policy 
and also to gauge the mood and opinion of the population. 
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L6. Condusiolll 
Overall the historical Syrian state as described above is an individual example 
of a corporatist state; a state where the regime has been able to secure for itself the 
loyalty of various groups within society and has allowed no dissent to surface. The 
regime in Syria has been able to build up a support structure composed of the 
following elements: a varied network of class alliances spread throughout society; a 
solid level of ideological legitimacy; formal institutions of control and a system of 
direct patronage to individual social groups who are seen as important for regime 
survival. Given the centrality of the regime it has been essential to examine the power 
structures within Syrian society in order to make a considered judgement on the 
reasons for introducing Investment Law No 10 in 1991. This centrality of the regime 
is one that by definition is not unique in the Arab world, but its degree of intensity in 
Syria does set a particular standard to follow. The issue of power, influence and 
contacts pervades all dealings with the central Government, and indeed influences 
governmental decisions and choices. An analysis of Syrian society and the state offers 
a unique insight into a symbiotic relationship where the individual is caught up in a 
web of relationships to the state. State structures in Syria fulfil a duality of roles as, 
apart from their formal, accepted role common to all mature political societies, the 
Syrian structures and organs within these structures also fulfil the role of acting for 
the regime. These roles are often ambivalent and do cause conflicts of interest. But 
the structure of the Syrian state has become so intrinsically bound up with the regime 
that it is often difficult to separate them. 
The examination of the intrinsic structure of Syrian society in a work dealing 
with investment legislation is essential in this case because since 1970 Syrian society 
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has been set on a course of gradual polarisation. The upper middle class, the 
entrepreneurs, and the urban bourgeoisie, have all benefited from infitah, a series of 
patronage-style economic reforms at the expense of the traditional salaried middle 
class, one of the traditional supporters of the regime.71 This gradual stratification by 
status pales into insignificance when compared to the real changes in wealth and 
poverty experienced in Syrian society. Wealth and poverty are not absolutes, but are 
variables in describing a person's position within society. Perthes has argued that; 
"on the whole, the proportion of those who own the means of production has 
shrunk considerably. Except for marginal means of production such as a shoeblack's 
box, the proportion of those who own the means of production ranges around 19 
percent at the beginning of the 1990's, whereas it lay over 3 7 percent twenty years 
earlier." 72 
The essential structure of the Syrian state, despite additional strains bought 
about by economic crisis and challenges has nevertheless remained remarkably static 
since 1970. 
71 This issue is discussed in Chapter Two 
72 V. Perthes, The Political Economy of Syria under As sad, London, IB Tauris, p 119 
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Chapter Two: Developments in Syria and the Ba'atb. 
2.1. Introduction 
This chapter will deal with the economic developments and political 
influences on the economy within Syria from the aftermath of WWII up to the end of 
the 1990's. My intention is to point out the salient reforms and factors that shaped 
Syrian economic policy during this period. This intention should be seen in the wider 
historical framework of the changes within Syria since 1946; reforms in Syria never 
appear in a vacuum, but can be traced and analysed from a wide historical 
perspective. Thus the historical background to the emergence of the 'correctionist' 
movement under President Hafez-al Assad needs to be examined, in order to be able 
to place his subsequent corrections and reforms within the ideological framework of 
the Ba'ath. 
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2.2. Syrian Politics: Pre-Ba'ath 1946-53 
At the time of the emergence of modern Syria on 17 April 1946 - the date the 
last French troops left Syria territory, and the date celebrated since as Syria's National 
Day - the groundwork had already been laid for the eventual success of the Ba'ath 
Party. The overriding problem after independence was the land question. Syria was a 
predominantly agricultural country, with 2 million of an overall population of 3.5 
million belonging to the peasantry. These peasants lived in around 5500 villages built 
of mud and lacking in basic amenities such as piped water, electricity, sewage or 
tarred roads. 1 Land, the real measure of wealth in traditional societies, was mainly in 
the hands of absentee landlords who exercised almost absolute control over the 
peasantry, a pattern of land ownership established during the 19111 Century under 
Ottoman rule. 
Before the 19111 Century collective farming of a kind had been practised, with 
agricultural land owned by a village and allocated to individual families in rotation. 
When, under Ottoman rule, a legal land registry was introduced, many local village or 
community leaders had registered land in their own names - instead of that of the 
village. Seale mentions the following individual case occurring following the 
introduction of the 1858 Ottoman land code; the family of the Ottoman Sultan 'Abd 
al-Hamid acquiring no fewer than 110 villages in Syria.2 Another example is the land 
around Ha'ma; of 113 villages in the region, 91 were owned by only four families. 3 
Rural Syria thus virtually came under the control of a small clique of landowners. 
I P.Seale, Asad of Syria, New York, UCP, 1995, p 44 
2 ibid, p 45 
3 ibid, p 42 
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Although the pattern of land ownership itself thus changed, from predominantly 
collective village ownership to individual family ownership, the pattern of collective 
village work on the land still remained the same, with profits however being siphoned 
off for the benefit of individual families. Most peasants, illiterate, fearing the 
omnipresent tax collector, or simply unaware of the situation, lost out in the battle for 
land registration and became little more than agricultural labourers, dependent on the 
good will of the local notable or tribal sheikh. The following period of rule under the 
French Mandate did nothing to lessen the basic inequalities inherent in the Syrian 
system. Indeed Ma'oz comments that; 
"the economic gap between the wealthy Muslim [Sunni] elite and the middle 
and lower Classes, both urban and rural, persisted during the French mandatory 
period without serious attempts on the part of the French to reduce it by 
initiating government reforms."4 
Syria in 1946 remained in the grip of the two traditional elites; on the one 
hand the rural elites, and on the other, the Sunni-dominated middle class based in the 
urban centres of Aleppo and Damascus. These two major groups continued to 
dominate the economic and political scene in Syria until 1954 and beyond. The two 
major trading cities of Damascus and Aleppo remained omnipresent in controlling 
trade and commerce within and outside the country. In a similar way these urban 
notables and merchants, together with the landed elite contrived to dominate Syrian 
politics as well. Although the French had installed a basic system of parliamentary 
democracy before their departure, the existing elites were able to establish a firm grip 
on the institutions of power. In effect, the French mandate, with all Syrians under the 
tutelage of the French, was exchanged for an oligarchic, pseudo-democratic system 
run by the existing Syrian elites. The disenfranchised members of Syrian society, the 
4M. Ma'oz, The Sphinx ofDamascus, London, Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1988, p 15 
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landless peasants and the disadvantaged minorities outside the Sunni political 
landscape continued to be excluded from any possibility of economic betterment or 
political involvement. These groups offered fertile ground for radical political 
demands for change to take root. Pipes has commented that: 
"the Sunnis of Syria, with their powerful sense of enfranchisement and 
superiority, stood out within the mix of peoples [within Syria]. Although 
making up only half the population of Syria, Sunnis constituted a majority in 
the Middle East at large. [ ... ] As the ruling elite of the Ottoman Empire, they 
were the nonehnics in a heterogeneous society."5 
Alawi and Druse minorities had benefited to an extent under French colonial 
rule as the French had followed a deliberate policy of supporting the strong individual 
tribal or religious identities within the region of Greater Syria, a classic example of 
the 'divide and rule' attitude. A prime example of this policy in action was the 
opening-up of the nascent Syrian armed forces to members of the minorities. Hafez 
al-Assad himself was a typical example of this phenomena; after his inability to enrol 
as a medical student in Beirut due to lack of funds, the armed forces (in Assad's case 
the Syrian Air-Force) offered a viable alternative for a member ofthe Alawi minority. 
Seale has commented that: "young men made for the army in droves rather than for 
other professions because their families did not have the means to send them to 
university."6 This state of affairs continued after 1946 when minorities "continued to 
provide the core of the regular army- the corporals, sergeants, and junior officers."7 
This was due to the fact that well-to-do Sunnis from the urban and land-owning 
classes had other opportunities for advancement in economic and political life; the 
poor and minorities did not. The rejection of the armed forces as a career- continuing 
after the introduction of general military service in 1950 -by the mercantile and land-
5 D.Pipes, Greater Syria, New York, OUP, 1990, p 20-21 
6 P.Seale, op.cit., p 38 
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owning class 'allowed [the armed forces] to be captured by their class enemies, who 
then went on to capture the state itself'S The Christians had been able to use their 
religious affiliation and links with Europe to 'force a new set of relations upon the 
Sunni Muslims' 9, in effect entering into an agreement concerning informal power-
sharing with them. Other minorities (the Druse and Jews in particular) tried to follow 
the Christian example, with varying degrees of success. As a result, Syrian political 
life before 1954 continued to be characterised by a recurrent pattern of conflict 
between Sunnis and minorities excluded from such (often informal) arrangements and 
agreements. But nationalism began to make strong inroads into Syrian society; the 
concept of a state representing a culturally cohesive people demanding equality for all 
citizens of the state, regardless of religion was very attractive, especially for members 
of traditionally disadvantaged minorities; who remained on the sidelines of political 
life even after independence. Syrian nationalism flourished within minority groups 
and combined with revolutionary proto-socialist ideology, offered an attractive 
alternative to the stultifying status quo of traditional rule. Following the first of a 
number of military coup d'etat, the individual military dictators who ruled Syria 
between 1949 and 1954 were only able to take small steps towards the emergence of a 
modem state. Adib al-Shishakli is the main individual who deserves attention, 
together with Akram al-Hawrani, the founder of the Arab Socialist Party (who in 1953 
became one of the new Ba'ath Party leaders). 10 Hawrani was the first Syrian politician 
to grasp the reality of the land problem, and his socialist ideas and rhetoric struck a 
chord within the rural population of Syria. In September 1951 the first 'anti-feudalist 
7 ibid, p 38-39 
8 ibid, p 39 
9 D.Pipes, op.cit., p 21 
10 M.Ma'oz & A.Yaniv (eds), Syria under Asad, London, Croon Helm, 1986, p 18 
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rally' was held and attracted thousands of peasants outside Aleppoll and in 1952 
Shishakli signed a decree concerning the distribution of state lands - an early attempt 
at land reform, limiting the right to individual land ownership. It was not so much the 
actual reforms that Shishakli carried out, as the impact even his limited reforms had 
upon traditional Syrian political and economic society. Ma'oz has commented rightly 
that, most importantly, "Shishakli's actions contributed to the jolting of the old socio-
political status quo and, perhaps more significantly, to cultivating new forces and 
tendencies in Syrian society."12 In 1953 however Shishakli and Hawrani fell out and 
the latter fled to Lebanon, where he met up with Michel 'Aflaq and Salah al-Din 
Betar.13 They decided to merge the Arab Socialist Party and the Ba'ath Party to form 
the Arab Socialist Ba'ath Party. After Shishakli's removal in 1954 and the re-
instatement of parliamentary democracy, the Ba'ath competed successfully in the 
parliamentary elections, winning 1614 (or 2215 seats according to a different source) 
out of the 142 seats in total (most of the others were retained by the conservative 
'People's' and 'National' parties). Seale has commented that this initial if modest 
success was due to Hawrani's influence and led to a fundamental change in Syrian 
political life: 
"Hawrani was an agent of change [ ... ]. No one did more [ ... ] to shake the 
foundations of the old ruling class. He roused the peasants, politicised the 
army and gave the theorists of the Ba'ath a cutting edge."16 
l1 Indeed, this was the first time the ASP had raised the spectre of returning land to the peasantry under 
the slogan of"this land can be yours". In following months the campaign in the rural areas intensified 
until Shishakli had no option but to initiate reforms. 
12 M.Ma'oz & A.Yaniv, op.cit., p 18 
13 P.Seale, op.cit., p 42 
14 M.Ma'oz & A.Yaniv, op.cit., p 18 
15 M.Ma'oz, op.cit., p 26 
16 P.Seale, op.cit., p 48 
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2.3. The Ba'ath in Ponitics 19541-63 and! the lUAR 
The political parties operating in Syria in 1954 and competing in the elections 
of the same year were all aware that the real political force in Syria was not the 
nascent politicians, the Sunni-dominated middle class of entrepreneurs or traders, nor 
the still considerable land-owning elite, but the military. The Army had assumed 
power in 1949, and although democracy had been restored in 1954, the Army was still 
the force behind the new democratic structures, with the power to remove politicians 
it disapproved of still intact. In a sense, this continued domination by the Armed 
Forces was to influence Syrian politics for the remainder of the decade. Political 
parties were intent on developing a relationship with the Army, rather than developing 
alliances and relationship with other parties to maintain and strengthen the democratic 
structure. Both the People's and National Parties strove to develop strong personal 
alliances with the existing army leadership, with moderate success. However, this 
correct assessment of the military's strength behind the scenes did not go unnoticed 
by the other parties in Syrian politics at the time. All 'revolutionary' parties therefore 
also made great efforts to recruit members within the Armed Forces. The main fault-
line in the gradually politicised army ran between the Ba'ath Party and the Syrian 
Social Nationalist Party (SSNP). The Ba'ath's ideology was clearly addressed to the 
whole Arab nation, unlimited and unfettered by national boundaries drawn by colonial 
powers. The SSNP's appeal in contrast lay in the concept of a 'Greater Syria', 
comprising Syria, Lebanon, Palestine and Jordan.I7 The SSNP was perceived to be 
pro-Western and anti-Arab nationalist (but pro-Syrian nationalist), whilst the Ba'ath 
was the classical Arab nationalist (and by implication anti-Western and anti-
17 D.Pipes, op.cit., p 3 
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imperialist) party. The years of 1954 and 1955 were dominated by a series of power 
struggles within the army between SSNP and Ba'athist officers and supporters. After 
a violent incident in April 1955, the Ba'ath Party and its ally, the Syrian Communist 
Party (SCP), were able to break the power of the SSNP and virtually remove it from 
Syrian politics 18 and the Ba'ath Party became the dominant power within the Armed 
Forces. The mood in Syria and the Arab World in general had swung from 
despondency after the 1948 loss of Palestine to a mood of more cautious optimism 
following the success of the coup of the Free Officers in Egypt in 1952. In 195 5, Syria 
entered into a defensive military pact with Egypt, but as a result came under Israeli 
attack in December 1955 near the Sea of Galilee. 19 The emergence of the Soviet 
Union as a major arms supplier to the Egyptian Republic and the successful outcome 
of the Suez crisis following Nasser's nationalisation of the Suez Canal offered the 
Syrian Ba'ath an apparent way out of the insecure internal and external situation Syria 
had existed in since independence. 
The Ba'athist group within the Army, who in December 1955 had first raised 
the idea 20, initiated in 1958 the creation of the United Arab Republic with Nasser's 
Egypt.2I The Communist Party in Syria at that point was enjoying a period of 
popularity within Syria because of arms shipments from the Soviet Union (in 
particular Soviet fighter aircraft - first delivered in 1957)22 and the promise of further 
18 The leading Ba'athist officer in the Armed Forces, Colonel Adnan al-Malki was assassinated by a 
member of the SSNP - triggering off a wave of arrests and trials of SSNP members within Syria. See 
also P.Seale, op.cit., p 50 for further detail on the circumstances. Seale hypothesies that the 
assassination was ultimately the work of Egyptian military intelligence working with Akram ai-Dayri 
(the then Syrian Military Police Chief) to deliver a pretext to remove the SSNP (an obvious anti-
Nasserite political force) from Syrian politics. 
19 P.Seale, op.cit., p 51 
20 P.Seale, op.cit., p 52 
21 P.Seale, op.cit., p 54 
22 Indeed, the SAR Defence Forces had traditionally been amongst the first non-Soviet armed forces to 
receive new weaponry after Soviet units- often even before Warsaw Pact countries 
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economic aid from the Soviet Union. The Ba'athists (historical campaigners for Arab 
Unity in any case) were anxious to profit from Nasser's immense popularity and 
utilise his weight against the growing Communist influence within the Army. For the 
Syrians the concept of the UAR was to be a close alliance of equals under the banner 
of Arab solidarity. The economic situation in Syria at that time mirrored Egypt, and 
most participants in the union assumed that Nasser would introduce a measure of 
gradual economic reforms and advances. In fact the period of the UAR was an 
unmitigated catastrophe for Syria and the majority of Syrians as Nasser was not 
prepared to cede any amount of real power to Damascus and demanded virtual 
subjugation from the Syrian authorities. Power passed completely from Damascus to 
Cairo and Egyptian civil servants were imported to run the bureaucracy. When in 
1961 the leadership of the UAR launched a radical 'wave of nationalisations that 
included some of the largest Syrian establishments ' 23 , a group of conservative Syrian 
officers assumed power in Damascus and bought to an end this first modem 
experiment in Arab unification. After three years of unhappy co-habitation, Syria 
demanded and received the dissolution of the Union. The old guard of the 1950's re-
established the old model of Syrian parliamentary democracy and were back in 
power. This however was only to last a little while. The Ba'ath, having tasted power 
for the first time, could not be subdued forever. The old guard were living on 
borrowed time and eventually were unable to resist the pressure from the Ba'ath. 
23 V.Perthes, The Political Economy of Syria under Asad, London, I.B.Tauris, 1997, p 2 
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2.4. The Ba'ath in Power 1963-1970 
In March 1963, after a sustained period of political unrest and econom1c 
stagnation following the collapse of the UAR, a Ba'ath faction within the military 
finally overthrew the interim government, abolishing the parliamentary system and 
parties and giving power to a National Revolutionary Council. The Ba'athist 
Government that took control after the 1963 coup resolved to introduce a new 
political-economic order based on socialist principles: 
The new regime at once ordered a massive redistribution of property by 
continuing the nationalisations begun in 1961 under the U AR (which had triggered 
the demise of the UAR itself) of businesses in the key industries of textiles, 
engineering, chemicals, cement and sugar in the manufacturing sector, the larger firms 
in the construction sector and the entire banking system. In addition, the formal 
economic Five-Year Development Plan begun in 1961 under the UAR24 was revived 
and expanded. Nationalisations of core industries were based on the ideological 
appeal of the Ba' ath as a socialist party and were seen as an integral part of economic 
policy. The nationalisations also had an overtly political angle; the first wave of 
nationalisations carried out in 1964, as Kienle has put it, "represented a warning that 
the old elite, already deprived of its political power, might also lose its economic 
power if it proved unwilling to co-operate with the new regime."25 
The nationalisations also gave the Ba'ath the opportunity to secure the loyalty 
of the urban workers and to combat the high popularity the Syrian Communists 
enjoyed in the urban centres. These nationalisations in effect foreshadow the 
subsequent systematic alliance building programme the Ba'ath was to undertake 
24 Syria 1994-95, EIU Country Profile, p 17 
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under Assad from 1970 onwards. The firm control that the Ba'ath had established 
over the Army by 1963 precluded any attempt by conservative elements within the 
army structure to attempt a counter-coup. These nationalisations were carried out in 
parallel with widespread purges of the army command structure and the advancement 
of politically correct Ba'athist officers, Hafez al-Assad among them. These industrial 
sector nationalisations were carried out simultaneously to significant agricultural 
reform. The previous unsuccessful land reform attempts modelled on the Egyptian 
example26 during the period of the UAR between 1958 and 1961 had created 
sustained pressure for more fundamental reform which the Ba'athists had to try to 
satisfy. Substantial land reform was well overdue and the pre-reform distribution of 
land ownership was manifestly unequal, as the following figures demonstrate: 
Figure 1: Pre-Reform Distribution ofLand Ownership 
Owned Holdings Agricultural Population Land Surface 
(in hectares) (in%) (in%) 
Large (1 00 +) 1 50 
Medium (1 0-100) 9 37 
Small(< 10) 30 13 
Landless 60 0 
Source: R.Hmnebusch, Peasant and Bureaucracy m Ba'ath1st Syna, London, 1989, p 88 
Although making up only 1% of the rural population, large holdings over 100 
hectares made up 50% of the overall land available, whilst 60% of the rural 
population were landless fellahin. For Ba'athists, the removal of such obvious and 
inequitable injustices had been a major motivator in supporting the revolution. The 
regime's public policy was generally orientated in favour of the social groups seen as 
political supporters of the regime; peasants, workers in the public or state sector, 
soldiers and students. The traditional powerbase of the Ba' ath was the countryside 
25 V.Perthes, op.Cit., p 39 
67 
and Hinnebush has expressed the overall traditional ideology of the Ba'ath as "the 
expression of a rural revolt against the great inequalities and agrarian crisis generated 
by Syria's traditional agricultural structure."27 The first years after 1963 thus also saw 
a concerted effort to establish and build up small, tightly integrated, village organised 
political units to politicise the countryside. This policy was a manifestation of what 
Olson describes as a continued "Ba'ath tendency to rely most heavily on the 
development of a rural support base"28, even after the Ba'ath had achieved control 
over the state. Hinnebush agrees and states that the "strategic key to state formation 
and political economy [in Syria was] the role of the peasant, rural society and 
agricultural development. "29 Economic policies after 1963 were thus dominated by 
the need to carry out land reform, to increase the standard of living of the rural 
population and thus to legitimise the regime, through its actions, in the eyes of its 
rural support base. The June 1963 Law of Agrarian Reform limited the ownership of 
irrigated and unirrigated land (150 to 500 dunams and 800 to 2000 dunams 
respectively - according to levels of rainfall) and the amount of land a previous 
landowner could distribute to his family.3° Although the land reform was partially 
successful, Hinnebush did note in four case studies he carried out in Syria during the 
1970's that only the actual removal of land distribution powers from centralised 
bureaucratic structures and their re-allocation to the local administrative level (carried 
out in 1966) ensured general implementation of the 1963 legislation. 31 In total land 
reform measures carried out after 1963 achieved the result that approximately 93% of 
all agricultural holdings (and making up around 50% of total agricultural land) 
26 Land Reform in Syria, p 211 
27 R.Hinnebusch, Peasant and Bureaucracy in Ba'athist Syria, London, 1989, p vii 
28 R.W.Olson, The Ba'ath and Syria 1947- 1982, New Jersey, Kingston Press, 1982, p 51-52 
29 R.Hinnebusch, op. Cit., p vii 
30 M.Ma'oz & A.Yaniv, op.Cit., p 20 
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comprised less than 24 hectares and were worked by small and middle income 
peasants. 32 In this series of land reforms, the Ba'ath were very careful to carry out a 
re-distribution and re-allocation of land from richer to poorer peasants, not a mass 
collectivisation, suggesting that the aim of land reform was two-fold: to ensure the 
theoretical continued economic viability of the new class of small land-owning 
peasantry, and at the same time to reward the rural support base of the party. 
Although the strict ideological base of the Syrian Ba'ath would have suggested a 
wholescale collectivisation, in fact the land reform did not attempt collectivisation at 
all (although a number of large peasant co-operatives were established, with 
ownership held in common in the village or clan). Data from the Agricultural Census 
of 1970, seven years after the initiation of land reform, shows the following altered 
distribution: 
Figure 2: Post-Reform Distribution of Land Ownership 
Owned Holdings Agricultural Population Land Surface 
(in hectares) (in%) (in%) 
Large (1 00 +) 0,5 17,7 
Medium ( 10-1 00) 15,3 58,7 
Small (<10) 48,0 23,6 
Landless 36,1 0,0 
Source: R.Hmnebusch, Peasant and Bureaucracy m Ba'athtst Syna, London, 1989, p 110 
The landless percentage of the agricultural population has fallen from the pre-
reform level of 60% to around 36%, whilst both small and medium sized holdings 
31 R.Hinnebusch, Local Politics in Syria: Organisation and Mobilisation in Four Villages, Middle East 
Journal, 1976, vol 30, pp 1 -24 
32 R.Hinnebusch, Peasant and Bureaucracy in Ba'athist Syria ,London, 1989, p 41 
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have increased in size. However, the most striking feature is the decrease in land 
ownership by large holders; from 50% of all agricultural land pre-reform to around 
17% post-reform. Together with these changes in the size of land holdings came a 
change in the agrarian class structure of Syria. According to calculations by 
Longuenesse utilising the 1960 and 1970 Agrarian Census figures, and referred to by 
Hinnebusch, the pre- and post-reform agrarian class structure can be compared as 
follows: 
Figure 3: Change in Agrarian Classes 1960-1970 
%of Total Employed Workforce 
Year of Census 1960 1970 
Agrarian Bourgeoisie 4,5 0,6 
Peasantry (Landholders) 27,4 41,5 
Agrarian Proletariat 20,5 8,9 
Source: R.Hmnebusch, Peasant and Bureaucracy m Ba'ath1st Syna ,London, 1989, p 110 
The agrarian structure of Syria had thus undergone a significant fundamental 
change. The most recent figures for land ownership in Syria give the private sector 
around 62% (3 Million hectares), the co-operative sector around 36% (1.7 Million 
hectares), and the public sector the remaining 2% (100,000 hectares) of arable land.33 
Although these figures sound impressive, Syria in 1963 (and to a degree still today) 
has a large proportion of arid or semi-arid land and is heavily dependent on irrigation 
systems.34 In this context, it is difficult to measure the actual increase in agricultural 
output following the reforms. Certainly the success of the land reform measures 
themselves can be ascertained by an immediate increase in the levels of self-
33 Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food (UK), Agriculture in Syria, Ministerial Report, London, 
HMSO, 1996, p 9 
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sufficiency, and a rise in the proportion of land under actual cultivation. However, the 
actual absolute levels of production did not rise out of all proportion. In assessing the 
reforms, it would be fair to state that the economic impact on farmers was substantial 
in altering their relationship with the land. 35 Years of confusion followed the initial 
land reforms, but agricultural productivity does seem to have increased. But the main 
impact of the first and subsequent land reforms was both psychological and political. 
Mohammed Harba, the son of a peasant who rose to ministerial rank under the Ba'ath 
summed it up eloquently when he said that "in a mere twenty-five years Syria [had] 
experienced a revolution on the land which it took France a century to accomplish."36 
Together with these economic changes, the political landscape within Syria 
also changed beyond all recognition after 1963. The creation of a socialist democracy 
meant the acceptance of the absolute dominance of the Ba'ath Party in political affairs 
by the other (still operating) radical parties.37 However, the Ba'ath itself was not 
necessarily internally united. The years between 1963 and 1966 were characterised by 
internal conflict within the Party, split roughly along radical and conservative lines. In 
1966 the radical wing of the Ba'ath prevailed, supported by a faction within the 
military, and replaced the National Revolutionary Council with a government 
favouring closer co-operation with the Soviet Union and the COMECON bloc, 
abandoning in the process, to a large extent, the original pan-Arab objectives of the 
Ba'ath.38 This success was also marked by the expulsion of Micheal 'Aflaq, the 
original founder of the Ba'ath, from Syria. However the military defeat in the June 
34 V. Perthes, op.Cit., p 24 
35 Many villages held elaborate ceremonies with landlord-owned land being 'returned' to villagers. 
36 P.Seale, op.Cit., p 447 
37 The main threat to the Ba'athists came from the Communists, an issue only finally resolved with the 
creation of the National Progressive Front in 1972. 
38 Since 1966 until the demise ofthe Iraqi Ba'ath Regime there had been latent and occasionally open 
tension and conflict between Iraq and Syria, as the Iraqi Ba'ath Party and the Syrian Ba'ath Party 
disagreed as to which faction truly represents the original objectives of the Party. 
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1967 War and the resulting loss of the strategic Golan Heights rapidly weakened the 
new government's position and led to renewed internal struggles within the Ba'ath 
about how to move forward. At the heart of the struggle lay the rivalry between Assad 
and Salah Jadid, the then Syrian President. There were a number of differences 
between the radical government and a group of officers loyal to Assad that came into 
the open after the 1967 conflict. First of all, there were the Palestinian guerrillas. 
After the defeat the Jadid government continued to glorify them and affirm Syria's 
commitment to a 'people's' war;39 Assad saw that the war had proven that the 
Palestinians could be allowed to operate as they pleased; their pre-war raids had 
played into Israeli hands, giving Israel a pretext to threaten Syria and to involve Egypt 
in the crisis. The Jadid government was also still intent on carrying out the 'class 
struggle', both internally, against the Sunni bourgeoisie, and externally, refusing to 
attend the Khartoum summit in August 1967 to show its contempt for reactionary 
Arab regimes present there. However the Khartoum summit agreed to set funds aside 
for both Jordan and Egypt to rebuild and rearm40 whilst Syria, as a result of not 
attending, did not receive any immediate help. Jadid's government also seemed to be 
focussed on the need to recreate Syria in the Ba'athist image, on internal struggle and 
the need for a permanent revolution, whereas Assad was intent on rebuilding Syria as 
quickly as possible for the resumption of the struggle with Israel. As part of that 
objective, Assad saw the need to find a renewed national consensus between the 
existing political parties and political forces in Syria. Although Assad did agree that 
the Ba'ath should be the main source of organised political power in Syria, he 
nevertheless argued that: 
39 P.Seale, op.Cit., p 144 
40 ibid, p 144 
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"[ ... ] we had not seized power on our own in 1963: there were other currents 
in the country which had much in common with us. We dealt with their 
leaders as individuals [ ... ], but we did not recognise them as organised 
political groups. I was for doing so. I believed we should form a front with 
them."41 
The differences between Jadid and Assad were of such severity that the term 
'duality of power' has been used to describe the situation in Syrian politics at that 
time.42 By 1968 Assad had been able to build up the military Ba'ath party structure as 
a separate one from the formal civilian one - in effect creating two Ba'ath power 
structures existing side-by-side. This uneasy co-existence continued for almost two 
more years. At an emergency National Congress of the Ba'ath Party, called on 30 
October 1970, the party leaders under Jadid's direction stripped Assad and his aide 
and friend Mustafa Tlas of their army commands and government posts. The 
leadership of the General Federation of Trade Unions backed the government against 
Assad' s military faction in atmouncing that : 
"the Popular Organisations [Peasant and Trade Union Federations] insist on 
strengthening and developing the present regime. They regard retreat from the 
achievements implemented by the Party and the Popular Organisations [ ... ] as 
the beginning of a painful setback which only serves the counter-revolutionary 
forces in their ferocious attack. "43 
This was a thinly veiled attack on the more conservative or less radical men 
grouped around Assad. He, however, could afford to ignore the resolutions of the 
Ba'ath Congress, as he had taken the precaution prior to the Congress of having all 
approach roads guarded with loyal troops and having the Conference Hall itself 
surrounded. When news of this pre-emptive strike became common knowledge 
amongst the delegates, the conference broke up in disarray on the 1th November and 
Assad was able to take power in a bloodless coup d'etat. 
41 ibid, p 146 
42 ibid, p 148 
43 Middle East Record 1969-70, London, 1970, p 1155 
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2.5. Policy and Performance under Assad 1970-80 
Although As sad's coup in 1970 initiated a further sustained period of 
economic and political change for Syria, Waldner has suggested that the economic 
refonns following the coup d'etat were primarily designed to further widen the base 
of support for the regime44 and were not specifically intended to liberalise the 
economy. In a sense then the actions of Assad can be seen post-1970 as emulating the 
actions of the radical Ba' ath in power from 1963; economics and economic issues had 
to serve political aims and goals, first and foremost the further development of the 
Party's power-base. However, following the uncertain years of internal political 
dissent and conflict, Assad did certainly unite the Ba'ath Party and impose a coherent 
- economic development strategy for Syria, based on clear and specific political tenets 
and setting clear economic and political objectives. During his consolidation of power 
he followed relatively liberal economic policies which, according to Ma'oz, "were 
aimed at revitalising the small and medium-sized private sector enterprises."45 
Commentators agree that the coup d 'et at in 1970 represented a switch from the 
radical socialist wing of the Ba'ath Party towards a more pragmatic approach, indeed 
represented the (in hindsight) definitive victory of the pragmatic or realist wing ofthe 
Ba'ath Party with a leader determined to permanently transform Syria.46 It is however 
no accident that the 'victory of the Correctionist Movement', as the coup d'etat is 
referred to in Syria, is portrayed as a correction of Ba'ath policy rather than a sudden 
or violent break with the 1963-70 period. It can be said that, whilst in practice the 
goals and aspirations of the two wings of the Ba'ath differed greatly, in theory they 
simply reflected differences of opinion within the ideological framework of the 
44 D.Waldner, More than meets the Eye, Middle East Insight, May/June 1995, pp 34-37 
45M_ Ma'oz, op.Cit., p 75 
46 P. Seale, op.Cit., p 171 
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Ba'ath. Starting in 1971, within the confines of the above-mentioned 'correctionist 
course', Ass ad set in motion a broad reform programme in both the economic and 
political spheres. A new Constitution was proclaimed, local self-administration was 
introduced, and a new Parliament was convened. Ten days after seizing power Assad 
had called upon the offices of the General Federation of Trade Unions to explain his 
government's political and economic programs, a delay that says much for the initial 
concentration of Assad's power in the military, rather than civilian area of the Ba'ath. 
After his visit, leading trade unionists expressed their support for the new regime47, 
giving Assad a useful link into the powerful Syrian Trade Unions. Assad reciprocated 
for this show of support at such a crucial time by immediately calling for the creation 
of a 'National Progressive Front' to involve other groups and parties besides the 
Ba'ath in government and political activity48 , a line of policy he had already quietly 
articulated pre-1970. 
Once Assad had made sure that his political power base was reasonably 
secure, he switched his attention to economic issues. In general terms, Assad's 
economic policies could be termed infitah, 'opening-up', but perhaps the term 
adopted by Lawson seems more appropriate. His expression for the reform 
programme was one of a "gradual relaxation of state control"49, this policy being an 
integral part of Assad's plan to moderate and shape the future economic direction of 
the Syrian state.so The Third 5-Year Plan (1971-1975) saw a concentration on public-
sector industrial development, with As sad's intention being to maintain a central 
47J.Harik & D.J.Sulivan (eds.), Privatization and Liberalization in the Middle East, New York, 1992, p 
139 
48 Bank Gesellschaft Berlin, Country Report Syria ,March 1996, p 4 
49 F.Lawson, Political-Economic Trends in Ba 'athi Syria: A Re- interpretation, Orient, Vol. 29, No 4 
December 1988, pp 579 
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command in key areas of the economy, whilst allowing the development and 
expansion of the private sector in marginal areas; the ultimate aim being to produce a 
mixed economy51 whilst retaining a large measure of economic control by the state. 
Indeed, Heydemann has argued persuasively that, 
"the Syrian regime has pursued stabilisation in a highly selective fashion. 
Rather than embark at one time on a full-fledged programme of economic 
rationalisation, with its attendant political risks, the Syrian government has 
managed economic reform as an inherent political process."52 
From 1970 to 1973 an Exceptional Import System was gradually introduced, 
allowing the limited import of previously prohibited goods. Import restrictions on a 
limited number of goods were lifted and certain categories of imports were relieved of 
the need to execute concurrent foreign-exchange transfers. 53 A General Authority for 
Free Trade Zones was established, offering foreign investors the possibility of 
participating in the Syrian market without being subject to import licensing or 
domestic labour laws. In addition, the return of expatriate capital which had moved 
abroad rapidly after 1963, was encouraged by a promulgated amnesty for 'financial 
and economic offences' committed before 1970.54 In the countryside, Hinnebush 
argued that, based on fieldwork carried out during 1972-1973, 
"it does seem that the creation of a new social and political infrastructure and 
the social reforms [in rural Syria] have laid part of the essential basis for the 
continuing modernisation of Syrian state and society."55 
This statement was made in assessing the initial results of the land reform 
projects (carried out since 1963) and the irrigation schemes begun after 1970. Across 
50 lnfitah did also apply to a certain degree to the political sphere, but to a far lesser degree, although 
Ass ad always made sure that the formalities of a democratic republic were always adhered to. 
51 M. Ma'oz, op.Cit., p 74-75 
52 S. Heydemann, The Political Logic of Economic Rationality: Selective Stabilisation in Syria, in H.J. 
Barkey (ed.), The Politics of Economic Reform in the Middle East, New York, St Martin's Press, 1992, 
p 
53 V .Perthes, op.Cit., pp 50 
54SAR, Legislative Decree 2 of 1971, Central Statistics Office, Damascus 
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the countryside roads, electricity, piped water, schools and hospitals were 
transforming rural life. Dozens of small dams were built to trap every drop of 
rainwater. Grain stores and silos were established in every rural govemorate. In the 
words of Seale, "the ignorant and oppressed sharecropper, so familiar a figure of 
Assad's youth, very largely disappeared."56 This is what the Ba'ath had come to do 
and this is what they achieved - the lifting of the great majority of the Syrian 
population out of poverty and ignorance. As a result the Ba'ath also gained a loyal 
and devoted following amongst the rural population. 
Although Arab private-sector investment was encouraged, control of the 
economy and of the political arena remained firmly with the government, even during 
this initial consolidation period. Assad was able to utilise Syria's position vis-a-vis 
Israel and his pragmatic stance (as opposed to Jadid) on the international scene as a 
means of attracting capital in the form of loans and aid from the Gulf States. It was 
largely this availability of external capital that financed the subsequent Syrian 
investment programme during the 1970's. This reliance has led commentators to 
describe Syria at the time as a quasi-rentier state. Robinson in particular notes that 
Syria's rentierist characteristics render the amount of resources available to the state 
"sensitive on both the international and domestic fronts."57 Following the 1973 War, 
the prospects for further economic expansion seemed good. Higher oil prices resulted 
in higher income and Assad was able to initiate a series of reform programmes 
between 1973 and 1975. Syria's hard currency reserves situation improved 
dramatically following the war due to higher prices for oil, cotton and phosphates, 
55 R.Hinnebusch, Local Politics in Syria: Organisation and Mobilisation in Four Villages, Middle East 
Journal, 1976, vo130, p 24 
56 P. Seale, op.Cit., p 447 
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increased capital inflow from other Arab countries (on average 540 US$ million/year 
between 197 4 and 1977)58, international credits and worker remittances. Public 
development spending increased around twelve-fold between 1970 and 1980 with the 
average growth rate of GDP around 13% between 1973 and 1976.59 In 1975 Assad 
announced that certain oil exploration areas were to be offered to foreign oil 
compames under production sharing agreements. A number of companies 
subsequently took up concessiOn areas (amongst them Shell, Marathon and Elf 
Aquitaine).60 
However the direct link between foreign Arab aid and defence expenditure 
remained as an obstacle to real economic growth in areas unrelated to defence or 
state-sponsored investment projects. In order to live up to its role as a 'front-line' state 
in the Arab-Israeli conflict, As sad had to continue to spend heavily on the military, 
and was thus faced with a growing and permanent drain on his budget. By 1980 
Syrian defence expenditure had reached the level of Sy£ 8.9 billion.61 Arab aid from 
abroad remained conditional on Syria striving to reach parity with Israel in strategic 
terms, a futile undertaking, considering the massive support the USA has always 
given the Israeli military and economy. Additionally, it could be argued that the 
dependency of the Syrian economy on Arab aid might well have led to a 
determination to display a 'front-line state' mentality in dealings with Israel in order 
to continue to attract net inward flows of aid. 
Full-scale reform of the economic system was neither intended nor 
attempted. Nevertheless, the creation of 'boom' conditions (witness actual growth 
57 L.Robinson, Rentierism and Foreign Policy in Syria, Arab Studies Journal, Vol. IV, No 1, Spring 
1996, p 37 
58 Syria, EIU Country Profile, 1991-92, p 14 
59 Middle East R~yiew, 1980, p 369 
60 Syria, EIU Country Profile, 1991-92, p 13 
61 International Institute for Strategic Studies, Military Balance, 1970-1995 
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rates of 13% as opposed to a planned growth rate of around 8.2%)62 and rapid 
development led to an increase in the trade deficit to Sy£ 2.9 billion by the middle of 
the decade. The Fourth Five-Year Plan 1976-1980 was originally formulated with a 
large investment in infrastructural projects in mind. However the involvement of 
Syrian troops in Lebanon from 1976 onward (with over 26 000 troops committed by 
1979)63 meant that Arab aid (in particular from Kuwait and Saudi Arabia) was either 
cut off or became more umeliable and variable, as well as putting the economy on a 
virtually permanent war footing (this apart from the fact that for internal and external 
political and strategic defence reasons the Syrian army in peacetime claimed a 
permanently large defence budget as of right). Beginning in 1976, inflation began to 
rise and the government was faced with a deterioration in the balance of payment 
figures. The economic focus of the regime had to turn away from new investment 
projects and instead had to ensure the successful completion of those projects already 
underway. The Fourth Five Year Plan thus became "more a notional guide to 
priorities rather than a strict framework"64 , with constant revisions being made to its 
structure. Import restrictions were re-introduced in 1977 (and again extended in 1981) 
on consumer items, foreign-exchange controls for trade were re-introduced and 
special economic courts were set up to deal with foreign exchange fraud, fraud 
connected with state contracts and smuggling (the latter being endemic between Syria 
and Lebanon). 
The regime was sending a clear message to the private sector that it was still in 
charge and thus would still determine the limits and the parameters of economic 
policy; and that concessions made to the free market could be rescinded if necessary. 
62 Syria. EIU Country Profile, 1991-92, p 14 
63 Middle East Review, 1980, p 363 
64 Middle East Review, 1980, p 370 
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It is interesting to note however, that in this context the impetus for economic 
adjustment of policies came from the problems faced on the external political front. 
Economically, the infitah policies were working, as long as external Arab aid 
continued to flow into Syria. Once this had reduced, and with Assad setting his 
priority on the political front, the regime reduced the importance of the economy 
accordingly. This change in policy illustrates graphically the secondary role the 
economy played at that time for Assad - if his political aims and goals were m 
conflict with economic plans or aims, it was the economic plans that had to give. 
The Baghdad Conference in November 1979 (in reaction to the Camp David 
Accords) resulted in a promise of increased aid from the Gulf States (US$ 1.8 
billion/year) for Syria.65 The continued involvement of Syrian troops in Lebanon 
however (and the departure of the non-Syrian military units of the Arab Defence 
Force during 1978), continued to represent an addition drain on the Syrian defence 
budget, continued to fuel the black market in Damascus and Aleppo and laid large 
numbers of the ruling elite open to charges of corruption. 
The continual problem, as Waldner has persuasively argued, was that "the 
pattern of economic policy-making [was] designed to ensure social support for the 
regime as much as to produce efficient economic outcomes."66 
Essentially, with the political Islamist threat internally simmering away and 
periodically erupting (witness the Artillery School massacre of June 197967 and a rash 
65 Middle East Review, 1980, p 284 
66 D.Waldner, op.Cit., p 35 
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of terrorist Islamist attacks on Ba'ath officials, Islamist sheikhs who had denounced 
violence, and Russian technicians68) and the external involvement in Lebanon, the 
Syrian leadership had to make sure that its traditional powerbases in the country were 
supplied and satisfied. This meant that the economic policy and the economic 
resources of the country were stretched to almost breaking point and had to be pressed 
completely into the service of regime survival. Nothing else mattered. 
67 Unarmed Alawi recruits were trapped inside a artillery school and shot down in cold blood, a trigger 
for a country-wide rash of terrorist attacks against Ba'ath officials, the military, students and trade 
unionists. 
68 P. Seale, op.Cit., p 324 
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2.6. The Years of Crisis and Survival: §yria from 1980-90 
The economic and political situation for Syria in 1980 looked bad, and was not 
about to get better. The 1980's marked the beginning of a period of acute economic 
stagnation and political tension for Syria. Although a number of large foreign 
contracts had been awarded to construct turn-key industrial plant and infrastructure in 
the last years of the 1970's (and by 1982 France, West Germany and Switzerland had 
all entered into agreements protecting their investments in Syrian industries against 
possible nationalisation, thus achieving a large measure of security)69 , and the 
government in addition had sought to attract foreign interest in setting up joint 
ventures with Syrian public companies, the reality of the Syrian investment strategy 
was somewhat different. A German civil servant interviewed in 1982 commented that: 
"[We] made a determined effort to initiate joint ventures by sponsoring a 
business organisation to send an official to Damascus. After 2 ~ years he left, 
frustrated by bureaucracy and the cumbersome system of regulations, and by 
the collapse ofmost ofthe various joint venture proposals."70 
These joint ventures included the Horns ammonia plant built by Creusot Loire 
Enterprises (completed in 1979, but not functioning until late 1981 due to a lack of 
Syrian specialists), and the sugar refineries at Raqqa, Deir-al-Zor, Salhab and 
Mashkaneh, all working well below capacity due to supply and transport problems.7 1 
Continued realism thus had to dictate the formulation of the 1981-1985 Five-Year 
Plan, again placing the onus on completing projects rather than embarking on new 
ones. Hussein al-Qadi (Minister for Industry) said in 1980: "Before embarking on any 
fresh industrial expansion, we are keen to operate at full capacity projects which have 
already been started. "72 The fight against inflation and corruption was seen as the 
main element of the Plan, combined with a rise in government subsidies and a revised 
69 Middle East Review, 1982, p 300 
70 ibid, p 300 
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import policy restricting additional 'unnecessary commodities'73 and offering 
additional incentives towards the import of raw materials and industrial equipment 
and machinery. However, Waldner has correctly argued that these early measures 
included in the state budgets to encourage private economic activity "did not establish 
a clear pattern of liberalisation, as they were mixed with other measures that 
continued and even enhanced state control over the economy."74 In addition, the 
traditional sector of agriculture, always supported in the past to ensure continued 
political support for the regime, faced its first setback; the "expenses for agriculture 
[investment in the 1981-1985 plan] were low and amounted to less than 10% ofthe 
total investment realised during the two Five Year Plans of 1971-1975 and 1976-
1980"75, according to Perthes. Lawson has identified the period of 1981-1985 as being 
one of a "re-assertion of central direction"76 after the more open policies of the 
1970's. 
This was almost certainly a direct reaction of the regime to the political unrest 
m Syria during the time period in question. The Islamist terrorist threat had 
culminated in the Hama uprising in 1982, the subsequent internecine fights within the 
Ba'ath Party structure, the attempted coup d'etat by Rifaat al-Assad, all these acute 
political threats to the stability of the regime over the period of only a few short years 
produced an instinctive political withdrawal into a siege mentality- and the economy 
followed suit. 
Thus, for most of the early to mid 1980's, Syria faced grave economic and 
political problems - a foreign exchange crisis which developed into economic 
71 ibid, p 300 
72 Middle East Review, 1981, p 326 
73 ibid, p 327 
74 D.Waldner, op.Cit., p 35 
75 V.Perthes, The Syrian Economy in the 1980's, Middle East Journal, 1992, vol46, p 38-39 
76 F.Lawson, op.Cit., pp 579 
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depression, low public resources and austerity budgets, a number of political uprisings 
culminating in open rebellion in Hama, and a strong challenge to the legitimacy of 
Assad's rule by his own brother. Nevertheless, the early 1980's did have one bright 
spot for Assad - in 1980 the Muslim Brothers had attempted to close down Syria 
economically by initiating widespread urban uprisings. The problems had started in 
Hama, with a two-week shutdown of the business quarter initiated by the Brothers. 
Hama, Horns, Idlib and Dayr al-Zur followed suit. Seale describes eloquently what 
occurred when the Brotherhood attempted to spread this rebellion to Damascus: 
"Would Damascus, Assad's capital, follow the trend? Anonymous leaflets 
circulated calling on merchants in the Hammadiyeh [ ... ] to close in solidarity 
with the northern cities. At this critical juncture when the goverriment seemed 
in imminent danger losing control Assad found an ally in Badr al-Din al-
Shallah, the influential chairman of the Federation of the Chambers of 
Commerce, a patriarch in his eighties who rallied prominent shopkeepers and 
urged them to stay open, turning the tide in favour of the regime. "77 
This event was a milestone in Assad's political strategy. It proved that the 
regime had been able to break out of the largely marginal support structures it had 
previously commanded and was now able to draw upon certain elements of the older 
traditional Syrian middle classes as well. However, subsequent events proved that the 
Islamists were not defeated. The campaign of terror continued and culminated in 1982 
with an uprising in Hama, defeated with great force by the regime. The defeat and the 
subsequent permanent suppression of the Islamist movement in Syria in a sense 
marked a political change in the way in which the regime viewed its population and 
its relationship with it. It is often disregarded, in particular recently in the West, that 
the Islamist terrorists leading the revolt in Hama were intent on establishing a 
fundamentalist Islamic regime in Syria. As Seale again describes it; 
77 P. Seale, op.Cit, p 326 
84 
"No-one truly knew what life would be like under their rule, and although they 
had the sympathy of religious conservatives and of some merchants, former 
landowners and other victims ofBa'ath rule, the weight of opinion was against 
them. Their long campaign of terror was political insanity. At the end of the 
day Ba'athist Syria, a state ruled by an armed party and resting on a broad 
coalition of the countryside and the swelling public sector, proved robust 
enough to defeat the challenge."78 
Nevertheless, this strong challenge to Assad's leadership and to the supremacy 
of the Ba' ath saw the growth of the Intelligence agencies needed to defeat the internal 
threat. Once the Islamists had been defeated, the role and importance of the security 
apparatus was not curtailed, but instead was maintained at an artificially high leveF9 
with predictable results. During the 1970's the regime had been generally liked or at 
least accepted by the majority of the population; with the change of tactics and the 
often brutal imposition of Ba'athist rule necessary to suppress the Islamists, this 
respect by 1982 had changed to fear. 
In the economic sphere, the shortage of foreign exchange had a direct and 
immediate effect on economic activity; in 1984 even state importers had to wait 15-18 
months for letters of credit to be opened (this implied a virtual refusal by the Central 
Bank to even consider opening letter of credit facilities for private importers); this in 
turn led directly to a severe shortage of raw materials and spare parts for existing 
industrial plants and thus to plants operating well below capacity. so In 1986, Syria had 
additionally to cope with the collapse of oil prices, affecting her in three ways: it 
caused a further large drop in profits from oil exports, it reduced the flow of payments 
from expatriate Syrians working in the Gulf, and it made the Gulf states more hesitant 
about fulfilling their aid promises to Damascus. The economic demise of the Eastern 
Trade Bloc COMECON during the late 1980's also put additional strain on the Syrian 
78 P. Seale, op.Cit., p 337 
79 Interview 26, Damascus, 2nd May 1998 
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economy. Indeed, the acceleration of Syrian attempts to deregulate the domestic 
Syrian economy in the late 1980's are generally seen by most observers to be a direct 
reaction to the removal of former Eastern Bloc subsidies and trading partners under 
favourable conditions from Syrian trade,8 1 although it would be wrong to assume that 
a change or even shift in emphasis in Syrian economic policy could ever be mono-
causal. 
By 1985/1986 the government was forced by economic pressure to initiate a 
second injitah in Syria, this one being characterised by Lawson as "controlled 
liberalisation".82 This new economic strategy was first articulated at the 81h Regional 
Congress of the Ba'ath Party, consisting of the following three parts: the state would 
maintain control over the 'commanding heights' of the economy, and economic 
reform would not be allowed to erode the regime's capacity to deploy resources to 
maintain its social and political support, but within these limits private capital would 
be given increasing latitude to operate. Reform began in the agricultural sector, which 
accounted for close to 30% of Syria's economy. February 1986 saw the promulgation 
of Legislative Decree No 10, providing for the creation of joint-stock companies in 
agriculture and tourism (with a minimum 25% stake held by the state). Advantages 
for firms formed under Legislative Decree No 10 were that they were not bound by 
the constraints of the Five-Year Plans. They were able to trade on the free market and 
were exempt from import/export restriction and from taxation on imported goods. 
They were also allowed to hold foreign currency accounts within Syria and transfer 
foreign currency abroad (within certain limits). Hopfinger has described these 
80 Middle East Review, 1985, p 243 
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companies as "Shareholding Corporations".83 Fruits and vegetables were the main 
produce of these ventures and these were exempted from agricultural taxation to 
facilitate their export abroad. As a consequence, by 1991, Syria's joint stock farms 
had become leading suppliers of these crops to the Arab Gulf States. Up to 1991 
eleven such joint stock farms had been approved. Subsequent secondary legislation 
also allowed a relaxation of import restrictions covering agricultural machinery; and 
between 1989 and 1992 almost 40 000 tractors and agricultural machines had been 
purchased by private individual farmers, more than the total of agricultural machinery 
in the country before 1989.84 The new joint stock farms were not seen universally as a 
step forward in agricultural development. One of the critics of this approach has been 
Perthes: 
"Instead of providing land to the new agro-companies, it would have made 
more sense to give the land and the supporting assistance - such as credits, 
seeds, fertiliser and machinery - to the many deprived and unemployed 
fellahin [ ... ] It was unlikely that this approach [of the agro-companies] would 
cause an improvement in the living conditions of the rural population [ ... ] It 
would seem that this new agricultural policy might lead to a replication of the 
same pattern of distribution whereby the urban areas accumulated rural 
surplus. This pattern dominated Syria before the 1958 land reform initiative, 
when absentee landlords based in Aleppo, Horns, Hama and Damascus ruled 
the countryside with virtually unlimited power."85 
Although the actual long-term outcome of the agricultural reforms are still to 
be analysed, the agricultural reform of 1986 does point out a long-terms shift in 
emphasis for the regime away from its traditional rural support base in the countryside 
and towards its new party cadre and its developing bourgeoisie support structures in 
the urban areas of Syria. This policy change can be attributed to two major 
considerations by the regime. The first was that the Islamist threat to the regime had 
come from the cities of Syria, not from the countryside, and that the regime had to 
83 H. Hop finger, Capitalist Agro-Business in a Socialist Country? Syria's new ShareHolding 
Corporations as an Example, unpublished research article 1990 
84 M. al-Imadi, Interview, Financial Times, 5th November I 992 
87 
focus on broadening its support base. But in addition, the regime calculated that the 
growth of the population of the cities through rural-urban migration offered a unique 
opportunity to incorporate into her power structure new arrivals from the countryside, 
often students or workers attracted to the cities by hopes of individual advancement. 
The regime was well set to capitalise on these aspirations and strove hard to fulfil 
them. 
In conjunction with agriculture, development of tourism was also supported, 
with the Decision of the Supreme Council for Tourism No 186 of 1985, exempting 
investors in tourism infrastructure from certain taxes and currency restrictions. 86 In 
1985 Syrians were allowed to open foreign currency accounts with the Central Bank 
to finance their imports (with few questions asked as to the origin of their funds)87 and 
companies could keep up to 75% of their foreign currency earnings to finance their 
own imports. By 1989 the official exchange rate for the Syrian pound was being 
continually re-assessed to keep it in line with the free/neighbouring countries rate, all 
measures to encourage the declaration of foreign currency earnings. In 1990 the 
government temporarily offered to buy private export earnings at the 
free/neighbouring countries rate - in effect conceding the state monopoly on foreign 
exchange transactions. The table below shows the precarious nature of the (official) 
foreign reserves of the Syrian treasury during 1985 - one of the prime motivators for 
the flexibility shown towards the tourism sector: 
85 V .Perthes, The Syrian Economy in the 1980's, Middle East Journal, 1992 vol46 p 52-53 
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Figure 4: Foreign Reserves of Syria 1983-1993 
1983 1985 1987 1989 1991 1993 Foreign Reserves US$ Millj 
Source: IMF, IBRD, MEED, BGB88 
Deregulation of foreign trade was also initiated, allowing a mix of public and 
private sector investments in previously state monopoly areas. The above measures 
allowed the private sector to make dramatic increases in capital formation, output and 
exports during the period 1985-1990. Indeed, utilising a number of sources, the 
diagram below shows a steadily rising GDP throughout the late 1980's. From around 
Sy£ 75,000 million in 1983/1984, we can see a steady rise in GDP to a level of around 
Sy£ 270,000 million in 1990. 
Figure 5: GDP in Syria 1983- 1990, in Sy£ million 
1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 GDP S£ Mill I 
Source: IMF, IBRD, MEED, BGB89 
A major contributing factor to this turn-around in the latter years of the 1980's 
was the fact that oil production as a major revenue earner trebled from 160,000 b/d in 
1984 to 480,000 b/d in 1991 as a result of newly discovered oil fields coming on 
88 Bank Gesellschaft Berlin, Country Report Svria, March 1996, p 20 
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line.90 The following figure demonstrates the consistent growth in output experienced 
by the Syrian oil industry during those years: 
Figure 6: Crude Oil Production in Syria 1983 - 1991 in 1000 b/d 
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Source: lMF, IBRD, MEED, BGB91 
This major economic development had a number of major repercussions in 
both the economic and political sphere. Economically Syria was at last able to post a 
trade surplus (see below). Practically, the regime was able to increase defence 
spending, purchase a number of new weapons systems from the Soviet Union92 and 
continue subsidising a number of major public infrastructual development projects. 
On the political side the regime was able to deflect marginal criticism from its left 
wing and the Communist Party concerning the operation of Western oil exploration 
partners in Syria, and was able to point with some justification to generally rising 
standards ofliving and levels ofprosperity. The political crisis ofthe early 1980's had 
been weathered and the regime went so far as to release a number of political 
dissidents (from the early days of the Ba'ath) as part of a series of Presidential 
amnesties. It was suggested however that these decisions were also intended to 
89 ibid, p 20 
90 D. Butter, Syria Emerges From The Shadows, MEED, 12 March 1991 , p 5 
91 Bank Gesellschaft Berlin, Country Report Syria, March 1996, p 20 
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buttress the position of the Ba' ath vis-a-vis the Islamist threat, after 1982 still active 
in illegality. 93 
As a result of the above developments, the balance of trade began to look 
reasonable on paper, after the dire years ofthe early to mid 1980's. In 1989 Syria was 
able to post a balance of trade surplus of US$ 1,192 million94 (or 991 million 
according to a second source )95 for the first time in almost 30 years. The Ministry of 
the Economy and Foreign Trade attributed this to a 60% rise in non-petroleum exports 
during 1989. However, as Lawson has pointed out, 
"much of the surplus [in fact] resulted from a sharp increase in the value of 
goods shipped to the Soviet Union -just over 1 US$ [billion] for the year. 
Sceptics in the local press and the People's Assembly speculated that the 
dramatically improved figures were little more than a statistical illusion, since 
trade with the Soviet Union was automatically calculated at the most 
favourable exchange rate.96 
This still does not detract from the fact that the official figures for 1989 and 
the subsequent years showed an improving trend towards a neutral level of balance of 
trade. Figure 7 shows that although the surpluses achieved in 1989, 1990 and 1991 
diminished in 1992, the deficit did not immediately rocket back up to the high levels 
of the early 1980's. As always, these official figures should be treated with caution, 
and should been seen as an indicator of a trend rather than as absolutely correct. 
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Figure 7: Balance ofTrade 1983-1993, US$ Billion 
3 
-3 .J.:!I:ILliEICII;IIIBI!III!iiiiiii!!~~~~~~~~~--BIIII-..-111111111...-' 
1983 1985 1987 1989 1991 1993 .---Ba-lan-ce_o_f_T-ra_d_e -U-S$_B_i__,ll, 
Source: IMF, IBRD, MEED, BGB97 
Syria had finally weathered the 1980's in terms of economics and politics; 
after the lean years of the early 1980's, increased oil revenue and the survival of 
Assad in power for twenty years, Syria seemed to be entering a new phase. Certainly 
the collapse of the Soviet Union was a major issue, but Syria seemed to be on the 
verge of stability at last. That was however an illusion; and indeed there was to be not 
let-up; the 1990's were just around the corner. 
97 Bank Gesellschaft Berlin, Country Report Syria ,March 1996, p 20 
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2.7. Am llnteli'Budle: §yll'ia ni!D. 1990-1991 
The result of the involvement of Syria in the Gulf War in 1991 meant 
that the difficult situation regarding external financial aid experienced during the 
1980's was eased. Estimates of the amount of aid Syria received after the Gulf War 
vary widely, from between US$ 2,000 million to US$ 4,000 million, with Gulf Arab 
aid estimated at US$ 1,500 million alone.98 Post Gulf War finance, in contrast to the 
finance packages of the 1970's, was tied to specific projects, limiting government 
discretion over its use. A large proportion of this funding was earmarked to upgrade 
urban infrastructure and a percentage was designated to supplement private sector 
funding for capital projects too large or too sensitive for the private sector to finance 
alone. 99 Heydemann has argued that prior to 1991 the Syrian leadership had 
independently implemented a set of measures that looked much like an IMF 
stabilisation programme, without entering into a relationship with the IMF.Ioo Syria's 
relationship with the IMF itself remained at best distant101 , with the regime stating 
that "it will under no circumstances submit to an IMF -approved reform 
programme" 102, yet the reform programme continued, even after the influx of post 
Gulf War finance. It could be said that this was an indicator that the regime was 
committed to the selective reform programme begun with the Correctionist Movement 
98 V. Perthes, The Political Economy of Syria under Assad, London, I.B.Tauris, 1997, p 34 
99 D.Waldner, More than meets the Eye, Middle East Insight, May/June 1995, p 36-37 
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in 1970103 , whilst making sure that the regime remained in control of the programme 
using it in ways it saw fit. 
I 03 S. Heydemann, The Political Logic of Economic Rationality: Selective Stabilisation in Syria, in H.J. 
Barkey (ed), The Politics of Economic Reform in the Middle East, New York, St Martin's Press, 1992, 
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2.8. Ambition or §tagllllation: Syria after 1991 
As part of the gradual reform program initiated in 1986, the Syrian 
Parliament in 1991 passed Investment Law No 10, the most ambitious stage so far 
(measured by Syrian standards) in Syria's attempt to revitalise her economy by 
attracting foreign investors and encouraging the private sector. The law theoretically 
allowed Arab or foreign investors to set up private or mixed (state/private joint 
ventures) in almost any area of the Syrian economy. Of particular interest is the right 
to repatriate invested capital and profits, and the guarantee of capital using the Inter-
Arab Investment Guarantee Agency or any other Guarantee Agency. Exemptions 
from corporate, income and property taxation are given up to seven years (and can be 
extended by two additional years if the project exports 50% or more of its output). 104 
The Higher Investment Council, created under the new legislation and supported by 
the Investment Bureau attached to the Prime Minister's office, had approved 529 new 
individual projects by the end of 1992, representing a total of Sy£ 79.5 billion in 
investment and the creation of 42 000 new jobs.105 By mid 1993 this figure had grown 
to 727 projects, with a total invested capital of Sy£ 96 billion. 106 Approved projects 
reached a new high of at least 950 by mid 1994. 107 By 1996 the overall amount 
invested was around US$ 6 billion. lOS However by November 1996, according to US 
sources, 'only a small percentage of approved projects have even began construction, 
much less operation.' 109 Nevertheless, regarding Investment Law No 10, the IMF in 
their report on Syria for 1991 stated that; 
104 MEED, 24th May 1991, p 29 
105 L. Marlowe, Financial Times, 5th November 1992 
106 M. ai-Imadi, Financial Times, 11th May 1993 
107 J. Whittington, Financial Times, 101h May 1994 
108 N.P.al-Chaoui, The Role and Activities of the Private Sector in the Syrian Market, Conference 
Paper, CBI Conference on Syria, 1996, p 3 
109 A. George, No Going Back, The Middle East, November 1996, p 20 
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"In a major policy shift in the early 1990's, the Syrian authorities initiated a 
multi-pronged reform program aimed at laying the foundations of a market 
base, export orientated economy driven by private sector initiatives. [ ... ] The 
reform program encouraged private sector investment through fiscal 
incentives; opened up foreign trade to the private sector; and improved private 
sector access to foreign exchange." 11 o 
The above passage was approvingly quoted by Mohammed al-Imadi, the 
Syrian Minister for Economy and Foreign Trade in March 1997 in a speech given to 
an audience of potential foreign investors. However, despite the apparent success of 
Investment Law No 10 in attracting new investment, the regime has been slow to 
follow with further reforms. The same above-mentioned Minister for Economy and 
Foreign Trade was quoted in 1993 as saying: "We believe in the public sector. It plays 
an important role in our infrastructure. The idea of our economic reform is not to 
transfer ownership, it is to add to what we already have." 111 These differing 
statements highlight the difficulties the Syrian state continues to face. The ongoing 
difficulty with the reform programme is the inability of the regime to want to risk any 
loss to the existing interest groups within the state. The current investment situation 
suits them to a degree, for whilst the investment structure does allow a certain amount 
of freedom in commercial dealings, it will only allow these privileges to extend to a 
closed cartel of regime-loyal businessmen. 112 Regime policy continues to restrict the 
private sector within specific limits, preserving 'core' elements of the economy, such 
as petroleum, mining, banking, heavy industry and so on for the exclusive attention of 
the state. 113 In the continuing development of the private sector, the Syrian 
government continued to send out mixed messages of intention depending on the 
110 Dr M. ai-Imadi, Opportunities for Investment in the Mediterranean Region, RIIA Conference 
Paper, 61h -7th March 1997, p 12 
Ill J. Whittington, Financial Times, 11th May 1993 
112 V. Perthes, The Economic Debate over Investment Law No 10, unpublished research paper 
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recipients of the message. 114 To anticipate a growth ofGDP in 2000 as was seen at the 
beginning of the 1990's would seem to be premature. After the healthy growth at the 
beginning of the 1990's possibly showing Syria breaking out of decades of economic 
stagnation, the figures for 1993 - 1996 are an indicator that this will not occur in the 
immediate future. After 4 years of surpluses, peaking in 1991 at US$ 1. 762 Million, 
the current account for Syria went back into deficit in both 1993 and 1994, recording 
deficits of around US$ 600 million. 115 GDP Growth between 1989 and 1991 averaged 
just under 10% and Syria's economic growth of around 10% in 1992 increased 
demands for imports, already boosted by the general improvement in the post Gulf 
War economic and political climate. 116 Growth rates for GDP already sunk to 5% in 
1994, and in 1995 the momentum of economic development slowed perceptibly 
further, reflected in a GDP growth rate of around 4%.117 
The Syrian economy in the mid to late 1990's was, in the words of a Western 
analyst, "characterised by structural imbalances, state interference, contradictory 
legislation, bureaucratic overload, artificially fixed pricing, and the state control over 
113 The regime continues to see the public industrial sector in particular as the 'engine' of the state. See 
Transcript of Speech by Prime Minister M. al-Zubi, 3rct December 1989, Foreign Broadcast Information 
Service, Daily Report :Middle East and North Africa Monitoring Service, 5th December 1989 
11 4 One example of this mixed message was the continuation on the statue books until2000 of Law No 
24, which forbid civilians to hold foreign currency, but was in effect obsolete given other financial and 
legal reforms. However Syrian investors and businessmen throughout the 1990's saw Law No 24 as 
quintissential 'catch-all' legislation; if the regime decided that a particular businessman was not 
looking after his backers in the regime or his silent partners, it was often possible to be charged with 
contravention of Law No 24. The widespread effects of Law No 24 can be seen in the following 
example; in December 1995 over 3000 prisoners were released from jails in Syria under a general 
amnesty. What tended not to be reported was the fact that the vast majority of these offenders had been 
imprisoned for foreign currency and related economic offences under Law No 24. The issue of Law No 
24 is further discussed in S. Heydemann, The Political Logic of Economic Rationality: Selective 
Stabilisation in Syria, in H.J.Barkey (ed), The Politics of Economic Reform in the Middle East, New 
York, St Martin's Press, 1992, p 21 
115 D. Butter, Syria Pays the Price of Peace Delays, MEED, 91h February 1996, p 2 
116 B. Linton & G.S. West, Agriculture in Syria, International Relations and Export Promotions 
Divison, Ministry of Agriculture. Fisheries and Food, February 1996, p 20 
117 MEED, 51h January 1996, p 5 
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all substantial resources."118 Reform demands during the last half of the 1990's were 
increasingly being made from within the Syrian business community itself, witness 
the comments made by Badi al-Fallaha, the Deputy Head of the Damascus Chamber 
of Commerce at a seminar on 'Difficulties and Opportunities for Investment', held in 
Damascus in 1996: 
" [We need] an eradication of the bureaucratic jungle, the unification of the 
exchange rates, the abolition of Law No 24. It is also necessary to facilitate the 
construction of a capital and financial market, free of state control, together 
with a network of specialised banks and insurance companies."119 
There has been no shortage of suggestions about the kind of reforms needed to 
help Syria better realise its economic potential. One of the most comprehensive came 
in the form of an open letter published in 1996 by Riyad Saif, an MP and one of 
Syria's leading textile exports. His proposals focussed on 5 key areas: 
a) raising public sector salaries to improve performance and reduce corruption, 
whilst cutting the state workforce; 
b) applying a proper commercial framework to the operations of public sector 
industries; 
c) promoting non-oil exports by removing taxes, commissions and foreign exchange 
controls, improving services at Syrian ports and providing easy access to credit for 
industrial companies; 
d) financial reforms (including the abolition of Law No. 24) and allowing private and 
foreign banks to operate within Syria; 
e) fiscal reforms, allowing industries to freely re-invest profits, and upgrading 
auditing procedures120 
118 BFAI, Wirtschafisentwicklung Syrien, 14th Aprill997, restricted research paper 
119 BFAI, Syrien !m Wettlauf um Auslaendische Investoren, 4th June 1996, restricted research paper 
120 D. Butter, Syria Turns Over a New Leaf, MEED, 5th September 1997, p 5 
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Essentially then, the 1990's were characterised by a fossilisation in both 
political and economic terms within the statist structure of Syria. With both the 
Palestinians and the Jordanians reaching agreements with the ideological and 
traditional enemy, with the ultimate demise of the old backer the Soviet Union 
into a confused and often irrational second-rate power, Assad and the Ba'ath were 
viewed as being either the last dinosaurs of the Arab-Israeli conflict, or as being 
the last true believers in an Arab stance against Israel. The continuing presence of 
Syrian troops in Lebanon - and the concurrent drain on the state's finances - was 
an additional burden placed upon the creaking economy for the sake of political 
expediency. Domestically at least, Syria was politically stable. The opening-up 
had provided enough opportunities for the majority of the population to acquire a 
measure of prosperity, although the permanent argument has been voiced that the 
rapidly expanding populationl21 constantly negates any successes this process 
might have achieved. 
121 V.Perthes, The Political Economy of Syria under Assad, London, 1997, p 252 
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2.9. Conclusion 
The need to move ahead after a decade now must be obviously apparent to 
Hafez-al Assad's successors, in particular his son Bashar, anxious to consolidate 
his still tenuous grip on power. The fact that Hafez el-Assad was able to satisfy his 
traditional political power base in the countryside by apparently maintaining his 
support for them, whilst at the same time developing alternative forms and areas 
of support within the urban communities must give rise to the thought that his 
chosen successor has a hard act to follow. Assad's policy of essentially staving off 
and delaying the increasingly vociferous demands from the members of the Sunni-
dominated bourgeoisie to continue on the path of economic liberalisation will be 
an issue his successor will have to deal with sooner or later. The picture of 
Syria's further economic development seems, even after the death of the Lion of 
Damascus, however, still to be one of continued incremental change, without the 
state abandoning the traditional interest groups that have supported the Ba'ath for 
the past 25 years. It would seem hasty and foolish to assume otherwise. 
Nevertheless, whatever the outcome of the next few years in terms of Syria's 
economic policies, the cornerstone of recent economic reform was set in 1991, 
with the introduction of Investment Law No. 10, and this legislation now forms 
the basis ofthe next chapter. 
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Chapter 3: Investment Law No 10 
3.1. Introduction 
Before May 1991, the Syrian economy was characterised by economic 
nationalism that favoured the public sector within a highly controlled economic 
framework. State interventionist policies had been gradually amended since 1970 to 
allow a greater, albeit strictly limited and controlled, role for the private sector (for a 
more detailed discussion of the economic development of Syria up to 1991 see 
Chapter 2). The foreign exchange-crisis of the mid-1980's added momentum to the 
process of economic liberalisation and Investment Law No 10 represented the most 
significant change to date (2005) to the previous principles of economic management 
in Syria under the control of the Ba'ath Party. Investment Law No 10 was seen as 
such an ideological departure from the Syrian norm that the actual articles of the 
legislation seem worthy of closer examination. In particular, the issues it raises 
concerning the dichotomy between the theory of investment legislation and its 
practical implementation are essential to understand the failure of the Syrian state to 
attract widespread private investment during the 1990's. In the past, this particular 
piece of legislation has only been examined in terms of its theory, what seems to be 
equally important is to see how this legislation actually functions in practice and how 
the recipients of such legislation view it. This chapter will first examine the 
introduction of Investment Law No 10, will then discuss and analyse the individual 
articles of the Law, will look at the implementation of projects under the legislation 
and will then attempt to draw conclusions as to the effectiveness of the legislation. 
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3.2. Baclkgrounllndl and Xntrodlunctiolll of tUne JLaw 
Discussions had begun in 1988 about how to attract more private investment 
into Syria beyond the strict confines of agriculture and tourism (see Chapter Two for a 
discussion of these legislative documents). Opening up the economy to allow private, 
and possibly foreign, investment in Syria outside these previously tightly controlled 
areas was obviously an issue of the highest political sensitivity for the government 
and the regime. At the outset the President's office formed, using the Regional 
Command, a Committee for the Encouragement of Investments to investigate the 
possible need for an Investment Law. It was chaired by the head of the Regional 
Command's Economic Office and contained in addition a number of Cabinet 
ministers. 1 This Committee is an indicator of how serious the government approached 
the issue of this new legislation, given the fact that unlike routine economic 
legislation (comparisons could be drawn with the issue of secondary tax legislation, 
which passed through the legislative approval system at approximately the same 
time), a special extraordinary Committee had to be formed at all. This Committee was 
drawn from a wide range of political opinion and encompassed ministers from a 
number of powerful departments and subsequently held a series of confidential 
meetings over a period of 18 months, examining for comparison the existing 
investment laws of Jordan, Turkey, Egypt and the (then) USSR. It then prepared a 
first draft of legislation. This first draft of investment legislation was then discussed 
extensively in the Regional Command of the Ba'ath Party. It was re-drafted a number 
of times to assuage a number of vehement critics2 before the final draft was submitted 
to the President for approval. The formal procedure for the introduction of legislation 
1 Rashid Ikharini, Salim Yassin (the Deputy Prime Minister for Economic Affairs), Mohammed 
ai'Imadi, and 4 other Ministers. 
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in Syria normally follows a number of set guidelines. The correct procedure for the 
formulation of a piece of economic legislation is for it to originate in the 
administration. A draft law or decree would be drafted in the Ministry responsible; in 
the case of Investment Law No 10, the drafting was undertaken in the Ministry of 
Economy and Foreign Trade, following close consultation with the Committee for the 
Encouragement of Investments. Government ministers in Syria are seen as top civil 
servants, not as political personages. In the case of Investment Law No 10, final 
drafting was therefore only initiated once approval by the President or the Prime 
Minister had been obtained. Inevitably, the law was to have political implications and 
possible repercussions, and thus was extensively debated before it was passed to the 
President's Office. The final draft bill was then submitted to the Economic 
Committee and would have passed through the various hoops of bureaucracy needed 
for its final approval. However, according to sources within the government, the 
actual final formal drafting of the legislation had only started at the beginning of April 
1991 3, and was therefore extremely brief. The President's Office finally presented the 
draft legislation to Parliament on April 25th 1991, and the bill was passed very 
quickly. Unusually for a usually compliant Parliament, debate on the legislation was 
heated, and the members of the Communist faction under Khalid Bakdash, members 
of the PNF, who had been consulted prior to the introduction of the legislation, voted 
against the bill. 4 The law came into effect on the 4th May 1991 with its publication in 
the Official Gazette. The following diagram is indicative of the typical decision 
structure economic legislation has to pass through in Syria; and Investment Law No 
10's progress was typical of this. However Figure 8 should be interpreted with the 
2 Interview 24, Damascus & Aleppo, 12th & 13th May 1998 
3 Interview 5, Damascus, 24th February 1998 
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following in mind: Legislation of an economic nature and indeed the economy itself 
during Hafez al-Assad's leadership generally occupied a secondary position compared 
to the political struggle with Israel and the general need to maintain the Ba'athist 
power structure. Drafting of economic legislation in general therefore was initiated in 
the Ministries concerned, and the President's Office tended to approve non-
controversial legislation without major amendments. The fact that the regime felt the 
need to appoint a specific Committee for the Encouragement of Investments 
(replacing the Economic Committee in Figure 8) to oversee the initiation and 
subsequent drafting of the legislation is a strong indicator of the political importance 
of the legislation in question. The subsequent public reaction to the legislation has 
been addressed in the introduction to Chapter One, and therefore the focus of the 
remainder of the chapter will be on the actual legislation itself. 
4 V. Perthes, The Political Economy of Syria under Assad, London, I.B.Tauris, 1995, p 163 
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Figure 8: Governmental Decision-Making 
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3.3. Specific Articles of Investment Law No 10 
The law itself comprises 39 articles, subdivided into the areas of fields of 
investment, the foundation of a Higher Council of Investment, franchises, privileges 
and facilities, joint-ventures, investment of external funds, and general rules. A 
general breakdown of individual articles follows: 
Articles 1 & 2: Definition of Terms and Limits of the Legislation 
According to Article 1, Investment Law No 10 shall apply to 
"money invested by Syrian Arab citizens, both residents and 
expatriates, and citizens of Arab and foreign countries, in investment projects within 
the framework of the state general socio-economic development plans and the general 
policy ofthe state."5 
The first article in itself sets the tone for the rest of the legislation. Investment 
projects are to run within the framework of existing development plans and must 
conform to the general policy of the state. Investors are thus by implication limited to 
certain state-defined areas of investment. 
Articles 3 & 4: Fields oflnvestment 
The formal limits of the law are exceptionally wide and vague. Theoretically, 
according to Article 3, projects can operate (after approval) in the agricultural, 
industrial, and transport sectors. However, approval for projects lies with the Higher 
Council oflnvestment which scrutinises projects according to set criteria.6 
5 SAR, Investment Law No I 0, article 1 
6 Projects have to be in line with state development plans, utilise local resources as much as possible, 
increase exports, rationalise imports and have stable assets of not less than Sy£ 10 million. 
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Articles 5-9: The Higher Council oflnvestment & Investment Bureau 
The Higher Council of Investment (HCI) comprises a number of Ministers 
under the Chairmanship of the Prime Minister (article 5). It has the power to approve 
development projects under Law No.1 0, it specifies state contributions to the capital 
of any joint-stock companies set up under Law No.1 0, it approves feasibility studies 
for development projects and it assesses foreign funds made available for projects 
under Law No.1 0 (article 6). It convenes every two months at least and when 
otherwise requested by the Chairman (article 7). Under the HCI a Syrian Bureau of 
Investment (SBI) was set up, affiliated to the Deputy Prime Minister for Economic 
Affairs, to refer and prepare projects under Investment Law No.1 0 submitted for 
approval to the HCI. The Syrian Bureau of Investment is also charged with 
implementing the decisions made by the HCI, receiving complaints by investors and 
attempting to settle them (article 8). All information and data offered by investors on 
their projects to the HCI is to remain confidential (article 9). 
Articles 10-18: Franchises, Privileges & Facilities 
Articles 10-18 grant certain privileges and exemptions to investors, covering 
imports (articles 10, 11, 12), taxation (articles 13, 14, 15), and currency regulations 
(articles 16, 17, 18). 
Articles 19-21: Joint Ventures 
Articles 19, 20, 21 and 22 govern the licensing of joint-venture companies set 
up as operations between private investors and state-sector companies. 
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Articles 23-26: Investment of External Funds 
Article 23 defines external funds to include foreign currency transferred to 
Syria from abroad, equipment and material necessary to operate projects, profits, 
revenues and reserves utilised from the investment project, and patent rights and 
trademarks realised from the project in question. Article 24 allows the re-transfer of 
the value of the investor's net share in the project after an initial time period, and 
allows the re-transfer of external (foreign) funds and revenues abroad. Article 25 
grants the Central Bank of Syria the right to allow the re-transfer abroad of the above 
funds. Article 26 governs the insurance of funds invested in projects under Investment 
LawNo.10. 
Articles 27-39: General Rules 
Articles 27-39 cover general rules concerning the legislation, including the 
time period for approval of projects under the law (article 27), accounting procedures 
to be followed (article 28), instances in which privileges granted under the law can be 
withdrawn (articles 29-31 ), the transfer of ownership (article 32), supplementary 
articles concerning existing legislation (articles 33-36), salary transfer arrangements 
for expatriate workers (article 37), and arrangements for the implementation and 
publication ofthe law (articles 38 & 39) 
Summary of Articles of Investment Law No 10 
Bypassing certain then-existing regulations and laws 7, Investment Law No 10 
in short allowed private investors (both Syrian and non-Syrian) to operate in areas 
where their presence had previously been prohibited. Foreign investors and domestic 
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companies were now treated equally in the eyes of the law.8 And, 'according to the 
articles of the law, all projects enjoy exemptions, privileges, facilities and 
guarantees. ' 9 The most important ones in summary include: 
the exemption from duties and taxes on the import of a business's 
requirements in setting up and running the project (article 12) 
tax relief on the operations of joint stock companies for a period of 7 years, 
other companies up to 5 years (article 13) 
the right to open an account in foreign currency at the Commercial Bank of 
Syria10 (article 16) 
the right to transfer in foreign currency out of Syria the net capital initially 
invested in the project (article 24a) 
the annual transfer of profits and revenues in foreign currency (article 24c) 
the transfer abroad, in foreign currency, of 50% of expatriate workers' 
earnings and 1 00% of any compensation awarded at the end of their services 
(article 37). 
Given that under Law 24 of the Syrian Criminal Code (which was still in force 
until 2000) it was illegal for Syrian nationals to hold any amount of foreign currency, 
the provisions of the above legislation passed in 1991 seem revolutionary. Before 
examining how the legislation works in practice however, the actual application 
7 These included Law No 24 and Legislative Decree No 10 
8 However, the actuality of the fairness of the legal process in Syrian civil courts is open to debate; 
according to Interviewee 5, a foreign company would simply have no chance in a civil suit against a 
domestic Syrian company, even if the issue of corruption did not arise. Interview 5, Damascus, 29th 
February 1998 
9SAR, Investment Law No I 0, article I 0 
10 Branch 14 (Damascus) and Branch 16 (Aleppo) of the Commercial Bank of Syria have been 
specifically designated to deal with accounts opened under the rules of Investment Law No 10 
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procedure for the approval of an investment project under Investment Law No 10 has 
to be looked at in more detail. 
110 
3.4. ApplicatioHll Procedure for a Project muller hnvestment Law No. H) 
The procedure for applying for a licence to operate under Investment Law No 
10 seems straightforward. After the initial decision to invest, a list of prerequisites for 
the project, an application form and economic study have to be prepared. These are 
then submitted to the relevant Ministry for analysis (in most cases this will be the 
Ministry for Industry, Ministry of Tourism, or Ministry of Transport). Within 30 days 
from the date of the application, the Ministry has to refer the project proposal to the 
SBI, along with its own recommendation and analysis of the project. The SBI then 
adds its own recommendation and analysis of the project's value to the Syrian 
economy under the guidelines laid down in Investment Law No. 10 (articles 1 & 4) to 
the Ministry's analysis. The SBI then submits the proposal to the HCI for its decision. 
If the project is approved by the HCI, the potential investor has one calendar year to 
initiate the implementation of the project; otherwise the licence is revoked. If the 
project is not approved by the HCI, there is no provision for any formal appeal other 
than following material changes to the project in question. The investor must either 
abandon his project or materially modify it and reapply using a petition to the 
Ministry. The HCI does not have to give any reasons for refusing a licence. The 
framework of application is described in the following diagram: 
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Figure 9: Approval Procedure for Investment Projects 
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The particular Ministries are thus in theory only the conduits of the application 
procedure. The decision-making process begins with the assessment of the individual 
project by the SBI, and is mirrored in the SBI's submission to the HCI. According to 
Investment Law No 10 (article 5), the Director of the SBI is a voting member of the 
HCI. Although the decisions of the HCI are confidential, it can be argued that 
submissions that carry a positive recommendation from the forwarding Ministry and 
the SBI are unlikely to be refused a licence from the HCI. Although it would be 
formally inaccurate to describe HCI approval as a rubberstamp for projects already 
approved and supported by the SBI and relevant Ministries, the actual figures of 
approved projects do indicate a large amount of approvals for projects in a short 
period of time. Between 1991 and 1996, 1476 projects (representing a total 
investment of US$ 6.5 Billion) were approved under Investment Law No 10. 11 If the 
average span of bi-monthly meetings is transposed to these approved projects from 
June 1991 (when the HCI was inaugurated) to the end of 1996, this must have meant 
that on average 44.7 projects were approved by the HCI during every meeting. 12 
Notwithstanding a large number of projects which by necessity must have been fairly 
straightforward, it still leads us to the necessary conclusion that detailed analysis and 
discussion of the merits and demerits of a particular project will have been carried out 
by the relevant Ministry and the SBI in advance, rather than by the HCI itself. Thus 
the decision-making process must be localised within the relevant Ministries and the 
SBI itself, rather than, as the letter of the legislation suggests, within the HCI. 
11 Interview I, Damascus 11th March 1998 
12 A meeting every two months from June 1991 would have resulted in 33 meetings to end 1996, 
averaging almost 45 projects approved per session of the HCI. 
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3.5 Achievements of Investment Law No. 10 
The apparent achievements of the law are represented in the following figures: 
Figure 10: Project Data for Investment Law No 1013 
a) Number of Projects Approved as a Percentage of Total Projects (to end 1996) 
ll!lldustry 
Transport 
Agriculture 
44.0% 
53.0% 
03.0% 
(649 projects) 
(782 projects) 
(045 projects) 
b) Capital Invested as a Percentage of the Total According to Sector 
Industry 
Transport 
Agriculture 
68.0% 
24.0% 
08.0% 
c) Potential Jobs Created as a Percentage of the Total 
Industry 
Transport 
Agriculture 
53.0% 
43.3% 
03.7% 
Industry includes diverse small and medium-scale investment projects m 
almost all areas of the economy, and transport covers the area of tourist and 
commercial car and minibus hire firms. Agriculture is covered by a number of 
13 Interview I, Damascus, 11th March 1998 
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medium and large-scale projects, usually in agreement with local co-operatives. 14 
Short-term projects offering immediate returns on capital invested became very 
popular projects under Investment Law No. 10 and continue to form the 
overwhelming share of projects under Investment Law No. 10, whilst projects 
approved under Investment Law No. 10 to the end of 1996 would theoretically 
provide 102,000 job opportunities. 15 The legal ownership status of the projects 
approved in the period 1991-1996 under Investment Law No. 10 can be individually 
defined as follows: 
Figure 11: Legal Ownership of Investment Projects 1991-199616 
Status of Projects 
Individually Owned 668 
Joint Companies 352 
Limited Partnership Companies 311 
Limited Liability Companies 95 
Limited Joint-Stock Companies 39 
Shareholder Companies 10 
Standing Companies 1 
Total 1476 
14 Most private investment in agriculture is still covered by Executive Decree No. 10 of 1986, allowing 
substantial private investment in particular agricultural projects - most projects prefer to continue to 
operate under Decree No. 10 rather then make the switch to operating under Investment Law No. 10. 
This seems strange at first, however the reason given for this preference is that the amount of 
bureaucracy involved in an Investment Law No. 10 project is simply too formidable. 
15 Syrian Bureau ofliwestment, May 1996 statistical abstract, Damascus, 1996 
16 Interview I, Damascus, 11th March 1998 
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From these last figures available, only 280 projects approved under Investment 
Law No 10 have a foreign ownership component at all (apparently amounting to 60% 
of the total investment in these projects) and of these, only 40 to 50 are partly owned 
by non-Arab foreign investors. Of the 280 projects with a foreign ownership 
component, 30 are fully privately owned, of which just a handful have foreign non-
Arab investors as participants. 17 The above statistics only cover approved projects by 
the Syrian Bureau of Investment. 
17 Interview 1, Damascus, 11th March 1998. The SBI officially refuses categorically to disclose any 
figures concerning the ownership of companies registered with it under Investment Law No I 0. Syrian 
companies are extremely reluctant to disclose shareholding arrangements or foreign participation, if 
only for tax reasons. One Syrian company director even went so far as to categorically deny that they 
held a minority stake in another, majority foreign-owned, firm, although this had been documented and 
verified by the firm in question previously to the author. (Gharoui Trading holding a 10% passive 
participation stake in Nestle Syria SA). 
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3.6. Implementation of Projects undler Investment lLaw No 10 
Data on actual projects carried out is difficult to assess and to quantify, if not 
impossible. Syrian data on the investment legislation is vague and ambiguous. In 
addition, data on individual projects is confidential (Investment Law No. 10, article 
9). According to Mohammed Saraqbi, the Director of the Syrian Bureau of 
Investment, execution rates were 'good' in 1998. 18 However, one of the main 
criticisms of Investment Law No 10 has been that the actual implementation rate of 
projects lags well behind the theoretical rate of approval. The following figures for 
actually executed projects were obtained through unofficial channels 19, are based on 
a confidential internal report from the Syrian Bureau of Investment to the Council of 
Ministers and thus should be treated with caution. However they do offer a valuable 
insight into the gap between theory and practice with regard to the investment 
legislation. 
Figure 12: Projects operating under Investment Law No 10 
a) Projects in the Industrial sector 
Execution % of approved projects by Apri11998 
Approved in 1992 
Approved in 1993 
Approved in 1994 
Approved in 1995 
Approved in 1996 
Approved in 1997 
18 Interview 6, Damascus, 161h March 1998 
19 Interview I, Damascus, 11th March 1998 
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95.3% 
60.0% 
55.0% 
40.0% 
35.0% 
15.0% 
b) Projects in the Transport Sector 
Execution % of approved! projects by April 1998 
Approved in 1991 98.4% 
Approved in 1992 90.0% 
Approved in 1993 60.0% 
Approved in 1994 55.0% 
Approved in 1995 40.0% 
Approved in 1996 30.0% 
Approved in 1997 20.0% 
The lack of industrial projects approved in 1991 (fig 12a) can be explained 
by the fact that no industrial projects were approved by the SBI until the end of 
1991.20 This was not due to the fact that industrial projects were declined, or that no 
industrial projects were put forward for approval; it was rather the case that the SBI 
was simply unable to process any industrial projects by the end of the year in 
question. This could be due to a number of factors; namely that industrial projects 
tend to be more complex and complicated than straightforward transport projects, or 
that a number of influential figures in the regime structure put forward their personal 
schemes in the transport sector for approval and were accorded preferential 
treatment. 21 The figures for transport projects approved in 1991 and 1992 indeed 
show an interesting and rapid execution level, transport projects being 
overwhelmingly small-scale car and mini-bus hire firms set up by Syrians to satisfy 
20 Interview 1, Damascus, 11th March 1998 
21 Interview 5, Damascus, 24th February 1998 
118 
the high pent-up demand for private cars which existed in 1991.22 The example of 
transport is useful because 24% of the total capital invested under Investment Law 
No. 10 is in the transport sector, with a total of 782 projects approved under 
Investment Law No 10 between 1991 and 1996 being transport projects. These 
numbers represent almost 53% of all projects approved under Investment Law No 10 
between 1991 and 1996. The conclusion from these figures is that the majority of 
projects approved under Investment Law No. 10 were projects requiring only limited 
start-up capital, were projects within the broader service industries, rather than the 
productive areas of industry, and were projects satisfying an obvious and immediate 
consumer demand. 
If we take the above data and apply the formal condition of the legislation 
which imposes a one-year maximum period between approval of a project licence and 
the beginning of the actual implementation period ofthe project, the following figures 
concerning projects approved, but not implemented can be calculated. These figures 
represent all projects which were granted a project licence by the HCI but have not 
been implemented within the one-year time limit. This means that these projects, if 
they were still feasible, would need a new licence from the HCI and would have to go 
through the entire application procedure again. 
22 Interview 9, Damascus, 9th March 1998 
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Figure 13: Projects Approved, but not Operating under Investment Law No. 10 
a) Projects in the Industrial sector 
Non-Execution % of approved projects by April1998 
Approved in 1992 04.7% 
Approved in 1993 40.0% 
Approved in 1994 45.0% 
Approved in 1995 60.0% 
Approved in 1996 65.0% 
Approved in 1997 85.0 %(*) 
(*) This percentage will adjust as projects approved in 1997 had until the end of 1998 
to be implemented 
b) Projects in the Transport Sector 
Execution % of approved projects by April1998 
Approved in 1991 01.6% 
Approved in 1992 10.0% 
Approved in 1993 40.0% 
Approved in 1994 45.0% 
Approved in 1995 60.0% 
Approved in 1996 70.0% 
Approved in 1997 80.0 %(*) 
(*) This percentage will adjust as projects approved in 1997 had until the end of 1998 
to be implemented 
By February 1998, 1514 projects under Law No 10 had been approved, with a 
total capital of Sy£ 358.5 billion invested, with 20% of the projects registered as 
industrial projects and 42% of the projects registered as tourism or transport 
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projects.23 The above figures do not take the subsequent failure of executed projects 
into account, and figures concerning this aspect were not available. It is highly 
doubtful whether the SBI itself has any reliable data on this subject. One of the 
interesting aspects concerning the above data is that once a project has been approved 
by the Syrian Bureau of Investment under Investment Law No. 10, there appears to be 
little or no actual control or quantification by the Syrian Bureau of Investment as to 
how or when the project is actually implemented. In theory, the legislation allows (as 
mentioned above) for a one-year grace period between the granting of a licence and 
the beginning of implementation. However, there is in practice nothing to stop a 
project being implemented on what could be described as a piecemeal basis.24 
According to other informed sources, overall only 25% of all projects 
approved during the period 1991-1997 were actually operating in 1998?5 The large 
discrepancy between the official/semi-official figures and the figures obtained via 
unofficial channels make apparent the difficulties that exists in the Syrian economy 
concerning the rate of success of the Investment Legislation in attracting private 
investment. It remains impossible to accurately statistically measure the actual success 
or failure of the legislation, as the only execution figures available are estimates based 
on a report submitted to the Higher Investment Council, which seems overly 
optimistic. No data on the actual implementation rate for projects under Investment 
Law No 10 have previously been made available outside the Syrian government. 
23 Interview 1, Damascus, 11th March 1998 
24Implementation does not have to be continuous- unofficial SBI sources admitted that implementation 
could range from renting office space to importing nominal amounts of machinery. In addition, policing 
of the one-year time limit appeared to be extremely lax. 
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The overall picture of projects under Investment Law No 10 is therefore one 
of confusion, with a large number of projects being accepted by the SBI and approved 
by the HCI, but the actual execution rate of these projects lagging well behind the 
approval rate. However, what can be assessed are the actual difficulties for firms 
operating under Investment Law No.l 0. From these concerns a number of 
conclusions can be drawn regarding the advisability of firms wishing to operate in 
Syria using Investment Law No.l 0. The actual contents of the legislation itself give 
rise to a number of concerns: 
25 Interview 5, Damascus, 24th February 1998 
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3.7. Problems within Investment Law No. 10 
From actual experiences related by interviewees, it was possible to identify a 
number of problem areas within Investment Law No 10 including, 
the degree of differentiation between projects and the incentives offered to 
them or rather, as some argued, the lack of adequate differentiation 
the lack of differentiation between geographical areas 
limited periods of tax exemption 
the lack of a 'one-stop shop' to provide information, advice and guidance and 
to approve projects under Investment Law No.1 0 
unseen changes and conditionalities to the law 
During a debate on Investment Law No 10 in the People's Assembly, one 
deputy commented, 
"the obstructions hampering the implementation of the law which cropped up 
in the course of execution left their marks on the investments and the investors. There 
is a plethora of resolutions to abort the legislation in force. The investor sees a stark 
contrast between what he sees, and on the basis of which he makes plans, and what he 
runs into during the execution phase [ ... ] Syria tops the list of countries in red tape 
and bureaucracy when it comes to economy and investment. "26 
Businesses operating under Investment Law No 10 complain on a regular basis 
that the local administration, indeed the national Ministries dealing with various 
aspects of business, have little or no inclination to assist or help firms without the 
promised payment of direct financial inducements to particular officials. If these 
inducements are not forthcoming, then approval for import licences for example can 
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be inexplicably delayed. An additional problem is that although Investment Law 
No.l 0 is widely known, the particular provisions of the legislation are often confused, 
assumed, or ignored by officials in other Ministries. 
Difficulties with the legislation can be broken down into the following 
detailed criteria: 
26 Speech by Hashim Anwar Al-Aqqad MP, People's Assembly, 1st March 1997 
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3./.L Project ][)nfft"erellltiatioi!R 
The offering of identical incentives to all types of projects approved under 
Investment Law No 10 has resulted in the majority of projects being started in areas 
where the necessary initial investment is lowest and the possible capital returns are 
highest. A number of Syrian businessmen operating under Investment Law No 10 
believe that as a result, available investment capital was drawn away from more 
'productive' sectors of the economy. Productive in this sense implies productive in 
terms of generating jobs, regenerating economic activity and raising the general 
prosperity of the community, rather than directly relating to the level of profit 
achievable by the individual investor. This implies that investments in industry and 
productive areas of the economy were neglected in favour of service-based 
enterprises. In particular, and this is a notorious example, Investment Law No.1 0 was 
used (or abused) to meet the pent-up demand for foreign cars.27 Many Syrian 
observers of the Syrian investment scene were outraged (or wryly amused) by the 
large number of transport projects approved, constituting 24% of the total capital 
invested under Investment Law No 10. Some would suggest that projects which create 
jobs, invigorating the employment market and lowering employment should be 
offered additional legislative benefits. If it had been the legislators' sincere intention 
to 
"direct the surplus of funds towards development and production [ ... ] within 
the framework of making use of all potentials available to the private and joint sectors 
[ ... ] encouraging them to build up the economic and development foundation of the 
country"28 
27 Investors imported cars under Article 11 of the law to use as long-term rental cars, thus avoiding the 
180% import tax levied on cars under one tonne and the 280% tax on cars over one tonne. The 
government sought to restrict such practices by limiting leasing contracts to one month but operators 
easily sidestepped this by simply renewing agreements each month. 
28 SAR, Investment Law No I 0, Introduction 
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then they should have theoretically offered more to encourage those investors 
who put Sy£ 59.2 billion into transport projects to invest their money in industry and 
manufacturing instead. According to this viewpoint (expressed by a number of 
interviewees )29 the general provisions of the law would have to be clarified to provide 
less scope for unpredictable decisions on who should be allowed to apply. Problems 
are inevitable if the system depends on officials discriminating between investments 
deemed to be 'good' and investments deemed to be 'bad'. If it is down to officials to 
decide on a purely subjective level which projects should be approved and which 
should not, there is obviously (and pointed out in interviews)30 theoretical scope for 
abuses within the system. Additionally, there are no provisions for an established 
formal appeal procedure against decisions made by the SBI. 
It was however pointed out by officials31 that the majority of capital invested 
has been in industrial projects, although clearly more long-term industrial investment 
would already have been attracted to Syria had certain business conditions been 
improved. One government official explained that the comparative absence of long-
term projects amounted to little more than a temporary statistical hiatus,32 however, 
this comment was only to be expected from an official giving the official explanation 
to this problem and should be treated with caution - given the fact that the 
comparative lack of long-term projects has remained a permanent feature of the 
investment legislation since 1991, there is clearly a need for this aspect of the 
legislation to be reassessed. Of course, if one steps back from the purely legislative 
29 Interview 5, Damascus, 24th February I 998 
30 Interview 5, Damascus, 24th February 1998 
31 Interview I, Damascus, IIth March 1998 
32 Interview 1, Damascus, 11th March 1998 
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approach to the implementation of Investment Law No 10, the reason for the 
preponderance of small-scale transport projects becomes abundantly clear: individual 
Syrians were using the legislation to convert illegal foreign currency holdings 
(possibly gained in the smuggling conduit between Syria and Lebanon) into tangible 
assets as quickly as possible; and the immediate tangible asset relatively safe from 
immediate depreciation in Syria is a car. 
The lack of differentiation according to sector continues to pose a difficult 
dilemma however - if differentiation is not offered, the current unsatisfactory status 
quo will by necessity, and fuelled by demand, continue. If differentiation towards 
specific individual industries is offered however, Syrian private investors are in turn 
quite capable of weaving together a web of interlocking companies aimed at 
maximising the potential extra benefits available, whilst continuing to invest the 
minimum amount of capital necessary to return the highest amount of profit. 
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3. 7 .2. Geographical Differentiation 
The same investment incentives are generally available wherever a project is 
to be geographically sited. As a result, approximately 56% of projects approved under 
Investment Law No 10 are based in and around Damascus and Damascus Region. The 
Syrian capital offers a level of infrastructure and services that is much better than 
those in other parts of the country. There is a readily available workforce, a large local 
consumer market for goods, well-maintained domestic and international transport 
links and connections, a generally good standard of infrastructural services, and the 
Ministries and offices relevant to private investment projects are all to be found there. 
Around 22% of approved projects are intended for Aleppo which offers a comparable 
infrastructure and services generally on a par with Damascus. Only 22% of projects 
are intended for other less developed areas of the country where services and 
infrastructure are much poorer.33 These traditional differences have historically 
encouraged the drift of the population towards the major cities, causing overcrowding 
and increased unemployment in urban areas, a situation that continues to exist and 
which the small proportion of Investment Law No.l 0 projects in rural areas has done 
nothing to alleviate. Extra investment incentives outside urban areas could possibly 
lessen this continuing grave problem. However many of those interviewed were of the 
opinion that differentiation in the legislation should be minimised and that instead 
infrastructure expenditure should be increased to create more ready-prepared business 
parks and manufacturing areas outside the urban areas. 34 This would allow investors 
greater freedom in their choice of location and would lead to a beneficial development 
of Syria's rural areas. The provision of added legislative incentives to projects set up 
33 Interview 2, Damascus, 30111 January 1998 
34 Interview 13, Damascus, 28th February 1998 
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outside Damascus and Aleppo would probably only be effective in the short-term.35 
The effects of recent amendments to the legislation, allowing extra tax breaks for 
firms set up outside Damascus and Aleppo36, remain to be assessed. However, it 
appears that these changes are not fundamental to the nature of the legislation and 
indeed will only have a short-term effect, if at all, given the fundamental and 
continuing difficulties of operating outside the two principal conurbations in Syria 
(although Horns, Hama and Lattakia have all attracted Investment Law No.l 0 
projects). Nevertheless, one could argue that business parks and production centres 
(with the added caveat of the provision of adequate infrastructure) away from the two 
major conurbations would also be less prone to possible direct interference by various 
Ministries. 
35 Interview 5, Damascus, 241h February I 998 
36 Cabinet Decree No 6, reported in MEED, I 81h September I 998, p 17 
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3.7.3. Limited Periods of Tax Exemption 
The limitation of tax exemption to seven years for joint stock companies and 
five years for other companies under Investment Law No.l 0 is widely seen as an 
insufficient incentive to those companies intending to continue operations after these 
exemptions have expired. These tax exemptions were originally intended by the 
legislators37 to allow projects to fully establish themselves, or even to begin to return 
in profits the original capital invested, before assessment for taxation began. When 
Syria was experiencing an economic upturn, many projects might have achieved that 
goal, but industrial and manufacturing projects in particular often require a longer 
time period to move into profit (this is another negative incentive for investors to 
avoid manufacturing and industrial investment projects). Given the economic climate 
in Syria from the mid 1990's onward, almost any business must expect to take longer 
to move into profit, and this must be inevitably associated with a high degree of 
uncertainty. Given the severity of Syria's tax laws, it is understandable that a number 
of businessmen have opted for short-term projects. Because Investment Law No.l 0 
effectively encouraged investment in projects likely to make a quick return, it has 
proved particularly vulnerable to a downturn in the domestic economic climate. Syria 
will need investors with a longer-term commitment to their investment and to the 
Syrian economy which will enable them to invest even when prospects for immediate 
and rapid profits are not ideal. Time-limited tax exemptions alone, even if they are 
relatively generous when measured internationally38, will not attract such investors. 
37 Interview 14, Damascus, 13th March 1998 
38 Tax-free exemption periods vary widely. Syria is formally offering a generous time. period. 
Generally, the time limit can also be negotiated individually between the host country and the investor. 
In the case of Syria, unconfirmed reports suggest that this might have recently occurred in the 
investment of the planned Four Seasons Hotel in Damascus, signed under the general provisions of 
Investment Law No 10 with a number of confidential modifications. As the legislators drafted a seven 
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3.7.4. Lack of a 'One-Stop Shop' 
The Higher Council of Investment was created under Investment Law No.l 0 
to "have investors deal with a single authority, thus avoiding red-tape and saving 
time"39 . Whilst the approval of projects itself is indeed handled through the HCI40, 
most investors feel that the notion that they will be able to manage the remaining 
bureaucratic aspects of establishing a business in Syria through a 'single authority' is 
an optimistic and misleading one. A country with so complex a bureaucracy as Syria 
needs, in the opinion of many interviewees41 , one office to cater for all the needs of 
investors. Such an office should offer objective and expert advice on how to establish 
and run an operation, and should handle the swift approval and provision of all a 
business' basic needs such as land, electricity, water and telephone lines, the problem-
free provision of which the investor should currently not take for granted. The Syrian 
Bureau of Investment (SBI), created under Investment Law No 10, was described by 
one interviewee as a 'mailbox'42 , and does not at present offer these comprehensive 
services. This is doubly unfortunate as some investors spoke of what they perceived 
as harassment from bureaucratic circles.43 The difficulty remains that there is a 
plethora of various Ministries and departments which investors have to deal with 
year period into the original legislation after consulting other investment legislation (see 3 .1.), it must 
be assumed that there are other obstacles to investment in Syria. See Chapter 4. 
39 Interview 1, Damascus, 11th March 1998 
4° Comprising the Prime Minister, The Deputy Prime Minister for Economic Affairs, the Deputy Prime 
Minister for Services Affairs, the Ministers of Agriculture and Agrarian Reform, Transport, Supply and 
Internal Trade, Economy and Foreign Trade, Industry, Planning Affairs, Finance and the Director of 
the Investment Bureau. Experts and others are invited as necessary. 
41 This sentiment was also expressed by Director of the Investment Bureau himself, when pressed on 
this issue. He was of the opinion that this failing has been recognised by the authorities and that 
'necessary steps' were being taken to increase the staff and the authority of the Investment Bureau; 
however to date (2003) no further measures seem to have been taken to change the present situation. 
The current staffing level of the Syrian Investment Bureau stands at nine (including administrative staff 
and drivers) 
42 Interview 5, Damascus, 241h February 1998 
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during the actual execution phase of a project and the inevitable delays automatically 
occur as Ministries struggle to allocate responsibility. Investors have often resorted to 
imaginative solutions to overcome this problem of bureaucratic delay and obfuscation 
(one foreign investor expressed the opinion that operating in Syria was the most 
stressful experience he had been through, after postings in 12 different developing 
countries across the globe).44 One example of this is the case of a foreign investor 
based in the Damascene countryside. His private accommodation was next to that of 
a particular General in the Armed Forces, who in return for a certain level of 
consideration ensured that the Syrian Army supplied the investor's factory at start-up 
with a water pipeline and electricity in half the time it would have taken the state 
water and electricity boards to deliver the necessary infrastructure (naturally to be 
paid for by the investor). The SBI had been previously unable to offer any alternative 
assistance in this case to the investor, who then resorted to the "Syrian way of doing 
business"45 to ensure the necessary infrastructure for the operation of his 
. 46 
mvestment. 
43 Interview 15, Damascus, 24th March 1998 
44 Interview 16, Damascus countryside, 20th March 1998 
45 Interview 16, Damascus countryside, 20th March 1998 
46 Inspection of the electric plant and lines and of the water transport system by the author revealed it to 
be of Russian military origin with a very high quality of execution. 
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3.7.5. Unseel!l Changes and Conditionalities 
Since 1991 , various businessmen have claimed that there have been 
approximately 200 Governmental Decrees directly affecting Investment Law No. 10 
which are not in the virgin text presented to investors. The decrees appear mainly to 
deal with import restrictions and duties on raw materials. A representative of the 
Syrian Bureau of Investment categorically stated that there were far fewer than 200 
Governmental Decrees of this kind, but was unable to provide exact numbers or 
specific examples of these secondary pieces of legislation affecting Investment Law 
No.1 0 as "every law passes through its own channel".47 However, most commercial 
and tax legislation concerning the domestic Syrian economy will affect or influence 
Investment Law No.IO projects in some way, if only to add further bureaucratic 
hurdles to an already complex business environment. The situation thus remains 
extremely unsatisfactory. The Syrian Bureau of Investment did however in 1998 have 
information on the positive changes planned or recently approved for Investment Law 
No 10. These included 
additional incentives for projects in rural areas in the form of tax and real 
estate exemptions (subsequently passed by Cabinet Decree No 6 in September 
1998) 
the granting of similar advantages to joint venture and holding companies 
the adjustment of a foreign investors' representation on the board of directors 
of a joint venture company from one to a figure proportional to his capital 
47 Interview I, Damascus, 11th March 1998 
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share investment (although this seems in fact to be in accord with Article 20 of 
the originallegislation)48 
the extension of tax exemption for a joint venture company from five to seven 
years 
Unseen changes and elusive decrees affecting crucial investment legislation 
make it difficult for businessmen to accurately assess the viability of their projects. To 
then give subsequent important changes to the legislation less publicity then they 
merit only makes investors suspicious of Syria's true commitment to private 
investment. Investment Law No.l 0 is a useful statement of aims but an imprecise 
piece of legislation. Parliamentarians have replied to criticism of the legislation that 
Investment Law No.l 0 was fashioned deliberately in that way to allow fine-tuning by 
Presidential Decree once its initial effect on the economy had been observed. Its 
critics however (and these includes a number of officials and MP's as well as 
businessmen)49 describe it as a working paper, rather than a piece of legislation, 
effective as a mission statement but lacking in essential legal detail. According to a 
number of interviewees 5°, the vagueness of individual articles leaves far too much 
room for interpretation and therefore allows investors either to deliberately exploit or 
to unintentionally contravene the law. 
48 Art 20a: "The joint-stock company will have a board of directors in which share-holders are 
represented according to the percentage of their subscription in the company's capital." 
49 Interview 2, Interview 5, Interview I 5, Interview I 6 
50 Interview 2, Interview 17 
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3.8. Conditionalities in Investment Law No.lO 
The actual words of Investment Law No.1 0 are also qualified in significant 
respects. Some of these conditionalities are raised in the law itself, others in an 
Executive Appendix separate to the legislation, other conditionalities are not included 
in either, but appear in apparently umelated legislation. Based on the fundamental 
premise of the legislation; that Investment Law No.1 0 will allow private enterprise to 
operate within the closed Syrian economy, the most important conditionalities 
affecting this premise in the legislation are perhaps the following: 
Article 11 (a) & (b) 
These clauses appear to allow the duty-free import of everything necessary for 
the establishment of a project. 
Conditionalities 
These exemptions are very likely to be modified in actual practice. Article 12 
(a) implicitly states that any imported equipment sold on or abandoned to a third party 
without the prior permission of the Higher Council of Investment automatically 
becomes liable to the imposition of the initial duties from which it was exempted. It 
remains unclear whether the investor must pay duties on any equipment sold or 
abandoned upon the conclusion or failure of a project. In either circumstance, it 
remains unclear whether seeking the permission of the Higher Council of Investment 
will automatically exempt you from paying duties on sold or abandoned equipment. In 
a paper assessing Investment Law No.l 0, Mohammed Saraqbi, Director of the Syrian 
Bureau of Investment, suggests that duties are indeed payable when equipment is 
passed on to a third party, even if permission to do so has been obtained; 
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"Article 12 [ ... ] stipulates that relinquishing those imports is subject to an 
approval by the Higher Investment Council and after payment of the taxes and fees 
assessed on their current condition"51 
The duty-free import of goods at the beginning of a project is thus probably 
only a temporary incentive. Article 30 (a) of Investment Law No 10 declares that any 
attempt to sell or abandon equipment exempted from import duties under Article 11 
will result in either the levying of customs fees and fines on the project's operations, 
or, if the offence is repeated, the cancellation of the project's status under Investment 
Law No.1 0. It seems all too easy for a large operation to inadvertently break this law 
and thus automatically forfeit its privileged status, without being actually aware of 
this fact in the first place. It also seems that for such a relatively minor infringement 
(given that no minimum value of the item or equipment is stated in the legislation), 
the censure of loss of status under Investment Law No 10 seems draconian indeed. 
Article 11 (c) 
This clause permits the import of 'all materials and requirements necessary 
for running these projects' despite laws prohibiting their entry into Syria52 
Conditionalities 
This clause does indeed permit the importation of goods and raw materials for 
the continued operation of a project under Investment Law No 10 (as opposed to the 
establishment of a project), but it does not reveal that a specific import licence is 
required for each and every individual item entering Syria or that full import duties 
51 M. Saraqbi 'On Investment Law No. I 0' ,internal Syrian Bureau of Investment paper, Damascus 1997 
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must be paid on every item. Under Investment Law No.l 0, raw material imports 
usually prohibited under Syrian law require import licenses for all individual items 
valued at more than Sy£ 2000 (approx. US$ 40) and import taxation tariffs can range 
from 0% to 200%. In view of state monopolies over certain areas of production, some 
imports may additionally be subject to special exceptional tariffs above and beyond 
the normal levels of import taxation imposed by the authorities. Import duties on 
products vary widely and can be punitive in the extreme. Decrees regarding changes 
to import arrangements and duties, from which the investor has no redress or right of 
appeal, are announced without warning or prior consultation. It can also take time to 
move goods through customs. Businessmen complain that items in customs are 
sometimes permanently removed or are tampered with. 53 It is not uncommon to have 
to 'expedite' goods through customs. This is not a problem confined to investors 
under Investment Law No.l 0 - problems and delays in the legal system governing 
imports into the Syrian Arab Republic can often be legion for companies wishing to 
simply trade or do business with the Syrian government or individual Syrian firms. 
Again, contact with individual members of the Customs Inspectorate or with officials 
within the Ministry of Trade can often accelerate matters considerably. 
52 Other laws in this context refer to legislation governing the import of goods prohibited under Syrian 
law for the protection of domestic industries, and legislation governing the import of a number of 
luxury goods. 
53 One representative of a foreign investor complained that his materials were left in the customs area of 
Damascus Airport for so long that the use-by date on the basic food ingredients needed for a production 
process was exceeded by 3 months. The outcome was that production of a particular product line was 
delayed by 6 months and that as a consequence a domestic Syrian producer was able to launch a 
competing product before the investor. It seems reasonable to suspect that an agreement was reached 
between the customs authorities (or individual officials) and the competing domestic producer. 
Interview 18, Damascus, 15th March 1998 
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Article 13 (a) & (b) 
Article 13 declares that projects are exempted from all taxes levied on income 
and real estate for periods of 5 or 7 years 'from the date of actual production or 
investment according to the nature oft he project'. (Emphasis added) 
Conditionalities 
It is presumably the decision of the Higher Council of Investment as to when 
the period of tax exemption begins. The decision is taken on a case-by-case basis. 
There is no general indication which particular type of projects or which particular 
areas of investment qualify for the advantageous exemption from taxation from the 
date of actual production as opposed to the date of investment (which could be 
construed as running from the date of application for an investment licence under 
Investment Law No.1 0 from the Higher Investment Council). The lack of a precise 
moment for beginning the exemption period could very well complicate a business' 
financial strategy and lead to further uncertainty. 
Article 18 
This article allows investors to obtain loans in local currency (Sy£) from the 
Commercial Bank of Syria 
Conditionalities 
The investor is in fact unable to take out a 'real' loan, i.e. to borrow money he 
does not already have. In fact, following a deposit of foreign (hard) currency in a 
particular account of the Commercial Bank of Syria, the investor can then take out a 
loan in local currency equivalent to 80% of the total foreign currency deposited 
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(according to the official exchange rate); he is also able to take a loan against a local 
property guarantee (i.e. the investor's factory or site of production in Syria). 
Guarantees from foreign banks are not sufficient guarantee to obtain a loan in Syria. 
Loans may only be taken for one year. After that time the investor may, theoretically, 
renew the loan at the prevailing rate of interest. It is currently impossible to obtain a 
loan in foreign currency from the Central Bank of Syria, or indeed any of the other 
banks operating in the SAR. Loans in foreign currency from foreign banks outside 
Syria (i.e. Lebanon), can, of course, be transferred to the Commercial Bank of Syria, 
and then used as a guarantee against a local-currency loan. 
Article 24 (c), Article 25 & Article 37 
These clauses appear to give investors the facility to repatriate their profits 
from their operations in Syria annually in foreign currency abroad, and workers to 
repatriate 50% of their wages and 100% of any terminal compensation award, both 
inforeign currencies. 
Conditionalities 
These clauses are perhaps the most important incentives for foreign investors 
(both Arab and non-Arab) contained in Investment Law No.l 0. These currency 
transactions have never been allowed in Syria before under the socialist Ba'ath 
regimes, and were one of the reasons why the passing of Investment Law No.l 0 
aroused so niuch comment and excitement amongst foreign observers of the Syrian 
economy. These novel clauses are however undermined by an alarming admission in 
the Executive Appendix. In the financial section, headed 'Guarantee by the Central 
Bank' it states; 
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'in order to increase trust and confidence from the part of investors from Arab 
and foreign countries, article 25 of the draft law provides that the Central Bank of 
Syria shall take the necessary actions to permit the transfer abroad of invested foreign 
capital and profits and interests incurred theron, either in the same currency in which 
it has been bought to the country or in any other convertible currency. It is clear that 
the said provisions constitute a guarantee that permission shall be given to effect the 
transfer, but they do not constitute in any way a guarantee that foreign currencies shall 
be available for conversion of Syrian currency into them in order to effect the said 
transfer, since [ ... ] the investment project itself ought to earn foreign currencies 
needed to cover all its needs.' (Emphasis added)54 
The stark message is that if the investment operation under Investment Law 
No.l 0 itself does not intend to ultimately generate its profits in a foreign convertible 
currency, the operation has no guarantee of being able to convert and repatriate its 
profits denominated in Syrian pounds. To ensure that he can exchange his Syrian 
pounds gained as a result of operating at a profit within the Syrian economy for a 
convertible foreign currency, a investor is therefore faced with the choice of risking 
his whole operation through illegal trading on the black market55 or else leaving and 
re-investing his profits in Syria. This important caveat has the effect of effectively 
deterring investment aimed at the Syrian domestic market, where all official 
commercial transactions should of course be carried out in Syrian pounds. 
54 Executive Appendix to Investment Law No.! 0 
55 Law No. 24 of the Syrian Criminal Code did not allow Syrian nationals from holding or dealing in 
foreign currency. The penalties ranged from confiscation and fines to I 0-year prison sentences. The 
legislation has since been amended to allow Syrian nationals to hold foreign currency, however dealing 
in foreign currency is still prohibited. 
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3.9. Conclusion 
The Syrian Arab Republic should in theory have much to offer the 
commercial private investor, be they Syrian, Arab or foreign. The country's 17 
million inhabitants56 , although constrained by low incomes, represent a large local 
market for certain products and services. Investment Law No.l 0 of 1991 was intended 
to work 'in harmony with the attitudes adopted by many countries in the world to 
create a convenient investment climate that will help to attract local and foreign 
. 1 ,57 cap1ta. 
The adoption of Investment Law No 10 in May 1991 was meant to allow 
private investors, both domestic and foreign, to invest in Syria. It led to an 
unprecedented flurry of short-term investment projects, particularly from Syrian 
businessmen with close ties to the regime, requiring the minimum of investment and 
delivering the maximum return on capital. 58 
With 147659 investment projects approved between 1991 and 1996 totalling 
some US$ 6.5 billion, officials of the Syrian government hold up the achievements of 
Law No 10 as proof that Syria provides an economic atmosphere conductive to 
efficient business and profitable investment. However, if this analysis is correct, why 
should businessmen complain bitterly of the frustrations in conducting business in 
Syria? The documented small number of long-term projects existing under Law No.1 0 
56 Energy Information Administration (USA) Syria Brief, March 1999 
57 SAR, Investment Law 10 of 1991, Introduction 
58 a large number of foreign investors (in the main ·from the oil and gas sector) also expressed interest in 
Syria, in particular during the first aftermath of Investment Law No.1 0; in 1991 14 oil and gas 
exploration and production companies were at least represented in Syria, by 1997 this number had 
dropped to 4: Royal Dutch Shell, Elf Aquitaine, Tullow Oil and Denimex 
59 Interview 1, Damascus, 11th March 1998 
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and the comparative lack of non-Arab investors, despite the incentives offered, 
suggest problems and difficulties within and beyond the provisions offered in the 
legislation. Despite the incentives offered, Investment Law No.l 0 has merely 
provided a further bureaucratic obstacle course for investors rather than a fast-track 
route for business project implementation. This opinion is backed by the experiences 
of the businessmen interviewed in Syria and abroad, who in general were unflattering 
in their opinion of the legislation. The difficulties experienced by investors interested 
in the undoubted possibilities offered by Syria are manifold, but worth mentioning in 
this context is the absolute paucity of information available for the putative investor. 
Official data, according to a source, is "a figment of our imagination"60 and 
independent (that is data not associated with official Syrian sources), international 
economic data on Syria is unreliable, vague and often out-of-date61 . Those 
interviewed from the private sector and those unconnected with the government 
believe that the introduction of Investment Law No.l 0 was essentially a 'quick fix' 
and not the correct answer to Syria's long term economic development needs (the 
political implications of Investment Law No.l 0 and its introduction are discussed in 
Chapter 5). The overall deceleration in Syria's economic growth and the continued 
stagnation of non-oil exports during the second half of the 1990's will require the 
Syrian government to approach long-term investment with greater seriousness and 
will not be solved by simply introducing new, isolated pieces of legislation. If Syria is 
to begin to realise its true economic potential, the opening of opportunities for 
investment must be matched by a broad review and reform of general economic and 
60 Interview 5, Damascus, 24th February 1998 
61 One example is the rate of unemployment. According to the Syrian government the current 
unemployment rate is 5%, although estimates by Syrian observers put the rate as high as 20%. Official 
international statistics mirror the official rate- one that is obviously misleading. 
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commercial procedures. Syria must put in place the necessary legislative, regulatory 
and physical infrastructure to make serious long-term investment in Syria more 
attractive (economic measures and suggestions outside the immediate scope of 
Investment Law No 10 are discussed in Chapter 4). To encourage serious investors to 
consider Syria over other countries, the country must begin to compete actively to 
attract them. Once certain changes have been made, there is no reason why the 
country should not fulfil its true trading and industrial potential. 
In effect Investment Law No.1 0 has proved to be a law that encourages short-
term investment. Moreover, the incentives it provides are only really adequate for 
Syrian investors already acquainted with local market conditions. Certain aspects of 
the practical application of the law make it less attractive to foreign investors and to 
any investor considering initiating a long-term project, which may take time to yield 
significant profits and results. The law does however represent a modest withdrawal 
of the state from certain sectors of the economy to allow private investors to begin to 
explore the physical and human potential of Syria. The private sector has the ability to 
inject dynamism into the economy in a way that the public sector cannot; however 
because of the wider economic downturn in Syria, ''the dynamism of the private 
sector will begin to peter out"62 unless further reforms take place. There are 
shortcomings in Investment Law No. 10 which seriously damage its attractiveness and 
effectiveness as a vehicle for investment in Syria. Some of these can be remedied 
within the framework of specific legislation on foreign investment (such as the minor 
changes announced in September 1998 regarding location, export percentage 
allowances, increased representation of foreigners and the eligibility of holding 
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companies to qualify for Law No. 10 status)63 , but others demand more fundamental 
change within the general economic structure of Syria. Indeed, Polling has rightly 
concluded that, 
"in order for the new legal framework to become fully operational further 
market reforms are needed to underpin effective private sector involvement [ ... ] 
speeding up the unification of the multi-tier exchange rate [and] an urgently needed 
overhaul of the financial and banking sector. "64 
These, and other specific shortcomings of the Syrian economy outside of 
Investment Law No.lO, will be discussed further in Chapter 4. However, Investment 
Law No. 10 should be seen in its context as an isolated piece of legislation drafted in 
haste, or, as a Syrian merchant put it; "more a discussion document than a piece of 
crafted legislation designed to attract investment capital - the most fickle capital of 
62 Interview 5, Damascus, 24th February 1998 
63 MEED, 18 September 1998, p 17 
64 Polling, S., The Role of the Private Sector in the Syrian Economy, in Hopfinger, H., (ed), Economic 
Liberalization and Privatization in Socialist Arab Countries, Gotha, Justus Perthes, 1996, p 160 
65 Interview 15, Damascus, 24th March 1998 
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Chapter 4: Overall factors in Investment in Syria 
4.1 Introduction 
Syria's new leader Bashar al-Assad faces an uphill battle in addressing Syria's 
economic problems, which include (among other things) corruption, political opposition 
to reform and public sector control of the economy. His task is further complicated by the 
fact that he must simultaneously consolidate his power base while coping with 
international political challenges. However, the reform process that started before 
President Hafiz al-Assad's death, the new president's smooth accession to power and his 
popular support all might suggest that he has the backing needed to carry out limited 
economic reforms and institutional adjustments. But, even if this is the case, Bashar still 
faces formidable obstacles. Whereas his father was absolute master of what he had built, 
the new president often seems more like a prisoner of it - of shadowy centers of power in 
army, intelligence and "the first family" itself. Since he came to power he has been torn 
between alternative courses - reform or reaction, liberalization or repression - reaching 
out to the people as his source of authority or falling back on the hidebound "old guard." 
To add to the particular economic and political situation Syria presents to the investor we 
must also add the particular dilemma of his succession. 
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4.2 Political Risk 
Hafez al Assad himself can clearly be credited with bringing a high degree of 
political stability to the Syrian Arab Republic. His 30 years in office achieved continuity 
and certainty and provided for a relatively smooth transfer of power to his son. However, 
this stability was built on a narrow base and was essentially provided by and supported 
by a ubiquitous security system. Hafez Assad had concentrated power in the hands of 
members of his own Alawi community1, although a small number oftrusted Sunnis were 
brought into the political elite to appease the Sunni majority, which had traditionally 
wielded power in Syria. The repressive regime that Assad constructed did not tolerate 
dissent or allow alternative centres of power to develop. 
The political system set up by his father has in the short-term benefited Bashar 
Al-Assad. The new president's domestic position was also encouraged by the regional 
situation, especially the historical violence between Israel and Palestinian factions. As 
with other countries in the region, the Arab Israeli conflict has produced general 
resonance in Syria, providing and ensuring support for the president and the regime.2 The 
consistent stance of the regime with regard to the United States has also helped the 
regime domestically. Recent US criticism of the regime has raised support for Assad, 
although the relationship between Syria and the US had not necessarily always been as 
1 E Zisser, A sad's Legacy- Syria in Transition, Hurst, St Martin's Press 200 I, p 31 
2 E Zisser, A sad's Legacy- Syria in Transition, Hurst, St Martin's Press 200 I, p 70 
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openly confrontationa1.3 However Bashar al Assad's long-term survival as president is 
not automatic. There are signs that he is unwilling to follow all aspects of his father's 
legacy, and this may bring him into conflict with his father's key supporters. The 
President has so far moved cautiously in order to avoid antagonising them. However, his 
attempts to implement economic reform and appoint a new generation of leaders will 
breach his policy of continuation, which may antagonise powerful elements within the 
political and military elites. As Zisser has commented, 
'the new government raised serious questions regarding Bashar's ability to 
influence matters and the direction in which Syria is really going. Far from manifesting a 
new spirit coursing through Syria, the government expressed only the existing state of 
decay and stagnation. ' 4 
In that respect, Bashar with his Cabinet of 2000 was certainly sending a clear 
political signal that it was to be business as usual.5 If important elements within the 
military-security apparatus perceive that he has acted against their interests, they could 
seek to remove him.6 
3 The 1990/91 Gulf War is a clear example of Syria's long term policy of Arab unity- Assad saw the 
invasion of Kuwait by Saddam Hussein as a distraction from the core problem of the Middle East; Arab 
disunity in the face of Israeli agression 
4 E Zisser, Asad's Legacy- Syria in Transition, Hurst, St Martin's Press 2001, p 168 
5 Z.Bar'el, Cautious Change in Damascus, Ha'aretz, 31 81 March 2000 
6 The recent events in 2005 regarding the Syrian withdrawal from Lebanon and the results of the 1oth 
Ba'ath Party Congress have lead to speculation in Syria that the Syrian withdrawal from Lebanon was 
orchestrated to cause maximum disturbance within the regime apparatus and to weaken Bashar al-Assad's 
position. 
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4.2.1 Levels of corruption 
Syria's opaque and secretive decision-making processes, the government and state 
domination of the economy, absurdly low public sector salaries, close ties between 
politicians and business interests and the accepted Syrian tradition of using public office 
to advance wider family or tribal interests all create an environment which is inherently 
susceptible to corruption. Indeed the problem with the Syrian economic environment is 
that its very core is comprised of informal and societal familial networks, and the 
introduction of new areas of economic opportunity simply allows these informal 
networks to spread and develop. Although foreign companies operating in Syria are not 
legally obliged to use agents, the complexities of the business environment make it 
necessary, indeed essential to employ an agent with high-level political contacts. This 
leads to corrupt practices, such as payments to junior officials to expedite bureaucratic 
processes and, in some cases, bribes to senior officials to secure contracts or other 
benefits. As Schofield has rightly commented; 
"how can anyone expect the director-general of a government ministry to close 
deals worth tens of millions of dollars when his own salary is scarcely enough to feed and 
clothe his family- and not be tempted by a bribe ?"7 
Companies from Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development 
countries face the risk of prosecution in their home country for involvement in corrupt 
practices; US companies, although currently barred from trading with Syria, must 
normally ensure that they comply with the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act. 
7 J .Schofield, Trade & Economic Reforms, Financial Times, 261h November 1999 
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4.2.2 Levels of violence 
Very isolated and rare terrorist bombings in Syria pose only a very remote threat 
to Western investors. More possible is the likelihood of growing civil unrest stemming 
from increasing inequalities of income. More specifically, the slow pace of any 
incremental economic reform has resulted in a decline in real per capita income and a rise 
in unemployment; in particular amongst the young and newly-qualified. Whilst in 1978 
the official unemployment rate in Syria was set at 1.6%, his had risen by 1991 to 2. 7. %. 
As Rivlin has commented; 
These official figures understate the problem of unemployment, but the fact that 
the official rate rose is an indication that the problem is becoming more serious. There is 
also a problem of underemployment: workers in the public sector and elsewhere who 
produce little and are a burden on the organizations that employ them and the economy as 
a whole. 8 
Political opposition to the regime was held in check until the death of Hafez AI-
Assad, who with a tight grip on power ensured that popular protest of any sort was 
swiftly suppressed. With the succession of his son, popular expectations of reform were 
high and immediate. However, the slow pace of change has subsequently increased the 
threat of civil unrest. It is still not clear if the bombings and gunfire in the al-Maza district 
of Damascus in April 2004 were sparked by these motives. 9 They were, however, a 
wake-up call to Syria, which, despite supporting Palestinian resistance groups such as 
Hamas, is rarely a target of terrorists itself. The incident appears to have been an isolated 
8 Rivlin, P., The Syrian Economy in the 1990's, in Syria: Domestic Political Stress and Globalisation, 
Moshe Dayan Centre, Tel Aviv University, 1999, p 40 
9 The Syrian authorities blamed foreign 'terrorists' at first, attempting to portray Syria as a victim of 
terrorism. It subsequently emerged that the events in April were of a domestic nature or were possibly 
instigated by elements of the regime themselves. 
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event; as political dissent continues to be tightly controlled, there is some risk of 
instability if the power of the president is seen to slip. The only exception to this 
generally stable situation and the lack of political violence is the sporadic operation of the 
Israeli security services against Palestinian resistance officials using well-established 
subversive methods. 10 Politically motivated and orchestrated levels of violence since the 
most recent war against Iraq by the Western Coalition have increased marginally, and 
should not be discounted completely. Specific levels of violent threats against individuals 
are very low however. Robberies or muggings of foreigners are almost unheard of if 
circumspect behaviour is adopted. 
10 Syrian-based Hezbollah and Hamas officials have been the target of two Israeli assassination attempts in 
2003 and 2004. 
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4.2.3 Interest Groups 
Individual investors or investor groups will need to be aware that specific interest 
groups exist within the civil framework. These interest groups can be characterized as 
clan-based circles of interest which find their outlet in the role they play in the framework 
of the state apparatus. Although the security forces will remain the linchpin of stability of 
the regime for the foreseeable future, Bashar's smooth succession was attributed to 
support from the key defence and interior ministers as well as elements within the 
intelligence agencies themselves. A complex network of military units, intelligence 
agencies and police strive to neutralize threats to the regime. 
The security forces will play a crucial role in the pace and scope of any reform. 
Senior figures within the regime structure have vested interests in the prevailing structure 
of the state, especially as regards the provision of state services and state contracts. It can 
be taken as read that hese officials will oppose policies that harm their interests and in so 
doing will attempt dilute or slow the pace of reform. In this context, the level of 
economic risk for potential investors is closely linked to Bashar's ability to convince the 
security elites of the necessity for change, but this will take time and will require the 
emergence of a younger and more liberal elite. The expectation that this would occur 
after Bashar's succession in 2000 with the new generation of a university trained Alawi 
elite stepping into the vacated shoes of their fathers should be recognized for the fallacy it 
is. 11 If elements within the supreme ruling clique (such as the Tlas family) are emulating 
the example of the Assads, it is simply to ensure the smooth transition of power from one 
11 Z.Bar'el, Cautious Change in Damascus, Ha'aretz, 31 '1 March 2000 
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generation to the next. Nothing in this transition can assume that in any way the Western-
educated and Western-trained Syrian elite will by necessity also implement Western 
values of openness and democracy in a regime they have to thank for their current elite 
positions. 
Beyond the specific circles of the security services stands a wider interest group or clan; 
that of the Alawi. Although the Alawi are estimated to account for less than I 0% of the 
population, they form an essential part of the military and political backbone and support 
structure of the regime. 12 In the early history of the state, the Alawi escaped poverty by 
joining the military, which they soon came to dominate. The key threat to the Alawi is a 
wider redistribution of political and economic power outside their specific existing sphere 
of influence. However, as long as Bashar remains in power and retains the loyalty of the 
Alawi clan groups the Alawi will continue to play a major role in Syrian politics. 13 As 
discussed in Chapter I, it should be noted however that interlinking elements of ideology, 
tribal and personal loyalties and bureaucratic legitimacy all play a part in providing the 
Syrian regime with a base of legitimacy. Although the above two groups (often 
indistinguishable) play the major role in the issue of special interest groups, the role of 
the Sunni should not be underestimated. They comprise around 80% of the population 
and prior to the 1970s formed the traditional ruling elite. There are clearly Sunnis in 
senior posts, including Vice-President Abdel-Halim Khaddam and Tlass, and although 
they are exceptions, the regime has been able to utilise elements of ideology, tribal and 
personal loyalties and bureaucratic legitimacy to weave a wider net of regime support 
12 R.A. Hinnebush, Authoritarian Power and State Formation in Ba'athist Syria, Westview Press, Oxford, 
1990,pix 
13 D.Pipes, The Alawi Capture of Power in Syria, MES, vol 25, no 4 ( 1989) 
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than simply a narrow tribal base. If any particular common interest lies at the heart of 
these different groups, it could be defined as the interest in the maintenance of the status 
quo, or, if that were not possible, the continued maintenance of the position of a 
particular group within the regime structure. 14 
All these above factors will obviously influence a decision to invest in the general 
sense. The specific political risk outlook for investors is dominated however, much as in 
other countries of the Middle East, by the historic preconditions ofthe region. 
14 This structure of regime support is examined in more detail in Chapter I 
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4.3 External Factors- Political and Economic 
By 1989, Syria faced a severe balance of payments crisis owing to an ever-
widening trade deficit. It became clear that the accepted policy of a state-dominated 
economy, based on a policy of import substitution, had failed. Tentative steps towards 
economic reform were therefore initiated. Hafez al-Assad believed that Syrian 
participation in the 1991 Madrid Conference that followed the Gulf War would bring 
immediate economic dividends; as Zisser has commented, 
The Syrians recognised that they could reap additional dividends from 
participating in this process - for example in the form of generous financial aid from the 
United States. Such aid was perceived as an important part of the effort to ensure long-
term economic stability in Syria. 15 
Regional and international realities also played a role here in Assad's 
determination to avoid a 'treaty of submission' 16 without Syrian participation. However, 
protracted peace negotiations between Israel and Syria finally came to an end when the 
parties were unable to continue negotiations following Shimon Peres' Labour defeat in 
1996. 17 Conflict with Israel has been an enduring, powerful and permanent feature in the 
political life of Syria. It has been used in the past and is used in the present to justify both 
the repressive political environment and the continued state control of the economy. In 
this respect it is essential for it to be recognised as a fundamental factor in determining 
domestic regime policy. Steadfast resistance to Israel and rhetorical defence and support 
of the Palestinians are vital and fundamental aspects of the political framework and 
ideological identity ofthe Syrian state; any relaxation of this stance would be detrimental 
15 E Zisser, A sad's Legacy- Syria in Transition, Hurst, St Martin's Press 2001, p I 05 
16 ibid, p 104 
17 i bid, p Ill 
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to the president's standing among both the population as a whole and key supporters of 
the regime in particular. As a result, Syria is unlikely to agree to a peace agreement with 
Israel unless it regains all land occupied by Israel following the 1967 conflict. Bashar' s 
insistence on the resumption of talks with Israel at the point they left off (with the 
acceptance of previously agreed Labour Israeli concessions) is a clear indicator of his 
boxed in position; without preconditions the current Israeli government will not begin to 
negotiate, but his domestic precarious position will not allow him to deviate from a 
position which is seen as a rare Syrian success. The issue of external political factors 
however must be seen in terms of the Syrian experience. The historical domestic Syrian 
view of Syria as the 'hapless victim' 18 of successive invasions and dismemberment 
means that external political threats cause an even greater closing of ranks than possibly 
elsewhere. It must be said however that in a society so imbued with official patriotism 
(hence the insistence of the regime in maintaining the tatters ofthe 'frontline state' myth) 
any perceived threat from abroad allows Ba'athist critics to label reformers as foreign 
agents and in receipt of foreign finance. 19 In addition, the greater the threat from outside 
appears, the better the reaction from traditionalists. This is a traditional approach which 
both Hafiz and Bashar are part of. Whether it be the aftermath of the 1973 War, the 
invasion of Lebanon by Israeli forces or the Syrian participation in the Gulf War against 
Iraq in 1990/91; all Syrian policy domestically felt the impetus of foreign action. How 
could it not be? With one of the pillars of authority for the regime resting on the premise 
of the frontline state and the economic prosperity of Syria resting on oil revenue and 
expatriate income, the regime was particularly sensitive to domestic repercussions as a 
18ibid, p 166 
19ibid, p 167 
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result of international events. In the wider international economic climate, the collapse of 
the USSR in 1991 is clearly the outstanding event which forced the regime to think about 
policy areas it otherwise might not have entertained. However it should be noted also 
that, as Perthes argues; 
'there can be no doubt that the Arab-Israeli Peace Process or the disappearance of 
the Soviet bloc has some influence on the economic reform process. In general however 
their impact should not be overstated, and oversimplifications which directly relate 
Syria's economic openin§-up to a changing international and regional environment 
should be warned against.' 0 
However one can argue that aspects of Syrian policy have been clearly linked to 
the formulation of policy and its promulgation. One example is the continued frontline 
state status which Syria has been at pains to uphold. Following the Baghdad Summit of 
1978 following the Camp David Accords Syria was promised a US$ 1.8 Billion annual 
grant for the next 1 0 years, a substantial proportion of which was actually paid for the 
first five. 21 Financial assistance amounts to more than half of Syria's projected 
development and investment budgets and the decrease in aid flow during the period 
1985-1990 did not cause the economic crisis of 1989, but rather exposed the situation that 
the investments made during the 1970's were not as successful as anticipated and were 
not able to reduce the dependency on imports.22 
An additional issue and an example which illustrates the underlying isolation of 
the Syrian Arab Republic is the refusal to join the WTO. This is a clear indicator of the 
regime's continuing approach to controlling imports and exports and the hold the regime 
20 Perthes, V., The political economy of Syria under Asad, IB Tauris, London, 1995, p 6 
21 ibid, p 34 
22 ibid, p 35 
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continues to extend over the economy. Currency evasion, smuggling and the economic 
relations with Arab neighbours, the EU and the USA all contribute to an uncertain 
situation. In addition the assassination of Rafik Hariri and the subsequent withdrawal of 
Syrian forces from parts of Lebanon ahead of Lebanese elections in 2005 will have added 
an additional level of uncertainty and political tension. 
External financing and the search for political rent has clearly been a factor in 
Syria's regional policy. Certainly pragmatic economic policy-making has been based on 
the political and social interests of the regime elite. Perthes argues convincingly that 
'as the economy had to function reasonably well to allow the pursuit of political 
goals, particularly the maintenance of national security and regime stability, economic 
needs were taken into account and economic crises could so bring about policy changes. 
This has evidently been the case for the ongoing economic adjustment process of the 
1980's and early 1990's.23 
In addition the scale of the challenge is immense if Syria is placed within the 
scale of an economic survey conducted in 2002. Syria was placed 1 02nd out of 185 
countries, a decline from 92nd in the previous survey.24 Mass protests at failing standards 
of living have shook other Arab countries ( Algeria, Morocco, Egypt, Jordan and 
Lebanon) and the regime is plainly clearly aware of the growing problem. 
23 Perthes, V., The political economy of Syria under Asad, IB Tauris, London, 1995, p 36 
24 George A., Syria- Neither Bread nor Freedom, Zed Books; London, 2003, p 162 
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4.4 Economic risk factors 
After recording robust real GDP growth for most ofthe 1990s (averaging 8.8% in 
1990-98), the economy contracted by 2.0% in 1999 (partly reflecting the impact of 
drought on the agriculture sector) and recorded weak growth of 0.6% in 2000.25 The 
strong performance of the 1990s reflected the development of the oil sector; the oil 
industry attracted investment from the public sector and foreign participants, such as 
Royal Dutch Shell.26 In addition, oil proceeds gave the government the resources to 
invest in other sectors ofthe economy. At the same time, Syria's participation in the 1991 
Gulf War to oust Iraqi forces from Kuwait paved the way for substantial economic aid 
from Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. Following the war, Syrian labour was also welcome as 
an expatriate workforce in the Gulf economies (approximately 250,000 to 500,000) and 
in Lebanon (approximately 500,000)27 ; hard currency remittances remaining an important 
source of foreign earnings28, along with tourism revenues. However, Syria was unable to 
build on these achievements and sustain this economic development. An inability to 
attract any substantial investment and structural problems with the economy (notably the 
high degree of state ownership and inefficient financial system) caused the economy to 
continue to deteriorate. Private consumption, investment and government spending all 
declined (although the public sector remains the dominant force in the economy). By the 
mid-1990s, many oil companies were reducing their commitments in Syria or 
25 Rivlin, P., The Syrian Economy in the 1990's, in Syria: Domestic Political Stress and Globalisation, 
Moshe Dayan Centre, Tel Aviv University, 1999, p 33 
26ibid, p 43 
27 EIU, Syria Country Report 1998, pp 5-16 
28 Zisser, E., Syria at a Crossroads, in Syria: Domestic Political Stress and Globalisation, Moshe Dayan 
Centre, Tel Aviv University, 1999, p 24 
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withdrawing altogether owing to the lack of viable oil discoveries and the challenging 
operating environment. Oil production reached a peak of 590,000 barrels per day (bpd) in 
1996 and has been declining steadily ever since, reaching 500,000 bpd in 2003?9 Prior to 
the 2003 war in Iraq, Syria was importing an estimated 200,000 bpd of oil from Iraq (in 
violation of United Nations sanctions) at discounted prices in order to free up its own oil 
for export. However, this ceased with the outbreak of the Coalition attack on Iraq, leaving 
the outlook for crucial oil revenues highly uncertain. 
Although not the only factor determining real GDP growth, movements in 
international oil prices play an important impact role. To that extent, although not an oil 
rentier economy, Syria is continuing to depend on its oil revenue. Moreover, the loss of 
export earnings from oil following the war in Iraq is estimated to have significantly 
reduced real GDP growth in 2003 to 2.0% from 3.3% in 2002. Syria was importing Iraqi 
oil at below market prices to fuel its own power, freeing up more of its own resources to 
export at a premium. GDP growth may have been even weaker than the above estimate in 
2003 (the risk is certainly present), although the oil-effect would have been offset by 
strong government spending and a good agricultural harvest, both of which bolstered 
private consumption. In 2003, in terms of expenditure components, the latter accounted 
for the largest share of real GDP (almost 60%). Gross fixed capital formation made up a 
further 20%, government consumption 12% and the foreign balance (i.e. net exports) the 
remaining 9%.3° Consequently, domestic demand made a strong positive contribution to 
growth in 2003, but this was partly offset by a negative contribution from net exports . 
. 
29 Syria Country Profile 2004, EIU 
30 Syria Country Profile 2004, EIU 
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Syria's national accounts are released with considerable delay, so the data for 
2003 is yet to be released (2005). There has been some effort to speed up the release of 
official statistics, but their accuracy is often somewhat dubious. In terms of the national 
accounts, reported investment growth for 2001-02 was very strong, but must be treated 
with suspicion as it appears to lack corroborating evidence. The accuracy of data 
concerning government consumption is difficult to assess as there is the potential for 
large historical revisions. In terms of assessment and judging the prospects for investment 
firms should bear in mind the poor quality of official statistics when conducting business 
dealings with Syria. 
Private consumption remains the most significant component of GDP growth. 
Despite an overall decline as a proportion of real GDP since 1993, it accounted for a 
58.7% share in 2003. Agriculture in this context is key to private consumption trends. 
Agriculture accounted for 30% of employment and 60% of non-oil exports in 1993.31 
Successive years of drought in 1998-2000 had a significant impact on rural incomes, as 
only a minority of the cultivated land is irrigated, the rest being rain fed. Rivlin makes the 
point well that 
Large investments have been made in irrigation. [It] has accounted for up to 75% 
of the state budget for agriculture. The objective is much higher production: the 15% of 
cultivated land which is irrigated produces 50% of total agricultural production. The 
other incentive was that production on rain-fed land fluctuated greatly each year.32 
31 UNESCWA, Survey ofEconomic and Social Developments in the Region 1993 (UN, New York, 1994), 
P: 100 
2 Rivlin, P ., The Syrian Economy in the 1990's, in Syria: Domestic Political Stress and Globalisation, 
Moshe Dayan Centre, Tel Aviv University, 1999, p 47 
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The wider impact of the agricultural sector cannot be underestimated; industries 
closely related to agriculture such as textiles, leather, tobacco and food processing 
accounted for 25% of output in the economy and around 50% of employment. 33 The 
agricultural downturn is believed to have forced significant migration from rural to urban 
areas and a consequent rise in poverty levels as these forced migrants failed to find jobs. 
The good rainfall season in 2003 (which prompted an increase in the area planted with 
cotton seed, an important agricultural product) will have boosted private consumption 
agam. 
Another factor affecting private consumption is unemployment. The economy is 
under pressure to provide sufficient jobs for a rapidly growing population (population 
growth averaged 2.5% between 1994 and 2001). Officially, unemployment stands at 
11%, but it could be as high as 30% or 40% among young Syrians. 34 In 2001, the 
government established an Unemployment Committee and formulated a five-year plan 
(2002-06) to tackle the problem. Under the plan, the government aims to spend US$1 
billion to create 800,000 jobs over five years, with the help of international donor funds. 
Some 70% of funds will be allocated to providing loans for small businesses, 20% to 
improving the investment environment (including infrastructure) and the remaining 10% 
to training. 
33 Rivlin, P ., The Syrian &onomy in the 1990's, in Syria: Domestic Political Stress and Globalisation, 
Moshe Dayan Centre, Tel Aviv University, 1999, p 46 
34 Zisser, E., Syria at a Crossroads, in Syria: Domestic Political Stress and Globalisation, Moshe Dayan 
Centre, Tel A viv University, 1999, p 24 
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4.4.1 Reform attempts 
Looking ahead to the 2006-2010 period, state planners have been trying to fresh a 
new approach to boost the reform process, integrate local businesses and sharpen their 
competitive edges. Yet, as holistic as the new approach hopes to be, critics of the plan 
range from those concerned about injecting more efficiency and flexibility into the 
system to those labelling the whole process as outmoded. 
The government line is, however, somewhat different - and stresses the usefulness 
of the plan to conducting reform. Abdullah Dardari, minister of state for planning affairs 
and head ofthe State Planning Committee (SPC), has formulated the rationale behind the 
plan as to co-ordinate the various strategies currently developed at ministerial levels with 
the ultimate goal of establishing a market economy. These include strategies in economic 
reform, export promotion, investment, agriculture and industry - as well as in social 
policy. Also called the National Indicative Plan (NIP)35, the 5-year scheme is the result of 
15 months of negotiations. The inclusion of the private and public sectors, as well as civil 
society, in the drafting of the plan this time also constitutes a major novelty. 
To co-ordinate these efforts, 14 different sectoral workshops are to be set up, each 
of them with a clear and specified programme. These channels will hopefully maintain 
dialogue and ensure synergies. The private-sector's role in developing the plan stands as a 
testimony to its growing influence over the economy. Private business now accounts for 
60% of total GDP36, and there is no doubt it has become the major driving force of the 
35 Syria Country Profile 2004, EIU 
36 Syria Country Profile 2004, EIU 
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economy. In society at large too, some lm Syrians are widely believed to fully depend on 
private charitable institutions for their living, making them partners to be reckoned with. 
Also boosting the private sector's importance has been the shift in government 
revenue streams over the last five years. In the past, oil revenues meant taxation was only 
rarely enforced. But with Syria likely to start importing major quantities of crude oil in 
the next few years, government revenues will have to come more from taxes. 
Reform of the tax system has therefore been a recent priority. But many argue that one 
issue the government must also concentrate on is its outdated productive assets. 
Bearing in mind that privatisation is still not acceptable37, the government wants to bring 
private investment and management into loss-making firms - mainly food-processing 
industries - through build-operate-transfer (BOT) contracts. This process, also named 
corporatisation, might actually mean little more than applying trade laws to these 
companies, making them private only in form, but not in substance. Yet as none of the 
country's many loss-making industries have actually gone through this process, it is hard 
to predict how successful it might be. For the small number of textile, engineering and 
chemical firms which do break even, however, the government seems resolute to pump in 
extra cash and modernise them. But in case of failure, there would be little other option 
than to call for external help. As far as the few profitable businesses are concerned, the 
state has made it clear it will remove any protectionist measures assisting them within 
two years. They would then have to compete on an equal basis with other companies. 
37 George A., Syria -Neither Bread nor Freedom, Zed Books, London, 2003, p 167 
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Elsewhere, the government has committed to applying the principles set by the 
Euromed Charter for Enterprises endorsed in October 2004.38 The charter aims to 
facilitate access to both financing and new markets, streamline administrative procedures, 
upgrade the education and training for entrepreneurship and improve quality control and 
transparency. Promoting this charter is also another way to support small- and medium-
sized enterprises (SMEs), whose contribution to the economy is increasing. 
Part of the reason for this heightened role is the dominance of SMEs in rapidly 
developing sectors such as IT. These businesses are taking on more outsourcing, a niche 
market in which local IT firms, such as Inana Group or Syriacomm, have already secured 
a place. As Syria is lagging behind in technology, the government has significantly 
deregulated the framework in which service companies operate. 
The Syrian economic landscape appears therefore to be becoming more polarised. 
On one side, IT firms are becoming models to emulate by setting new demanding 
operating standards at all levels. But on the other, the state is engaged in a race to 
dismantle and/or upgrade its inefficient assets. Attempting to bridge these two extremes 
has become the difficult task entrusted to the hands of the SPC. However, the project has 
been hindered by bureaucratic difficulties and although this new development is of some 
note, as Nyrabia has commented, 
38 EUROMED Charter for Enterprises 2004, EU Brussel 2004 
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'at the core of the issue lie [once again] the deeply established interests that have strong 
roots and that tend to obstruct any change and to bury it in general concepts in order strip 
it of its contents. ' 39 
In addition, the target for job creation is too modest: an estimated 150,000-
350,000 jobs would be required just to absorb new entrants to the job market each year. 40 
At the same time, wages have not seen adequate advancement. The government 
employs the vast majority of working Syrians, but prior to 2000 had failed to provide 
substantial wage increases. In 2000, buoyed by the rise in oil prices, the government 
announced plans to increase· public sector wages by 100% over three years. The 
government instigated a further 20% wage hike in the first half of 2004 to boost 
consumer confidence in the face of US economic sanctions; this move may be replicated 
in 2005 if external pressures continue as it represents the most direct route to providing 
an immediate expression of loyalty and an outlet for economic protests and demands. In 
addition, the government has paid a number of bonuses in recent years to public sector 
employees. However, despite these increases, state and private sector salaries remain low, 
limiting the ability of many Syrians to make discretionary consumer purchases. The 
government's tighter fiscal position will make it more difficult to increase wages and 
offer bonuses in future years. 
39 The Syria Report, No 11, October 2003, p 4 
40 Syria Country Profile 2004, EIU 
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4.4.2 Population Growth 
The labour force is expanding rapidly and represents a key stress point for the 
country. From around 17.5 million in 2004, the population is expected to reach the 20 
million mark by 2010, which means the economy must absorb around an estimated 
200,000- 250,000 new job entrants each year.41 This demographic trend also implies that 
the economy must grow by at least 2.4% per annum to maintain current living standards. 
The number of people of working age (15-64 years) is expected to rise by 39.3% in 2000-
2010, resulting in a sharp drop in the dependency ratio from 0. 78 (78 dependants per 100 
workers) to 0.44 in 2025. Beyond that date, the dependency ratio is expected to rise 
gradually. 
Ideally, the growing young population should provide a long-term boost to the 
country's economic development by maintaining a buoyant level of demand in the 
economy and providing Syria with a sufficient pool of labour. However, this is unlikely 
to prove the case. The government's persistent failure to provide adequate funds for 
education means that many of the new entrants to the workforce are ill equipped to meet 
the needs of employers or Syria's general economic requirements. If they graduate from 
the system, their qualifications are often outdated or useless. Pay scales are pitiful by 
international standards42 and Alan George has made the point that 
'many of the better graduates are forced to emigrate in a brain drain that deprives 
the country of its most talented young people. Thousands of Syrian doctors, engineers 
and teachers work abroad, in particular in the Gulf countries and the United States. ' 43 
41 George A., Syria- Neither Bread nor Freedom, Zed Books, London, 2003, p 163 
42 George A., Syria- Neither Bread nor Freedom, Zed Books, London, 2003, p 152 
43 ibid, p 153 
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In particular, fiscal tightening has prevented an increase in already low education 
spending; and the rapid growth of the population quickly absorbs any small increase in 
available funds. This effect has been compounded and accelerated by the swift rate of 
urbanisation, which has meant that schools and universities in the major cities have been 
overwhelmed. Although the Syrian state made it a priority to ensure universal education, 
the actual quality of that education is debatable. As George has again commented; 
'The education system remains in the grip of a bitter legacy. Rapid expansion 
with limited resources has taken its toll on the quality of facilities and teaching. Despite 
constant clean-up campaigns, corruption and political favourism are as endemic here as 
elsewhere in the system. The problems are compounded by fear of upsetting the 
authorities and a related fear of taking initiatives, and by a tradition of rote-learning 
which discourages independent and creative thinking.' 44 
All these factors have combined to limit human capital growth. Although private 
schools and universities have emerged in this environment these will benefit only a very 
small segment of the population and have little effect on the broader labour market. In 
2003 four new private universities were given authorisation to establish themselves, with 
fees ranging from US$ 1,500 to US$ 5,000 per annum depending on the university and 
facult/ 5; clearly out of reach of the vast majority of Syrians, with average wages around 
US$ 100. 
Productivity ratios have fallen since the late 1980s, although precise figures are 
unavailable. Nevertheless, the fall in capital investment and under-investment in human 
capital, combined with anecdotal evidence, suggest that Syria failed to increase its 
productivity in the 1990s. The manufacturing sector in particular has suffered from 
44ibid, p 148 
45 The Syria Report, No 11, October 2003, p 5 
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under-investment and remains inefficient and unable to compete effectively in world 
markets. Furthermore, controls on direct investment and the capital account impede the 
transfer of foreign capital and human technologies into Syria. In addition the paucity of 
employment opportunities and the lack of access to modern equipment and business 
practices have encouraged skilled and educated Syrians to seek employment abroad, 
mainly in the Gulf states and in the United States. This long-term trend has not 
diminished since 2000. The government has made some effort to accelerate the process of 
computerisation since Bashar's ascent to power. Although personal computer usage is 
quite low, it is increasing. In addition, the government has awarded contracts to a Chinese 
company to upgrade the telecommunications system operated by the Syrian 
Telecommunications Establishment. Internet usage is allowed but IS more strictly 
controlled than in the West. Since Bashar came to power, internet access and mobile 
phones have been allowed to proliferate, mainly because he once headed the Syrian 
Computer Association and is enthusiastic about new technologies. Although websites are 
strictly monitored and banned if necessary, and the poor cannot afford the technology, the 
increased usage is positive for productivity growth and consequently long-term economic 
potential. 
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4.4.3 Capital 
The economy failed to benefit from an upward trend in the savings rate 
throughout the 1990s. In 1991, the domestic savings rate reached a low of 10.3% but 
climbed to a high of 23.0% in 2000. This was in line with the contraction in both private 
and public consumption in that period. However, widespread distrust of the formal 
banking system and the lack of developed financial products in Syria mean that the 
economy has almost no method of harnessing the increased level of savings to provide 
funds for domestic investment. Very few Syrians possess a bank account and savings 
vehicles such as deposit accounts and private pensions are virtually unknown. Many 
Syrians, in contravention of the existing financial law, hold their funds in Lebanese bank 
accounts. This will change slowly as the banking system is liberalised and modernised 
under the government's current reform programme46, but substantive change will only 
occur over the longer term. The lack of investment funds has left much of the country's 
capital stock outdated and obsolete. The country requires substantial investment to ensure 
that its infrastructure can meet the demands of the rapidly growing population. Power and 
water shortages are common, particularly in the Greater Damascus region, as basic 
services struggle to cope. Equipment in factories and offices is also out of date and 
businesses are struggling to improve efficiency and productivity, limiting the country's 
economic development and long-term outlook. 
Syria's longer-term economic outlook is therefore encumbered by significant 
political and economic challenges. Under the leadership of Bashar al-Assad, the country 
has begun to take tentative steps towards reform; this reform however is only economic, 
46 The liberalization program allowing private banks to operate in Syria took effect in 2004 
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not political. Even then, the process of economic reform has been slow, and out of 
alignment with the demands of a rising population, which will place undue pressures on 
the state's finances and social stability. 
The economy has a long way to go in transforming itself from a closed, 
centralised and state-controlled regime to a fully-functioning market economy with 
respect for the rule of law. There is considerable resistance to any change involving 
relinquishing state control of the economy, which extends into all sectors. Promotion of 
investment, private banking and the talk of the establishment of a stock exchange are all 
encouraging. However, the economy is firmly controlled by the state and the process of 
privatisation has been ruled out while the war with Israel formally continues; ultimately, 
this represents a bridge that must be crossed if Syria is to become more productive and 
grow at rates sufficient to boost living standards. 
The pace of change will demand political reform, but this will be hard to come by 
in a state dominated by the intelligence services and the military, and without formal 
democratic institutions. Syria is a bureaucratic and legislative nightmare for business 
dealings. Economic sanctions imposed by the US only make matters worse, and if these 
continue for several years, this will further weaken any inflows of foreign investment, 
which are crucial to boosting future growth prospects. Given all of these obstacles, 
together with the country's narrow structural base, inadequate capital stock and inflexible 
labour market, there would appear to be little prospect of high potential growth rates in 
the future. 
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The monetary environment of cash based transactions puts additional strain on the 
viability of attracting investment options to Syria. The twin elements of inflation and the 
balance of payments issue both serve to depress and put off options to put investment into 
the SAR. In addition, the growth rate of per capita GDP in Syria is as stated a vague and 
uncertain beast and the reality of the investment situation is far less viable if investment 
decisions cannot be based on certain economic data. The link between GDP growth and 
the state reliance on international oil markets as a primary source of income is another 
weak factor. Syria continues to be an oil dependent country, a major factor which will 
impact on investment decisions to a high degree. The only viable areas for potential 
investors to operate in are in the exporting business of textiles or handicrafts, oil or 
tourism. Syria's long term potential is therefore weakened and major structural factors 
impede on any possible investment opportunity in the country. 
Syria's legal system recognizes and facilitates the transfer of property rights, 
including intellectual property rights. Acting on Syrian law, the government has raided 
shops known to pirate computer software. In April 1995, the Syrian government 
announced its intention, in principle, to join the Paris Union for the International 
Protection of Industrial Property. The government also stated that it is considering joining 
the 1967 Stockholm Intellectual Property Rights Agreement. However the Syrian 
government is not a signatory to the WTO and so therefore a foreign investor could not 
use the additional safeguards of that agreement if in dispute. Although the WTO legal 
procedures are not open to individual companies, it would be feasible (as with the EC 
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taking action on behalf of her auto manufactures against Japanese imports) for a 
sovereign state to take action against the Syrian Arab Republic. 
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4.5 Attitude of the Syrian state towards FDI 
Has the reform process led to an 'institutionalisation' of economic reform? 
Clearly not - Investment Law No 10 is still operating within a tight framework of 
competing legislative hurdles. Ba'athist policy and individual reluctance by a civil 
servant to assume control or responsibility on the one hand continue to drive the overall 
state attitude towards foreign investors or the loosening of the control over state 
dominated industries. Without additional payment to assuage the risk of accepting 
responsibility for a project which might compete against a regime company or might fail, 
most bureaucrats will not ensure a smooth path through the administrative jungle. In 
addition the multitude of competing state organisations overseeing the operation of 
business in Syria (which forces many Syrian medium sized businesses to remain small 
and therefore unnoticed)47 means that the amount of bureaucracy is formidable and 
complex. 
Even if these bureaucratic problems could be overcome, what of the climate 
regarding the stability of the investment legislation? The climate of investment certainly 
seemed to change in 1991 with the introduction of the Investment Law, and again in 2000 
with Bashar al Assad's ascension. But the difficulty remains that the speedy introduction 
of Investment Law No 10 could also set a precedent for the speedy removal of that same 
legislation. 
47 This is of particular relevance when placed in the context of tax legislation. 
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The regulatory and legal systems are simply not fair and predictable; in addition 
the role of Syria within the WTO must be examined. No framework of international rules 
is applied consistently and no independent systems of arbitration in law exist, there are 
arbitrary rule changes in terms of ownership, there is the role of taxes and hidden 
payments to consider, the issue of currency controls and conflicts in trade and contract 
law. 
Competent government structure is essentially measured by the stability of 
currency and the stability of the political apparatus. There is also the issue of capital 
flight and illegal holding of currency in Lebanon and elsewhere. 
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4.6 Aim of investment 
Is it worth investing in Syria? Commercial risk assessment and overall Trade 
environment is clearly not overall attractive to investment, yet the picture is not 
completely bleak. Between 2003 and 2005 alone in the Gas and Oil sector there were 8 
major new investment or exploration ventures announced. These included a joint venture 
for city gas distribution48 , a marine oil survey with the Norwegian Oil Establishment, oil 
exploration agreements with Soyouz Petrol, Bouchamaoui, and HBS International, an 
expansion and development agreement of the Oudeh oil field with Tanganyika Oil and 
the completion of the first private joint venture petrol refinery in Damascus.49 In the 
manufacturing sector, KIA motors and LG have agreed to build an assembly plant in 
Syria, Daimler-Chrysler have obtained permission to re-enter the Syrian market, Khodro 
(a SIAMCO joint venture) has begun the construction of an automotive assembly plant50 
in Damascus and Proton have also announced plans to begin assembling cars in Syria. 
Despite the apparent slump in tourist stream towards the Middle East, Syria has managed 
to attract investors from Dubai, the Saudi BinLaden Group, lnconnu, the Emirates, 
Andratos Developpment, and the UAE for a variety oftourism projects in Damascus and 
along the Mediterranean coast. The introduction of private banks into Syria has also led 
to a surge of applications for the operation of private banks. Byblos, Banque Audi, the 
Housing Bank for Trade and Finance and the Syrian - Bahraini Bank are all examples of 
the demand which exists in the Syrian sector for private alternatives to the state operated 
incumbents. Areas of interest to investors would therefore include the oil and oil-related 
48 21 March 2005 Gait Energy 
49 Euro-Mediterranean Network of Investment Promotion Agencies data 2003-2005 
50 ibid 
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areas, in particular machinery, maintenance and logistics, including upgrades and the 
development of gas-related developments (especially in Palmyra). In addition specialised 
investors would be able to look at specific agricultural projects and equipment (in 
particular for specialist produce such as pistachio nuts or dates), textiles and textile 
production and licensing agreements (Bennetton is already a operator here- competition 
from Jordan already exists with the production of Nautica sportswear there). In addition 
the areas of Pharmaceutical agreements and licensing factors could also prove lucrative, 
as could Import and Export agreements of materials and products occupying a niche 
market (olive oil soap, traditional artefacts, textiles). Finally there is always tourism 
operations in a specialised market (Mediterranean coastline and antiquities). 
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4. 7 Conclusion 
The blanket assessment that Syria is simply not worth investing in is therefore 
inaccurate. However it can be clearly stated that Syria is a risky country to invest in. It 
can clearly be worthwhile if the investor is well-connected, able to operate within the 
system and is accustomed to the 'Syrian way' of doing business. Connections can be 
useful and productive, can open doors to further investment opportunities otherwise 
denied. Therefore Syria will remain closed to those companies that do not take account of 
local peculiarities and sensitivities. The fundamental problem however still remains the 
need to reform the economy. In practice any reforms simply mean a larger role for the 
private sector supplementing and replacing the state controlled areas of the economy. 
This however implies a relative marginalisation of the poorer sections of society which 
have the highest stakes in the continuation of Ba'athist rule. The beneficiaries of such 
limited liberalisation, often individuals with regime connections, if not regime figures 
themselves, often tend to display their wealth conspicuously, triggering much resentment 
in a country where hundreds of thousands live under the poverty line. Economic reform 
has therefore to be constrained by the need to appease - or not to provoke - the very 
classes on which the regime had traditionally depended. Corruption was a similar 
problem; although successive campaigns targeted corruption in the bureaucracy higher 
levels of the regime remained untouched because Assad valued political loyalty above 
all. As Van Dam has correctly commented; 
Various campaigns to eradicate corruption were successful only to a very limited 
extent, as the corrupt elements of the higher-placed Alawi (and for that matter also non-
Aiawi) military elite belonging to the direct entourage of the President, as well as their 
clientele, were to a great extent left untouched. Disciplinary action against the most 
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important supporters of the President could have directly undermined the whole regime, 
and therefore was not undertaken [ ... ] After having enriched themselves and having 
obtained all kinds of privileges to defend, the same elite turned into a major obstacle to 
the reform of abuses enveloping the state. 51 
Therefore Western commentators who urge the regime towards the adoption of ever-
increasing free market reforms or Western governments who see the Syrian regime as the 
next domino to fall in the area of the Middle East dictatorships need to be wary. Syria is 
not easy to change. 
51 Nikolaos Van Dam, The struggle for power in Syria, Politics and Society under Asad and the Ba'ath 
Party (London IB Taurus 1996) p 142 
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Chapter 5: Politics and the Economy in Syria 
5.1. Introduction 
The discussion of Investment Law No I 0 and its repercussions for Syria has to be 
seen within the political situation of Syria. Like Western states, economics and economic 
decisions in Syria are naturally connected and intertwined with politics. Unlike Western 
states, these bonds and structured links between politics and economics in Syria are 
particularly strong and intense. This chapter will endeavour to point out the various 
individual linkages between politics and economics in Syria that have become apparent 
during the course of this study. In this way it is hoped that observers of Syria and Syrian 
politics and economics will be able to continue to analyse the complex structure of the 
Syrian state and find it helpful to assess the particular nature of the Syrian situation. 
The overall aim of this chapter is to point out the political factors that shaped and 
influenced the formulation and the content of Investment Law No. I 0. 
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5.2. The Economic and Political Background to the Law 
Since the Corrective Movement seized power in 1970, the aim of the regime has 
been to maintain Ba'athist domination over the state and public sector domination over 
the economy, whilst alienating as few interest groups as possible. The regime essentially 
re-incorporated private capital after the alienating period that followed the coup of 1963 
into a broad cross-class coalition. This cooperation between the regime and private 
business saw these groups benefit from the massive influx of financial aid into Syria 
following the 1973 war. Private-sector businessmen set up as subcontractors for state 
companies and overall the convergence of interests - as private businessmen cultivated 
regime officials, and regime officials in turn set up their own business ventures, a group 
Waldner has described as the 'new bourgeoisie' 1 - saw the development of the new type 
of regime support; a loyal group of businessmen, whose loyalty had been purchased by 
preferential public policies. 
This is the atmosphere into which Investment Law No. 10 was introduced. To 
determine to what extent Investment Law No. 10 was a genuine attempt to liberalise and 
to 'open up' the Syrian economy, the linkages between Investment Law No. 10 and 
possible political issues need to be examined. The first step is to examine the actual law 
to see whether it fits into an established framework of economic legislation. If it indeed 
does so, the rationale for arguing that the legislation was primarily politically motivated 
would be necessarily weakened. However, as demonstrated in Chapter 3, the legislation 
in fact sits uncomfortably alongside other economic legislative measures, often 
contradicting them or creating a sense of confusion and uncertainty within the broader 
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economic legislative framework. For a major investment law it is extremely short, only 
comprising 39 articles. Far from overriding contrasting and contradictory established 
legislation, and removing barriers to investment, the legislation often adds to the complex 
economic legislative structure in Syria. As we have seen in Chapter 4, the additional 
domestic and international barriers to wide scale and substantial private investment in 
Syria outside the remit of Investment Law No. 10 are formidable. Investment Law No. 10 
therefore appears to be a law that could only really work as part of a wider package of 
reforms - yet substantial further economic reforms have not been forthcoming. Despite 
the genuine potential for economic development in Syria and despite the existence of 
Investment Law No.l 0 on the statute books for more than a decade, the actualities of 
investment in Syria by private individuals outside the influential circle of regime 
supporters remain difficult and awkward. 
If Investment Law No. 10 has remained an exception in legislative terms, the 
question then has to be asked why it was passed in the first place. The continuing ability 
of the existing elite in Syria to control the levers of political power partly depends clearly 
on their ability to control the economy and the income generated by the state. In terms of 
budgetary income, the taxation system is inefficient and clumsy, open to widespread and 
systematic abuse and evasion. The continued oil-rentier income from the Syrian 
Petroleum Company and its additional affiliation with Elf Aquitaine and Royal Dutch 
Shell through the medium of the al-Furat petroleum compan/ is generally accepted to 
1 Waldner, D., State-Building and Late Development, lthaca, Cornell University Press, 1999, p 89 
2 Al-Furat Oil Company is a Syrian-based private oil company, in which the Syrian Government and Dutch 
Shell Oil hold undisclosed stakes. No Syrian-based Shell manager was willing to comment on the internal 
181 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
i 
I 
I 
provide the continuing financial crutch needed for regime survival. The lack of private 
firms allowed to independently operate within the oil-rentier sector without the need to 
sign affiliation agreements with the Syrian Petroleum Company shows that the regime 
intended and continues to intend to keep close control over the sectors of the economy it 
deems essential to its survival. However at some point the oil is going to run out. 
A further argument along these lines concerning Investment Law No. 10 is the 
following: 
A straight-forward approach to the analysis of the political aspects of Investment 
Law No 10 is to argue that this law simply marked an incremental development in the 
continued attempt by Hafez al-Assad to secure the economic and political viability ofthe 
Ba'athist regime. Following this line of argument, the regime was, by introducing 
Investment Law No. 10, simply following a multi-faceted approach to politics by 
allowing the tightly controlled expansion of the private sector into areas previously 
denied to them. What then are the primary economic and political advantages for the 
regime that would seem to result from this decision? 
industry rumour that the Syrian operations of the company are the 41h most profitable worldwide for Shell. 
AI-Furat currently controls 179 oil wells in Syria. 
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5.2.1. Capital Advantages 
Firstly, the regime hoped to attract expatriate Syrian capital back into the country 
and thus hoped to benefit from the immediate influx of hard currency. One of the 
misconceptions that foreign observers of the economic climate and development of Syria 
have developed since 1991 was the (possibly natural) assumption that Investment Law 
No. 10 was primarily aimed at foreign private investors, rather than Syrians. This 
misconception was understandable given firstly the enthusiasm of Syrian officials to 
emphasise the radical departure away from the economic norm that Investment Law No. 
10 represented, secondly the paucity of genuine private domestic investment or economic 
openness evident in Syria until that time, and thirdly the then current international fashion 
for foreign direct investment legislation3. The results of Investment Law No. 10 (as 
shown in Chapter 3) however show that in contrast, the vast majority of Investment Law 
No. 10 projects are small-scale family size Syrian-run affairs, often with only a modest 
amount of start-up capital (at least by international standards). Most of this capital 
originates not from officially held sources, but from the substantial covert hard currency 
holdings Syrians have accumulated since 1963 in banks in Lebanon or further afield. 
Traditional Syrian commercial activity (as elsewhere in the Levant, but this is a 
particularly Syrian trend) is strongly family-based,4 and the amount of capital an extended 
family can raise is often surprisingly substantial, at least by Syrian standards. And even if 
3 One example among many are the 'Provisions for the Encouragement of Foreign Investment' initiated by 
the Chinese Government in 1986. See Dunning, J.H., & Narula, R., Foreign Direct Investment and 
Governments, London, Routledge, 1998, pp 396. 
4 Indeed, one of the reasons for the economic survival of many Syrians is the existing wide family network; 
cousins, brothers, uncles etc. all contribute to the family income, and often work within family enterprises. 
In addition, many Syrians hold down two or more jobs, explaining why civil servants or academics on very 
small salaries are able to survive. 
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this capital raised is modest by international standards, Syrian wages and incidental start-
up expenses are low and most projects are on a small scale. One concrete indicator of this 
effect is the operation of the majority of projects under Investment Law No. 10 in one 
particular sector of the economy. As discussed earlier in Chapter 3 the majority of 
projects operating under Investment Law No. 10 are in the transport sector of the 
economy. These projects are overwhelmingly small-scale, with the majority of firms 
supplying hire-cars or minibuses to private individuals. Hire cars, if imported under 
Investment Law No. 10, are still exempt from import taxes (as they are classified as 
equipment) and foreign cars continue to attract (if imported outside the application of 
Investment Law No 10) levels of taxation between 150% and 300% of the car's value. 
These projects offer a three-fold advantage over other projects in other economic sectors; 
there was pent-up demand in Syria before 1991 for foreign cars\ immediate profits from 
rental agreements were assured, and start-up costs were low. 
The argument holds that the regime, by passing Investment Law No. 10, hoped to 
legitimise these cumulatively substantial currency holdings (domestic and international) 
and to re-introduce them into the official economy. To that end, the official exchange rate 
between the Sy£ and the US$ has been kept at around 90% of the black-market rate ever 
since the reforms were introduced. The official or apparent advantages of operating (and 
profiting) from a legitimate base have apparently outweighed the immediate pecuniary 
5 Indeed, although import taxes were prohibitive, in a number of cases it was still profitable for individuals 
to import a car (if equipped with the rare import allowances), pay the taxes and sell the car in Syria. 
Depreciation was almost unheard of. An interesting parallel can be drawn with the former German 
Democratic Republic; before 1991 ownership of a car was seen as the ultimate status symbol - one of the 
first consumer items East Germans acquired after 1991 was a Western car. 
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loss of 10% of capital. In addition the recent partial abrogation of Law No. 24 of 1986 
concerning the holding and trading in foreign currency to allow Syrian individuals to 
legally hold foreign currency (although still not to trade in it) should also be considered. 
The aim of this decree (apart from the obvious relaxation of pressure on the overworked 
judicial system) is three-fold; politically it offers a further incremental concession to 
prominent economic critics of the government, but, by not completely removing Law No. 
24 from the statute books the regime can simultaneously assuage conservative and 
traditional power groups within the regime that the full measures of Law No. 24 can 
always be re-introduced if necessary. The third aim is that this measure will re-introduce 
further substantial hard currency holdings into the wider legitimate economy. 
The regime has in fact felt the need to substantially amend and effectively disable 
a major piece of Syrian legislation with a strong ideological message barely 14 years after 
its introduction (a short time period by Syrian legislative standards). This is a strong 
indicator that Investment Law No. 10 in its legislative isolation has indeed been 
acknowledged as falling substantially short of at least one of its stated aims, and that 
additional measures are indeed needed to encourage investment. An additional point is 
that the regime since 1991 has seen fit to pass no fewer than seven executive orders6 
amending or clarifying Investment Law No. 10 - a strong indicator that it had not been as 
successful as initially hoped. A further indicator of the unseemly haste is the 
comparatively rapid legislative process which Investment Law No. I 0 was passed -
another indicator that the law was designed not to form the basis for a fundamental 
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restructuring of the legislative framework for private investment in Syria, but as the short-
term solution to a particular parlous political and economic situation. 
6 For examples of Executive Orders 6 & 7 (the most recent) see Appendices 2 & 3. 
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5.2.2. The Economy of Emotions? 
A second point to consider is the wider economically emotional (for want of a 
better word) effect the passing of Investment Law No. 10 achieved. It went further than 
simply satisfying the small elite groups at the head of the regime in allowing them to 
invest illicit hard currency they had previously accumulated; (this in particular applies to 
army officers smuggling a range of prohibited goods (including medicines) between 
Lebanon and Syria).7 Syrians in general saw opportunities open up to them which 
appeared to be previously closed or impossible. Whether or not these opportunities were 
actually realised by them is a moot point - simply the theoretical opportunity for private 
investment and commercial activity was a great moral boost for many individuals and 
lead to a renewed growth of confidence in the country (at least amongst certain elements 
of the property-owning classes). Indeed the wider impact of the legislation was that 
middle-class Syrians were able to utilise their existing client networks in the political 
sphere and use them to set up new private enterprises. 8 
Now although the actual direct and specific economic effects of Investment Law 
No. 10 are difficult to quantify and impossible to isolate within the larger scope of the 
Syrian economic picture, the emotional effect of the legislation was immediate. 
Interviewees in the business community spoke of their relief and anticipation when the 
legislation first appeared9 that Syria was to finally emerge from the stranglehold of 
economic constraints and fulfil its true economic potential. The actual result after 
7 Interview 26, Damascus, 2"d May 1998 
8 Interview 18, Damascus Countryside, 151h March 1998 
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Investment Law No. 10 has been m operation for just over a decade IS somewhat 
different. 
One of the stated aims of Investment Law No. 10 was that new projects should 
contribute directly to the creation of employment opportunities and to the reduction of 
unemployment. However, data from the Department of Employment in Syria does not 
show a dramatic fall in unemployment from 1991 onward, rather it shows that the already 
identified trend of gradually falling unemployment in Syria since 1986 has continued. 10 
The identification of Investment Law No. 10 as a contributory factor to the continued fall 
in official unemployment cannot be discounted; but it would be incorrect to identify 
Investment Law No. 10 as the prime reason behind this continued fall. Again however it 
is necessary to stress that there remains a clear difference between actual levels of 
unemployment and official levels of unemployment or underemployment. 
But one wider economic indicator that can be identified from Investment Law No 
10 is of particular interest and importance in this respect. The sheer number of projects 
submitted under Investment Law No 10 to the Council for Investment between 1991 and 
1998 is a defining indicator of the huge possible potential and apparent readiness for 
investment in Syria which was and continues to be present among the Syrian population, 
despite the well-publicised continued and substantial economic, political and bureaucratic 
difficulties of operating a private business in Syria. Interviewees all expressed great pride 
in Syria and (sometime obviously by necessity) in the then President Hafez al-Assad and 
9 Interview 5, Interview 13, Interview 18, Interview 25, Interview 27, Interview 29, Interview 30 
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the Ba'athist regime. The option of being seen to allow a degree of economic freedom 
was an inspired one by the regime, and one that certainly allowed it to regain some 
credibility amongst the Syrian petite bourgeoisie. Although that initial optimism seemed 
to have faded after the first three to four years of operation of Investment Law No. 10, 
after it became clear that further reforms were not immediately forthcoming, the Syrian 
business community nevertheless remains of the opinion that the long-term economic 
potential for Syria is great. In this respect it should be recognised that this feeling 
appeared to affect more groups than the traditional regime supporting networks. 
Therefore the regime could conceivably be attempting to reach out and gain support from 
hitherto not approached classes of entrepreneurs. 
In contrast the current difficulties of operating in Syria seem to Western firms and 
officials to be so acute that Syria is now seen as an almost impossible market. A number 
of Western firms when interviewed were adamant that they would not contemplate 
operating in Syria at all in the present or near future. 11 This is indeed a further indicator of 
the previously made point that Investment Law No 10 was not primarily aimed at 
international foreign investors, but at affiliated Arab and domestic Syrian investors. 
However grim the economic situation might appear to a Western investor, from a 
Syrian domestic commercial perspective, the simple legislative enactment of Investment 
Law No 10 seemed to be a momentous event. It appeared to symbolise the first crack in 
an otherwise tightly controlled economic system. Although the results are difficult to 
10 Again, it should be pointed out that official data is extremely unreliable and subject to manipulation 
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quantify, the economic atmosphere in domestic private Syrian firms during the late 
1990's cannot be compared to the atmosphere in the same firms during the 1970's or 
early 1980's. From that perspective, Investment Law No. I 0 by itself was a success by re-
invigorating the commercial and entrepreneurial spirit of Syrian businessmen in general. 
In this context it should be stressed that a number of expatriate Syrians returned to Syria 
after the enactment of the 1991 legislation and set up business in Aleppo and Damascus. 12 
From this point of view, the enactment of Investment Law No. 10 could either be 
seen as a conscious shift by the regime towards a greater degree of openness; or equally 
as an essentially short-term measure designed to appease elements within the regime. On 
the balance of arguments I would contend that Investment Law was a short-term measure 
designed as an economic safety valve. I would suggest that the view that Investment Law 
No. I 0 marked a first step towards a pluralist economic system is essentially incorrect and 
shows an incomplete grasp of the complexities and influences prevalent within the Syrian 
economic context. 
11 Interview 16, Interview 20 
12 Interview 15, Interview 30, Interview 31 
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5.3. The Short-term role of Investment Law No. 10 
As the regime allowed the tightly contrqlled expansion of the private sector into 
areas previously denied to them, it must have had a clear notion that even this slight 
economic loosening would have political implications. It indeed seems that the 
introduction of Investment Law No 10 had as many political aims as economic ones. The 
continual difficulty is to assign a comparative level of value to these respective aims, but 
one thing is absolutely certain; the overall political aim behind the introduction of 
Investment Law No 10 (as was the case with all of Hafez al-Assad's decisions) was to 
ensure his regime's stability and continuity. There are however a number of individual 
factors within this paradigm that deserve closer attention. 
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5.3.1. The Ability for Criticism of the Economy 
Firstly there is the question of the ability to voice criticism of the economic 
situation. Ba'athist Syria under Hafez AI-Assad and continuing under Bashar AI-Assad 
did not and does not have a tradition of allowing or welcoming open political criticism. 
Criticism or discussion of political matters tends to be carried out behind closed doors 
within the inner circles of the Ba'ath Party, if at all. Indeed the examples of Members of 
Parliament being charged on a number of charges relating to allowing discussion of topics 
relating to political reform are legion. 
However, criticism of the government on economic matters has traditionally been 
if not widespread then certainly more tolerated, in particular from Members of 
Parliament, after the introduction of Investment Law No. 10 in 1991. To observers ofthe 
regime, it has seemed that the years since 1991 have been ones where economic criticism 
of the government by prominent businessmen or Members of Parliament (these roles are 
often combined) has been allowed by the regime authorities and sometimes positively 
welcomed. Indeed, the level of criticism allowed has on occasion surprised and almost 
baffled veteran Syrian observers. 13 The Syrian Parliament, after years of loyal service as a 
rubber-stamping institution, has apparently begun to act as a safety valve for criticism of 
the government from areas of potential opposition. Criticisms are voiced by both the 
clique of 'new' businessmen (foremost amongst them Riyad Seif), frustrated with the 
continuing blocks and impediments to their individual commercial expansion and 
development, and from the 'old' group of traditional Ba'athists or members of the 
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National Progressive Front who see the government leaning too strongly towards further 
reform. 14 The regime can thus offer both sides a venue for impassioned debate on 
economic matters, whilst keeping politics to the sidelines, and can subsequently steer a 
moderate incremental course between them on economic matters. The degree of debate 
and the levels of criticism voiced are unprecedented in a supposedly 'closed' popular 
socialist-type democracy. It is interesting and illuminating to note that Investment Law 
No. I 0 is the first piece of Syrian economic legislation to be allowed this kind of 
openness in debates within the Parliament. To judge on whether the regime intended the 
discussions over Investment Law No. I 0 to act as a safety valve for political discontent 
would be difficult. However, what can be said is that the regime realised that once the 
legislation had been passed, a measure of economic debate would have to be allowed in 
Parliament. In the past, debate in Parliament on the Syrian Development Plans had been 
worthy and predictable, simply because they did not indicate a departure from the 
political norm. However, Investment Law No. 10 did exactly that - although it was 
supposedly set within the state-controlled economic sphere, it brought a taste of non-
Ba'athist economic pragmatism into the previously closely-controlled world of Syrian 
economic dirigisme. It is certain that the regime after I99I would not have allowed any 
measure of open political debate; and the sycophantic and (at least outwardly) smooth 
transition of power from Hafez al-Assad to Bashar al-Assad in July 2000 without any 
13 the degree of open economic debate in Parliament still seems anachronistic to many observers 
14 One example of this was the impassioned debate regarding the development of wasteland in the centre of 
Damascus for a proposed luxury hotel. Opposition was raised in 1997 in Parliament by Communist MP's 
anxious about the fate of squatting families on the site of the proposed hotel. Embarrassing for the 
government was the fact that the hotel project was a Investment Law No. 10 project with particular 
exemptions and a joint venture between the Syrian Tourism Ministry and a Saudi Prince. The Syrian 
investment in the project was the provision of the site for construction- which was very obviously occupied 
by squatters. 
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measure of open dissent from within the country or the Parliament (witness the indecent 
haste in which the Constitution was amended to allow the ascension of Bashar al-Assad 
to the Presidency following his father's death) has indicated the continuing strong control 
the regime exerts over the external political arena. 15 
Nevertheless, I would argue that the effect of Investment Law No. 1.0 in allowing 
a measure of freedom in debating the economic future of Syria for the first time in 
Parliament was either directly intended by the regime, or was seen pragmatically after the 
introduction of the legislation as a useful way of allowing discontent and debate 
concerning the economic situation to be aired, whilst still maintaining a strong grip on the 
political arena. However, the previously solid appearance of the Syrian Ba'ath Party has 
begun to appear, post-1991, as a looser federation and alliances of various power 
groupings within the Party, all obviously intent on securing their prosperity and continual 
power base. Sources within Syria16 have suggested to the author that parts of the regime 
have used Parliament and certain Members of Parliament to embarrass other parts of the 
regime by leaking or placing information with them. In fact, the economic debate within 
Parliament by necessity will, at some point, touch upon the political structure of the 
Syrian state. It remains to be seen whether the regime (as distinct from the government) 
will allow that. However the current feeling amongst Syrians is that the regime (and the 
controlling parts of the regime) continue to watch and monitor Parliament (and its 
debates) very closely, despite the recent ascendancy of Bashar al-Assad. 17 The arrest in 
15 ArabicNews.com, Syria PA Committee approves Bashar al-Assad's nomination for President, 27th June 
2000 
16 Interview 4, Interview 24, Interview 26 
17 Interview 24, Damascus & Aleppo, 12th & 13th May 1998 
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2002 of Riyad Seif, following a partial relaxation during the 'Damascene Spring' 18, can 
be seen in this context as a clear signal that whilst economic development and debate is 
something the regime can tolerate and encourage within closely controlled boundaries, 
elements within the regime continue to keep a close eye on the boundaries they allow 
individuals to reach when debating economic change and reform. 
18 Perthes, V., Geheime Garten, Berlin, Siedler Verlag, 2002, p 203 
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5.3.2. Support for Investment Law No. 10 Within the Regime 
The central political aspect of the introduction of Investment Law No 10 is one on 
which most Syrians would still be reluctant to express an opinion. Clear indicators exist 
that the regime intended to pacify certain specific powerful interest groups within the 
regime by passing legislation that allowed them to launder foreign capital accumulated 
from various enterprises. These indicators are obviously indirect, but they cannot be 
discounted. The common opinion (although not publicly or officially expressed) of a 
number of private and public individuals, both Syrian and foreign, is that a combination 
of groups who were close to Hafez al-Assad were exploiting Investment Law No. 10 for 
their own gain and were actively resisting any further reform of the economic system or 
the law. This is indicative of a wider problem in the introduction of Investment Law No. 
10 - the balancing act between regime survival and necessary change. The regime itself, 
made up in its core constituencies of groups who had advanced under socialism, had a 
clear interest in maintaining the controlling interest of the state in the economy. The elite 
at the top of the Ba'ath party had historically been recruited through a socialist party and a 
sectarian-based advancement system and were clearly reluctant to allow an economic 
free-for-all that would immediately weaken their own power base and allow their 
traditional enemy - the Sunni dominated petite bourgeoisie - to re-enter the political 
arena. This issue was combined with the presence of corruption, either through illicit 
currency transactions or smuggling or through accommodations to the elite from 
businessmen in order to set aside bureaucratic regulations. The traditional losers in any 
economic liberalisation programme- public sector workers and employees- were part of 
the traditional groups who supported the regime, whilst the traditional beneficiaries -the 
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Sunni-dominated bourgeoisie - were the traditional rivals for power which the regime 
could not become too dependent upon. Therefore, continued survival of the regime and 
its legitimacy depended on supplying its traditional supporters with economic 
opportunities, the volatile urban population had to be provided for and the state economic 
sector (in particular oil and gas generation and exploration/exploitation) needed to be 
protected as the main revenue base of the state as long as tax demands on the private 
commercial sector could be easily evaded. The demands on the state that the military 
establishment made as long as the conflict with Israel continued, in itself another 
legitimising factor for the continued existence of the regime, also meant that state control 
over the economy had to be maintained. 
On the other hand the continuing economic pressures the regime faced in the late 
1980's were essentially forcing the regime's economic planners to look towards 
economic liberalisation. The issue of the 1990 Syrian stance against Iraq was rewarded 
and in a sense put off the day of reckoning, but the eventual collapse of the Soviet Union 
in 1991 left no alternative but to look to the private sector and selective liberalisation. In 
addition, the availability of Gulf investment capital for Syria was going to take the form 
of private iq_vestment rather than direct state aid, and there was the possibility of tapping 
into illicit funds held by Syrians and accessing existing expatriate Syrian capital. In a 
sense therefore, the state-connected bourgeoisie within Syria wanted economic 
liberalisation, but only as long as it was linked to the continued existence of the state 
sector. The traditional non-state bourgeoisie remained largely commercial and rentier-
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based 19 and therefore the immediate beneficiaries of the liberalisation process and 
Investment Law No. I 0 were to be the alliance between elements of the regime and their 
closest supporters, the state-connected 'new bourgeoisie'. 
The majority of the individuals interviewed and willing to discuss this aspect of 
investment legislation believe that for a major investment project to succeed, payments 
will have to be made to a member of this elite20. One source went so far as to comment 
that the legislation and the legislative process were controlled by 'traitors'21 using the 
loyalty pact with the President as a cover for their own advancement. Abdul Rahman 
Khaddam, Mohammed Maklouf and Major-General Mustafa Tlas were all seen as 
profoundly corrupt (this assessment includes by definition their relatives, especially their 
sons). The above group apparently selected information to pass to Hafez al-Assad, 
deceiving him if necessary, and ensured his continued ignorance of the situation. Hafez 
al-Assad was apparently, according to one senior source, "lazy, ill, unable to concentrate 
and able to work only a few hours a week"22 and was simply not interested in domestic 
politics or the day-to-day economic affairs of state. One senior source23 (who, according 
to another interviewee24 had himself close ties with the Muchaberat) said that all major 
government decisions and laws during the 1990's were in fact drafted by the Muchaberat. 
They were then presented to the President as afait accompli. Investment Law No. 10 was 
19 Hinnebusch, R., Syria, Revolution from Above, London, Routledge, 2001, p 133 
20 Interview 21, Interview 22, Interview 23, Interview 27, Interview 28, Interview 29, Interview 30, 
Interview 31 
21 Interview 25 
22 Interview 25 
23 Interview 21 
24 Interview 5, Damascus, 24th February 1998 
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seen by this source simply as a direct means for highly influential businessmen and 
politicians to launder their corruptly acquired capital. 
This capital almost certainly partially came from the extensive smuggling 
operations operating between Syria and Lebanon. A large proportion of the 30 000 strong 
SAR armed forces stationed in Lebanon until 2005, in particular the commissioned 
officers, were clearly involved in smuggling activities, despite repeated and continued 
crackdowns by the regime. However, crackdowns are not necessarily driven by any 
honest desire to eradicate smuggling, they often simply served as merely a warning for the 
most blatant excesses to be curbed. In effect, smuggling is all-prevalent in Syrian society, 
at all levels. Very few Syrian neighbourhoods are without the ubiquitous cigarette-seller, 
who is offering Western brands 'imported' from Lebanon at Sy£ 50/pack. Similarly, 
Western medicines smuggled from Lebanon fetch absurd and inflated prices on the black 
market, whilst comparable quality, Syrian medicine is cheaper and readily available.25 
Nevertheless, a number of Syrians, conditioned by the traditional belief that a Western 
product carries a certain cachet, and governed by the sometimes accurate preconception 
that quality is not high on the list of issues addressed by certain Syrian domestic 
manufacturers, still prefer the imported products. The profits from these operations 
during the 1980's had to be held and stored somewhere. Overseas bank accounts and 
deposits held in Lebanon were the obvious answer and the funds deposited therein were 
an obvious target for the legislation enacted in 1991. 
25 Interview 31 
199 
5.4. Conclusion: Investment lLaw No. 10 and Beyond 2000 
As we simply cannot validate the specific reasons behind the actual introduction 
of Investment Law No 10, we need to step back and recap the overall position. By 1990 
powerful socialist ideological resistance to liberalisation had been weakened by the 
gradual acceptance of bourgeois norms and values by the existing elite.26 Business 
partnerships developed between eo-opted businessmen and the second generation of the 
political elite, who unlike their fathers, had no intrinsic opposition to economic 
liberalisation. The weaknesses of the public sector and the loss ofthe Soviet Union forced 
the acceptance of the private sector as full partners in these new enterprises. The focus on 
liberalisation using Investment Law No 10 stimulated the expansion of the private sector 
and for the first time since 1963, private investment exceeded the state investment 
budget.27 This new private investment was however simply not enough to substitute for 
diminishing public sector investment as, demonstrated above, private investment was 
largely confined to the tertiary sector; if private businesses did invest in industry, it was to 
set up consumer industries producing goods (one example is pharmaceuticals) under 
European licence, which could deliver a rapid return on investment. 
The added difficulty was that institutionalised problems remained. Bureaucratic 
obstruction, corruption and Law No. 24 all still hampered genuine economic expansion. 
Payment of consultancy fees to the bureaucratic elite resembled little more than 
protection money.28 Private sector growth continued into the small business sector due to 
the avoidance of government bureaucracy, the official labour laws and the continued 
26 Hinnebusch, R., Syria, Revolution from Above, London, Routledge, 2002, p 133 
27 Hinnebusch, R., op.Cit., p 135 
28 ibid. 
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lack of public financial markets that would be able to finance expansion. The difficulty 
with Investment Law No. I 0 is that it simply provided a short-term solution for a long-
term problem. The law was simply designed to allow the immediate legitimisation of 
foreign currency holdings and allowed their reintegration into the Syrian economy, giving 
an influential group, well connected to the regime, an opportunity to profit from a certain 
degree of economic activity, benefiting in turn the traditional middle classes and 
bolstering regime support. The introduction of Investment Law No. 10 gave the new 
generation of business leaders and entrepreneurs in concert with the sons of the regime 
elite an opportunity to operate within Syria, benefiting the economy as a whole, and in 
parallel allowed the measured voicing of criticism of the government in economic terms, 
acting thus as a safety valve for the high level of political frustration accumulated during 
the last 20 years. 
In addition, the introduction of Investment Law No. I 0 would improve the image 
of Syria abroad; foreign investors would at least show a passing interest in the economy, 
and the EU might be willing to part with funds to update the economic and financial 
infrastructure. Although this thinking behind the enactment of Investment Law No. I 0 
might seem to be rather Machiavellian, the results are manifest. The regime continues to 
survive, the various interest groups inside the regime have benefited directly from the 
legislation, pressure on Syria to reform further has lessened (in particular after the 
regulation of its outstanding international debt), and Syria has been in negotiations since 
1998 with the EU concerning the EU-Mediterranean Partnership Agreements and has 
been able to secure EU financial assistance for a series of projects aimed at reforming the 
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state financial sector. It seems then that the intention behind Investment Law No. I 0 was 
not singularly economic, it was not designed simply to offer the private sector new areas 
of opportunity, but carried with it a multi-faceted economic and political array of 
intentions, all however with one basic aim and intention in mind, the continued survival 
of the Ba'athist regime. It would thus seem appropriate to assess the impact of Investment 
Law No. I 0 as a vehicle for achieving short-term political goals rather than a piece of 
legislation simply designed to attract private investment and to reach economic aims. In 
that sense then, Investment Law No. 10 has set a precedent for reaching these political 
goals whilst appearing to strive towards developing the economic attractiveness of the 
Syrian Arab Republic. Indeed the increasing frailty of Hafez al-Assad in 2000 and the 
prior collapse of the Arab-Israeli peace process (such as it was) in 1996 essentially 
paralysed the economy and provided a clear example of the continuing relative 
importance of political stability over economic reforms. In addition the succession of 
Bashar al-Assad in July 2000 marked not a new beginning for Syria, but rather a gradual 
reassessment of immediate political aims and ambitions. 
Hafez ai-Assad's death and the succession by Bashar al-Assad essentially marked 
the coming together of three forces within the leadership elite, the will of the dying 
President for his son to succeed him, the will of Bashar himself to succeed his father, and 
most importantly, the combined will of the regime apparatus - military and security, the 
Ba'ath Party itself, the state bureaucracy and the state eo-opted bourgeoisie- to maintain 
the internal stability and the regional influence of Syria - the two achievements of the 
Assad regime which even opponents will acknowledge. Economic considerations were 
given a secondary role until the new President felt secure enough in his position to tackle 
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these outstanding problems. From late 2000 onwards, a series of reforms have been 
introduced under his leadership, including a recent banking law allowing the 
establishment of private banks and the introduction into Parliament of a bill allowing the 
operation of a stock exchange. In addition the appointment of Dr Hassan al-Nuri as 
Minister for Bureaucratic Reform29 and the temporary toleration of the publication oftwo 
manifests demanding greater democratisation during 2000 and 2001 30 indicated a slight 
but significant shift away from the policies of his father. 
Under the old regime the clear emphasis and goal of the regime was to achieve a 
settlement on favourable terms of the Arab-Israeli problem, and to maintain the regime in 
power. Under Bashar al-Assad there seems to be an understanding that Syria needs to 
address the basic economic problems as well as addressing the traditional issues dear to 
the Ba'athist heart. His emphasis on the need for change has however a clear tradition; by 
appealing to the young of Syria, Bashar is trying to build up and develop his own, as 
opposed to an inherited, powerbase. Yet as the new President is still in the first years of 
his Presidency, he is reliant on the established forces which organised his succession. 
When Investment Law No. I 0 was passed in 1991, it was a clear indicator of how delicate 
a balance had to be struck between economic necessity and political expediency. Bashar 
al-Assad has not laid aside the careful consideration of either just yet. 
29 Perthes, V., op.Cit., p 202 
30 Perthes, V., op.Cit., p 205 
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Cmndusion 
Investment Law No. 10 of 1991 has generally been viewed as a piece of 
legislation simply designed to attract private and foreign investment to Syria. If we 
now return to the research questions the following answers emerge; 
1. What was the political-economic situation in Syria at the point of 
introduction of Investment Law No. 10? 
It is clear that for most of the 1980's leading up to the introduction of 
Investment Law No 10 the Syrian economy was struggling to develop and faced a 
series of severe economic crises including a foreign exchange crisis which developed 
into a wider economic depression. Diminishing public resources and austere budgets 
forced the government gradually to open additional areas to the private sector and to 
abandon some of its instruments of control. This austere situation was further 
compounded by the collapse of the COMECON bloc and the loss of the USSR as a 
trading partner. This dire situation, only slightly bettered by the abnormal foreign rent 
influx following the 1990/91 Gulf War, the Syrian response to which was itself an 
example of the changed international and regional outlook at the time, contributed to a 
change in the government's overall development strategy and the transfer of some of 
its economic levers to the private sector. The regime introduced a number of reforms 
in agriculture and in tourism allowing the concentration of private ownership of 
agricultural land and the mobilisation of private capital, both Syrian and foreign, into 
productive investment projects, primarily in export-orientated or foreign currency 
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earning enterprises. With these measures came a liberalization of trade regimes and a 
wider policy of encouraging private investments, particularly in industry. 
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2. Why did the regime introdlUIIce Knvestmelllt ILaw No. H) at tllnat time anndl inn 
that lform? 
The introduction of Investment Law No 10 was to encourage private 
investment particularly in manufacturing industries. The stated objective was to 
mobilize domestic, private resources rapidly to make up for the inability of the state 
not only to maintain the state-led growth strategies of the past decade, but also to 
secure the supply of imported consumer goods and production imputs both for the 
private and public sector. Investment Law No 10 intended to open the space for 
private investors to launch projects in almost all areas of the economy, exempt from 
taxes for a fixed period of years. It led to an unprecedented rush of short-term 
investment projects, particularly from Syrian businessmen with close ties to the 
regime, requiring the minimum of investment and delivering the maximum return on 
capital. Investment Law No.1 0 was a useful statement of aims but an imprecise piece 
of legislation. There has been some suggestion that Investment Law No.1 0 was 
fashioned deliberately in that way to allow fine-tuning by Presidential Decree once its 
initial effect on the economy had been observed. However it is best described as a 
working paper, rather than a piece of legislation, effective as a general statement of 
intent but lacking in essential legal detail. Individual articles leave far too much room 
for interpretation and therefore allows investors either to deliberately exploit or to 
contravene the law. There are shortcomings in Investment Law No. 10 which 
seriously damage its attractiveness and effectiveness as a vehicle for investment in 
Syria. Some of these can be remedied within the framework of specific legislation but 
others demand more fundamental change within the general economic structure of 
Syria. 
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3. JHiow llnas the view of Investmel!llt Law No. 1() cllnanged since tlllat time 
annong domestic al!lld intematio~man illlvestors? 
Despite the incentives offered, Investment Law No.l 0 merely provided a 
further bureaucratic obstacle course for investors and the introduction of Investment 
Law No.lO was a 'quick fix' and not the correct answer to Syria's long term 
economic development needs. Essentially Investment Law No.l 0 proved to be a law 
that encourages short-term investment. Moreover, the incentives it provides were only 
really suitable for Syrian investors already familiar with local market conditions. 
Certain aspects of the practical application of the law make it less attractive to foreign 
investors and to any investor considering initiating a long-term project, which may 
take time to yield significant profits and results. It is clear that in isolation, and in 
purely economic terms, Investment Law No. 10 has failed to live up to its premise. 
Foreign investment projects were slow to appear on the Syrian economic scene and 
continued to be scarce, and the hoped-for subsequent economic reforms following the 
enactment of Investment Law No. 10 have largely failed to materialise. The 
legislation did little to remove the already formidable barriers to foreign private 
investment in Syria, indeed in a number of instances it simply added to the overall 
picture of confusion by introducing new layers of bureaucracy. Businesses continued 
to be reliant on an informal network of individual contacts and agents within the 
structure of government, and business dealings in Syria (both by foreigners and 
Syrians) continued to be facilitated by the widespread use of inducements to officials. 
The expansion of existing foreign businesses to exploit new opportunities outside the 
traditional areas of supply and support for the oil industry did not occur to any large 
extent. If new foreign investors, encouraged by Investment Law No. 1 0, entered the 
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Syrian scene, they were faced with continuing formidable obstacles. There are failings 
in Investment Law No. 10 which seriously damage its attractiveness and effectiveness 
as a vehicle for private investment in Syria. A number of these could be addressed 
within the framework of specific legislation on foreign investment but others demand 
more fundamental change within the general economic structure of Syria. In domestic 
economic terms, the legislation did however enable a substantial number of Syrian 
businessmen to operate their own privately owned businesses for the first time, some 
with a notable degree of success. These businesses are based in various economic 
areas previously not open to private investors. These opportunities have changed 
certain aspects of the domestic Syrian economy, but the underlying structure has not 
been substantially altered. 
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4. What influence has the political system had on the operation of 
Investment Law No. 10? 
The overall political aim behind the introduction of Investment Law No 10 
was to ensure his regime's stability and continuity. It has become clear that 
Investment Law No. 10 was enacted with a number of underlying political objectives 
in mind, centred on the overriding need to contribute in economic form towards the 
survival and stability of the regime and in reaction to a number of factors, drawn from 
both the economic and political spheres, both domestic and international. It should be 
stressed that the overriding emphasis of enacting Investment Law No. 10 was regime 
survival in the face of domestic and international pressure and not reform of the 
domestic economy in any significant way nor the loosening of the tight control the 
regime holds over the political levers of power. The political reality of the operation 
of Investment Law No 10 is that a combination of interest groups exploit Investment 
Law No. 10 for their own gain and actively resist any further reform of the economic 
system or the law. Essentially the regime itself, made up in its core constituencies of 
particular overlapping interest groups, had a clear interest in maintaining the 
controlling interest of the state in the economy. These groups were clearly reluctant to 
allow an economic free-for-all that would immediately weaken their own power base 
and allow their traditional enemy - the Sunni dominated petite bourgeoisie - to re-
enter the political arena. The option of being seen to allow a degree of economic 
freedom was an inspired one by the regime, and one that certainly allowed it to regain 
some credibility amongst the Syrian Sunni petite bourgeoisie. Initial optimism faded 
after it became clear that further reforms were not immediately forthcoming and the 
regime was faced with the need to amend the legislation substantially and at length on 
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a number of subsequent occasions. In this respect however it should be recognised 
that the introduction of Investment Law No 10 affected more groups than the 
traditional regime supporting networks. Therefore the regime could have conceivably 
have been attempting to reach out and gain support from hitherto not approached 
classes of entrepreneurs. However this has not been successful. The deeper problem 
regarding the ability of the regime to change in any substantial way is the continued 
existence of entrenched and conservative power groups and networks within the 
regime resistant to any more than incremental change if this threatens their established 
position. These groups welcomed the introduction of Investment Law No 1 0 because 
it suited their particular economic needs, but remain resistant to any wider economic 
reforms. Investment Law No 10 essentially was a tool for elements within these 
networks to increase their economic influence. 
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5. How did the research question change with the developing analysis of the 
topic over the duration of the thesis ? 
When the research question was first formulated, the view of Western analysts 
of Investment Law No. 10 was that this was the beginning of a gradual and 
incremental reform process which would lead to further economic liberalisation and 
culminate in the establishment of a fundamentally open, free-market economy. With 
Investment Law No. 10, the Syrian government seemed to have given the signal for 
the country to follow a new path of pragmatic, cautious development, moving towards 
liberalisation throughout the 1990's. This assessment prompted a wave of interest 
amongst academics. 1 As the research progressed however and as more evidence was 
accumulated, it became clear that the reasoning behind the introduction of the 
legislation was more complex than simple economic liberalisation. Subsequent Syrian 
legislation did not appear to be supporting an incremental reform process, neither did 
the legislative detail in Investment Law No 10 fulfil the criteria for the encouragement 
of investment. Investment Law No.l 0 appeared essentially to be a useful statement of 
aims but a very imprecise piece of legislation. The articles comprising the law were 
badly formulated, imprecise and took no account of the realities of investment in 
Syria. The actual executive framework designed to implement the law was essentially 
inefficient, ineffective and marginal in determining the actual operation of the 
legislation. When this became clear, the analysis moved from examining the operation 
of the law itself to the wider political and economic issues surrounding the legislation; 
in particular the characteristics and timing of its introduction. The question that the 
1 Polling, S., Investment Law No 10: Which Future for the Private Sector ? in Kienle, E., 
Contemporary Syria , London, British Academic Press, 1994. See also Hinnebush, R., Syria: The 
politics of economic liberalization, in Third World Quarterly, Vol 18, No 2 (1997), pp 249-265, and 
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research began to focus on was why, if the investment was so badly drafted and 
introduced in such haste, was it introduced in the first place ? The outcome of the 
research has been that far from being a simple piece of investment legislation 
designed to encourage foreign investors, Investment Law No 10 was a short-term 
measure designed as an economic safety valve to meet a number of demands. It 
allowed elements of the ruling elite to access and invest foreign currency holdings and 
allowed their wider family groups to expand further into the private economic sphere. 
In addition it allowed the a large number of short-term projects within the transport 
and tourism sector to be introduced. Finally, by allowing a measure of economic-
centred debate and criticism within institutions, it deflected attention away from the 
fundamental inequalities and weaknesses of the political system. The assumption that 
Investment Law No. 10 marked a f,irst step towards a pluralist economic system is 
essentially incorrect and shows an incomplete grasp of the complexities and 
influences prevalent within the Syrian economic and political context. 
Concluding remarks 
The fundamental problem for Bashar al-Assad remains that if he pushes ahead 
with an ambitious economic reform package, he risks alienating the very power 
groups which helped him into power following his father's death. His ascendancy 
presents a problem for Syria in a number of ways. 
Hopfinger, H. and Btickler, M., Step by Step to an Open Economic System: Syria sets a course for 
Liberalization, in British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies (1996) 23 (2) pp 183-202 
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On the one hand his comparable youth and his Western education made him a 
popular image for reformists to latch onto when he first came to power- in particular 
in the West. This is also apparent if you view the initial success in which he has been 
able to harness support from the young people of Syria. 
On the other hand it is clearly premature to believe that this new Assad is in 
any way fundamentally different from his father. He has attempted to be a 
powerbroker, like his much more successful father, operating between different power 
groups and interests. Indeed the interim success of the Bashar administration can be 
explained by the ability of Bashar to accommodate existing power structures within 
the regime. It is clear that Bashar did not become President in 2000 (ignoring a 
Constitutional Stipulation that would have made Vice-President Khaddam interim 
Presidenti following a rapid amendment to the Constitution lowering the minimum 
age for the President from 40 to 343, simply by virtue of being Hafez al-Assad's son. 
His father had clearly intended him to replace his elder brother Basil as the heir 
apparent after Basil's death in 1994 and Bashar' s role had become clear in 1999 when 
he headed an anti-corruption drive which led to the then Prime Minister Mahoud 
Zoghbi committing suicide and Salim Yassin the Transport Minister being jailed for 
corruption over a purchase of Airbus transport aircraft in 1996.4 This alone would 
have not been enough to secure his succession. It is also clear that at this particular 
time it suited the groups surrounding the President that Bashar be chosen and 
confirmed as heir. Bashar has been able to build for himself a measure of support 
amongst the existing cliques of the Syrian leadership group but Bashar has not earned 
2 Business Week, September 4th 2000, p36 
3 The Times, June 13th 2000, p 21 
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this position only by virtue of effort - as his father had done - and it is rather a case 
that the entrenched interest groups within the Syrian elite tolerate him rather than he 
tolerate them. One question which is yet unanswered is the long-term effects the 
withdrawal from Lebanon will have on the framework of power within Syria. The 1 01h 
Ba'ath Party Congress in June 2005 did not fulfil expectations in that it did not offer 
anything beyond a symbolic rearrangement on ministerial chairs and the predictable 
closing of ranks in the face of perceived foreign aggression. 
The picture for the future of Syria and the economy then is a mixed and 
contradictory one. The modernisation drive which Bashar initiated as head of the 
Syrian Computer Society before his father's death gave rise to the following 
comment: 
"if you want to computerise, you are considered to be displacing power from 
one generation to another. Managers get the equivalent of US$ 160 a month - and 
they drive a Mercedes. And these people are dead against reform. So right now we are 
in a system where there are a few hundred people in charge and they have an 
enormous stomach cramp about modernising."5 
The issue for Bashar is that these are precisely the groups of people he needs 
support from. Without the backing of the influential groups within the regime 
structure his position is untenable. However to deliver true reform and growth in the 
Syrian economy he needs to attack precisely the entrenched positions these groups 
have managed to establish within the Syrian hierarchy- yet he himself is a product of 
that hirachy. 
Certainly Bashar al-Assad's transition to power marks a new phase in Syria's 
development. Assad is still reliant on the support of the existing groups of the 
4 Business Week, September 41h 2000, p35 
214 
previous regime; neither willing nor able to embrace reform; he has no major support 
base of his own, and he certainly would not wish to ally himself with the more open 
appositional groups calling for more reform - in particular as this would lead to a 
criticism of his own inherited regime. 
Nevertheless things have changed. The modernisation of Syria is being 
attempted incrementally. The new technocrats of the Syrian elite are drawn from the 
same interest groups Bashar's father also cultivated- in effect Bashar is following his 
father's example by developing his own powerbase. What is different is that this 
transition of power is occurring incrementally and following a generational change, 
rather that following a revolutionary change as in 1970. This gradual and generational 
transformation is helped by the fact that the majority of technocrats are from within 
the existing power groups and structures of the regime. In effect Bashar is gradually 
attempting to achieve en masse what he achieved as an individual in 2000. 
This generational transformation from a highly personalised quasi-tribal 
authoritarian state to a modernised authoritarian one, possibly a slightly pluralistic one 
following the Egyptian model6, is only then to be expected when the new generation 
of technocrats Bashar has put in place have fully replaced and supplemented the 
existing elite of the old regime. But it cannot be expected that individuals from within 
this new group will in any way risk their own positions or their role in the 
implementation of the reforms the President is aiming for by demanding rapid or 
excessive change to the existing political power structure. They, like Bashar himself, 
are largely children of the Ba'ath elite, and therefore conditioned by heritage and 
5 Financial Times, 26th November 1999 
6 Perthes, V., Geheime Glirten, Berlin, Siedler Verlag, 2002, p 215 
215 
upbringing. In addition it is clear that any internal changes in Syria are dependent on 
the progress of foreign policy. A solution acceptable to both sides of the Israeli-
Palestinian issue, a peace accord between Syria and Israel, or the peaceful withdrawal 
of Syrian troops from Lebanon might very well trigger the possibility of internal 
debate; further escalation of the conflict or the further entrenchment of the Israeli 
position will lead to a stiffening of Syrian foreign and internal policy. 
Therefore demands of Bashar and his generation of new Syrian technocrats 
should be modest. Certainly we cannot expect that the new President will allow free 
elections to the Syrian Parliament, and in particular not in his first seven-year period 
as President. But we cannot pretend that the brief opening of political debate 
following the death of Hafez al-Assad has not touched or changed Damascene and 
Syrian society. In that respect, the death of Hafez al-Assad and the ascension of his 
chosen heir have done much more to open Syria and to prepare Syrian society for 
change- even if it is incremental -than Investment Law No. 10. 
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Composition of the main figures in the Syrian Cabinet in March 2000 
Muhammed Mustafa Miro 
Lt General Mustafa Tlas 
Naji al-Otari 
Khaled Raad 
Farouk al-Shara 
Muhammed al-Imadi 
Khaled al-Mahayni 
Muhammed Maher Jamal 
Radwan Marteini 
Adnan Omran 
Muhammed Harba 
(*) designs new appointments 
Prime Minister (*) 
Deputy Premier & Defence Minister 
Deputy Premier for Services (*) 
Deputy Premier for Economic Affairs 
Minister for Foreign Affairs 
Minister for the Economy and Foreign Trade 
Minister of Finance 
Minister for Oil (*) 
Minister of Communications (*) 
Minister of Information (*) 
Minister of the Interior 
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Investment Law No. 10, 251h April 1991 
Introduction 
Out of the desire to direct the surplus of funds towards development and production, 
and within the framework of making use of all potentials available to the private and 
joint sectors and encouraging them to build up the economic and development 
foundation of the country, and in harmony with the attitudes adopted by many 
countries in the world to create a convenient investment atmosphere that helps attract 
local and foreign capitals and invest them in channels of production that are bound to 
yield good and prosperity to the country, the unified law of investment was issued. It 
aims at encouraging Syrian Arab citizens, both residents and expatriates, and Arab 
and foreign nationals to invest their funds in development projects in the country, thus 
contributing to push ahead the economic development march of the country 
LawNo. 10 
The President of the Republic, Recalling the rules of the Constitution and Approval 
by the People's Assembly in its session held on 25.4.1991, issues: 
Article One 
This law bears effects on the money invested by Syrian Arab citizens, both residents 
and expatriates, and citizens of Arab and foreign countries, in investment projects 
within the framework of the state general socio-economic development plans and the 
general policy ofthe state. 
Article Two 
The following terms used in the application of the rules of this law shall mean the 
following: 
(a) Council= Higher Council of Investment 
(b) Council Chairman = Chairman of the Higher Council for Investment. 
(c) Bureau = Bureau of Investment 
(d) Project = Project undertaken by a natural person or a legal person with a local or 
foreign capital, or both, and governed by the rule of this law 
(e) Investor= Natural or legal person who obtains a license to set 
a project in accordance with the rules of this law 
(t) Authority in charge= Public authority concerned 
(g) Foreign fund = Fund primarily supplied from abroad by Syria, Arab or foreign 
citizens. 
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Chapter 1: Fields of investment 
Article Three 
Rules of this law shall be applied to economic and social development projects 
approved by the council in the following fields: 
(a) agricultural projects, both vegetation and livestock, including various agricultural 
products manufacturing projects 
(b) industrial projects allowed to both private and joint sectors 
(c) transport projects 
(d) projects approved by the council to be governed by the rules of this law 
Article Four 
When approving projects, the following points shall be taken into consideration: 
(a) to be in line with the aims of the state development plans 
(b) to use as much as possible the local resources available for the national economy 
(c) to contribute to increasing the gross national product and employment 
opportunities 
(d) to lead to increasing exports and rationalising imports 
(e) to use up-to-date machines and technologies which are suitable for the national 
economy needs 
(f) that the stable assets which would be invested in the project, including machines, 
tools, equipment, apparatus, means of transport (non-tourist) and all other production 
means definitively imported to be used exclusively in the project, shall not be less 
than ten million Syrian Pounds. This amount can be modified by a decision passed by 
the Council of Ministers. 
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Chapter II: The Higher Council of Investment 
Article Five 
(a) A higher council of investment shall be founded, comprising: 
the Prime Minister as chairman 
The Deputy Prime Minister for Economic Affairs as vice-chairman 
The Deputy Prime Minister for Services Affairs 
The Minister of Agriculture and Agrarian Reform 
The Minister of Transport 
The Minister of Supply and Internal Trade 
The Minister of Economy and Foreign Trade 
The Minister of Industry 
The Minister of State for Planning Affairs, 
The Minister of Finance 
as members. 
The Director of Investment Bureau as a deciding member 
(b) The chairman ofthe council may invite to the council's meetings experts and 
other people concerned with the subjects under discussion by the council, 
provided that they have no right to vote. 
Article Six 
The council shall have the following powers: 
(a) approving for the natural and legal persons to initiate development projects 
governed by the rules of this law and the authority charge shall subsequently issue the 
relevant licenses. 
(b) specifying the state's contribution to the capitals of the joint-stock companies. 
( c )issuing licenses for setting up joint-stock, share-holding and limited liability 
companies governed by the rules of paragraph (a) of this article, as per a decision 
passed by the Prime Minister. 
(d) entrusting concerned authorities with preparing initial economic feasibility studies 
for the development projects falling within the fields specified by this law. 
(e) adopting the assessment of foreign funds, prepared by the authority in charge. 
Article Seven 
The council shall convene at a call by its chairman once every two months, at least, 
and whenever necessary. 
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Article Eight 
By a decision by the Prime Minister, an investment bureau affiliated to the Deputy 
Prime Minister for Economic Affairs shall be set up and assigned with preparing and 
referring to the council the projects submitted to it by the concerned authorities. It 
shall also be assigned with following up the implementation of decisions passed by 
the council, receiving the investor's complaints and working to settle them. It shall 
also discharge all tasks entrusted to it by the council. 
Article Nine 
All statements and special data offered by the investors on their projects shall not be 
for publication or circulation. 
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Chapter Ill: Franchises, privileges and facilities 
Article Ten 
According to rules of this law, all projects approved enjoy exemptions, privileges, 
facilities and guarantees. 
Article 11 
Projects approved to be set up according to the rules of this law may Import: 
(a) all requirements of machines, vehicles, apparatus, equipment, means of transport, 
buses and mini-buses, that are needed to serve the projects, and other materials 
necessary for setting up, expanding and developing these projects. 
(b) cars. 
(c) all materials and requirements necessary for running these projects. 
The concerned authority determines the quantity and sort of various means of 
transport mentioned in paragraphs (a) and (b) of this article and according to the rules 
determined by the council. 
The import processes mentioned in the previous paragraphs are carried out 
irrespective of the rules prohibiting and restricting imports and irrespective of the 
rules of importing directly from the country of origin and the rules of hard currency 
regulations. 
Article 12 
(a) Imports quoted in paragraph (a) of Article 11 of this law are exempted from all 
taxes and fiscal stamp, local and customs duties and otherwise, provided that they are 
exclusively used to serve the goals ofthe project, and that they cannot be relinquished 
to a third party except by the council's consent and after paying the taxes and duties 
levied on them in their present condition. 
(b) The project's imports specified in paragraphs (b) and (c) of Article (11) of this law 
cannot be relinquished or used in service of other purposes than the project, except by 
an approval by the council. 
Article 13 
(a) Joint-stock companies approved according to the-rules of this law, together with 
their shares, funds, profits and dividends, are exempted from all taxes levied on 
income and real estates owned by the companies to achieve their purposes and fulfill 
their tasks, for seven years right from the date of actual production or investment 
according to the nature of the project. 
(b) Projects related to individuals or non-joint-stock companies licensed according to 
rules of this law, together with their profits and dividends, shall be exempted from all 
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taxes imposed on income and from the real-estate taxes on the buildings owned for 
realizing the project's objectives and tasks, for five years right from the date of actual 
production or investment, according to the nature of the project. 
Article 14 
In case the time spent on establishing the project approved according to the rules of 
this law exceeds three years, then this period shall be deducted from the duration of 
tax exemption quoted in paragraphs (a) and (b) of Article (13) ofthis law. 
Article 15 
By a decision of the council, an additional period of two years may be added to the 
duration of exemption quoted in Article (13) of this law, should the total revenues in 
foreign currencies actually transferred into the Syrian Arab Republic through its 
banks and realized by the project's exports of merchandises and services exceed 50 % 
of the total production of the project during the original period of exemption. 
Article 16 
(a) In addition to the facilities given by the rules and regulations in force on foreign 
currencies, the investor may open in favor of his project, which is approved according 
to the rules of this law, an account in foreign currency at the Commercial Bank of 
Syria, recording on the credit side: 
(1) 100 % of payments made in foreign currencies of the project's capital and of the 
loans granted to the project in foreign currencies. 
(2) 75 % of the total foreign currencies realized from the revenues of exports and 
services ofthe project. 
On the debit side of the afore-mentioned account, are recorded funds necessary for 
covering the project's liabilities, requirements and needs of foreign currencies, 
including the payments allowed to be transferred to the favor of Syrian expatriates, 
citizens of Arab and foreign countries and non-Syrian persons or the like, working in 
project, according to rules of this law. 
(b) Regardless of any text in force, the investor may use his foreign currency funds in 
financing projects licensed to be set up according the rules of this law, or contribute to 
the capital or buy shares of these projects. 
Article 17 
(a) The Bank shall put the investor's funds deposited at it accord to the rules of 
paragraph (a) of Article (16) of this law at the disposal and at the request of the 
investor, and the Bank shall take necessary procedures to achieve this. 
(b) The Bank shall calculate interest for the foreign currency fu deposited at it in favor 
of the project's account and in harmony the current interest rates. 
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Article 18 
Investor may borrow local currency from the state's banks in favor of his project and 
against guarantees of his own funds according to the rules in force at these banks. 
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Chapter IV: Joint-ventures 
Article 19 
(a) Joint-stock companies licensed by the rules of this law, in which the public sector 
takes part at 25 % at least of the capital, take the form of a society anonym share-
holding company or a limited liability company. 
(b) Founders shall set a draft for the company's bylaws in conformity the nature of its 
being . This bylaws is issued by a decision by the Prime Minister after it is approved 
by the council. 
Article 20 
(a) The joint-stock company will have a board of directors in which Share-holders are 
represented according to the Percentage of their Subscription in the company's capital. 
The concerned authority shall name the public sector representatives at the board of 
directors at the same percentage of this sector's share in the capital. 
(b) The board of directors shall appoint the company's director-general, who cannot 
hold his post together with the chairmanship or membership of the board of directors. 
Article 21 
(a) With exception from the rules of Law No. 134 of 1958 and the Legislative Decree 
No. 49 of 1962 and their amendments, the board of directors shall draw out the 
company's personnel bylaws taking into account the rules of the Labor Law No. 91 of 
1959 and its amendments. This bylaws is issued by a decision by the Prime Minister. 
(b) The board of directors shall issue the financial bylaws and the accounting system 
for the company, according to the relevant models prepared by the Minister of 
Finance. 
(c) The company's other regulations shall be issued by a decision by the board of 
directors. 
Article 22 
The joint-stock companies coming to being according to the rules of this law shall be 
exempted from the stamp tax levied on the share issuance. 
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Chapter 5: Special rules on investment of external funds 
Article 23 
External funds shall include: 
(a) foreign currency transferred from abroad by Syrian citizens, Arabs or foreigners 
through Syrian Bank or in a way approved by the Foreign Currency Bureau. 
(b) machines, vehicles, equipment, means of transport, buses, mini -buses, and 
materials necessary for setting up or expanding, renewing or developing these 
projects, as well as materials imported from abroad, necessary for operating these 
projects. 
(c) profits, revenues and reserves realized from the investment of the external funds in 
investment projects, if they were added to the capitals of these projects or were 
invested in other projects approved according to the rules of this law. 
(d) moral rights utilized in projects, as well as patent rights and trade marks registered 
in a member state of the International Federation for Industrial Property, or according 
to the international rules of registration included in international agreements 
concluded in this regard. 
Article 24 
(a) Investors of Syrian expatriates, or of Arab or foreign nationals, are allowed, after 
the elapse of five years from the investment of the project, to re-transfer abroad the 
net value of their share in the project in foreign currencies on the basis of the actual 
value of the project, provided that re-transfer of funds should not exceed the capital 
brought in by them in foreign currencies, and according to executive instructions 
issued by the council in this regard. 
(b) External funds may be re-transferred abroad after six months from their entry and 
in the same way as they were brought in, should any difficulties or any circumstances 
beyond the control of the investor, and at the council discretion, stand hindrance 
against the investment of these funds. The council, in special cases, may approve the 
re-transfer abroad of external funds without consideration of the aforementioned 
period of time. 
(c) Profits and revenues realized annually by the investment of the external funds 
may be transferred abroad according to the rules of this law. 
Article 25 
According to the rules of Article (23) of this law, the Central Bank of Syria shall 
allow the transfer abroad of the external funds invested in the project, together with 
the profits and revenues, in the same currencies brought in or in any other transferable 
currency. 
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Article 26 
Investors of Arab or foreign nationals may insure their funds invested in the approved 
projects at the Inter-Arab Investment Guarantee Corporation or any other 
establishment with the approval of the concerned authority. 
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Chapter 6: General Rules 
Article 27 
(a) Investor shall apply to the concerned Ministry for approval of his project and that 
it is covered by the rules of this law. Application form shall be accompanied by 
papers and documents that indicate the prerequisites, elements, and aims of the project 
and its economic feasibility and the legal form it will take. 
(b) The concerned Ministry shall study the project, give its opinion about it and refer 
it to the council within a period of 30 days from the date of application. 
(c) The council may cancel the decision of approval, if the project propose fails to 
take serious procedures to initiate his project within one-year period from the date of 
issuance of decision of licensing, unless there are justified reasons accepted by the 
council to extend the given duration of implementation. 
Article 28 
The proposer of the project approved shall: 
(a) keep books as per the commercial law. 
(b) present an annual balance sheet and a statement of profits and losses ratified by an 
authorized auditor, within a four-month period from the end of the fiscal year of the 
project. 
(c) keep a special register in which all details relating to the project funds, which, as 
per the rules of this law, enjoy franchise, privileges or facilities, are taken down, 
together with the, movement of these funds and overhead expenditures. 
(d) at the request of the council and the concerned authority, the investor shall present 
all data and statements about the project. 
Article 29 
By a decision taken by itself, the council may suspend the validity of franchise, 
privileges and facilities given to the project, wholly or partially, in case the project 
proposed violates the rules of Article (28) of this law, and until these rules are 
implemented. 
Article 30 
(a) Customs fees and fines, according to customs rules and regulations in force, shall 
be incurred on the project in case the materials mentioned in Article (11) of this law 
are used to serve purposes other than the project itself or were abandoned to a third 
party without the council's consent. 
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(b) In case the offence quoted in the previous paragraph is repeated, the council may 
cease the project's enjoyment of the franchise, facilities and privileges specified in this 
law. 
Article 31 
By a decision by the council, franchise, privileges and facilities quoted in this law 
may be given, except the exemption from taxes and fees, to any of the standing 
projects. All obligations quoted in it remain in force 
Article 32 
In case the ownership of Projects approved is transferred, wholly or partially, to a new 
owner, then the new proprietor replaces the old one in rights, obligations and duties he 
had to fulfill as per the roles of this law and the regulations and instructions issued in 
this regard. Capital profits ensued by the sale of the stable assets are subjected to 
profits income tax according to rules and regulations in force. 
Article 33 
Rules of the Legislative Decree No. 10 of 1986 regarding joint-stock agricultural 
companies shall continue to be in force. 
Article 34 
Tourist projects are governed by the rules and regulations in force and relating to 
them. 
Article 35 
Rules of the Legislative Law No. 348 of 1969 shall remain in force as regards the 
projects effected by it before this law is put in effect. 
Article 36 
Projects approved shall be subject to the roles of the Commercial Law No. 149 of 
1949 and its amendments, provided that these rules are not in contradiction with the 
rules ofthis law. 
Article 37 
Experts and technicians of Arab and foreign nationals working in any of the approved 
projects are allowed to transfer abroad in foreign currencies 50% of their net wages, 
salaries, remunerations and 100% of their compensations at the end of their services. 
Article 38 
The Prime Minister, the chairman of the Higher Council of investment, shall issue the 
instructions necessary for the implementation ofthe rules of this law. 
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Article 39 
This law shall be published in the official gazette. 
Damascus, 41h May 1991 
President of the Republic Hafez Al-Assad 
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Out of the desire to direct the surplus of funds towards Development Law No.1 0 
encouraging investment 1991 
Investment Law No. 10, 25th April 1991 
ORDER NO. 7 O.M.: Implementory Instructions for Law No.l0/1991 
Law No. 7 Promulgates Investment Law No. 10 
Introduction 
To encourage investment and production, and within the framework of making use of 
all potentials available to the private and joint sectors and encouraging them to build 
up the economic and development foundation of the country, and in harmony with the 
attitudes adopted by many countries in the world to create a convenient investment 
atmosphere that helps attract local and foreign capitals and invest them in channels of 
production that are bound to yield good and prosperity to the country, the unified law 
of investment was issued. It aims at encouraging Syrian Arab citizens, both residents 
and expatriates, and Arab and foreign nationals to invest their funds in development 
projects in the country, thus contributing to push ahead the economic development 
march of the country 
SYRIAN ARAB REPUBLIC . 
PRESIDENCY OF THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS 
ORDERN07 
Implementory Instructions for Law No.1 0/1991 
The President of Council of ministers, In accordance with provisions of article 38 of 
Law No. 10 issued on 4.5.1991, With resolution adopted by the Council ofMinisters 
at its meeting on 28.5.1991, And with resolution adopted by the Supreme investment 
Council at its meeting on 8.6.1991, issues the following instructions, 
Definitions 
Article 1 
The following terms shall have the meanings given to them hereunder: 
Investment Law: Law No.1 0, issued on 4.5.1991 
Council: Supreme Investment Council 
Chairman: Chairman of the Supreme Investment Council 
Office: Investment Office 
Project: Project established by a natural or juristic person with local or foreign capital, 
or both, and approved under the provisions of investment law. 
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Investor: The natural or juristic person who obtains a permit to establish a project 
under the provisions of investment law. 
Competent authority: Concerned Public Authority 
Foreign capital: Capital lawfully brought from abroad by Syrian, Arab or foreign 
nationals in accordance with the provisions of article 23 of investment law. 
Article 2 
Beneficiaries from the Law Shall benefit from the investment law economic and 
social development projects approved by the council and established with local or 
foreign capital, or both, by the following natural or juristic persons: 
1) Syrian Arab nationals residing in the Syrian Arab Republic and those treated as 
such. 
2) Syrian Arab nationals residing abroad, whether or not they have obtained the 
nationality of the host country. 
3) Nationals of Arab and foreign states. 
4) Juristic persons (corporations) which are authorized by the council to establish 
projects under the provisions of investment law. 
Investment Fields 
Article 3 
Economic and social development projects mentioned in article 3 of investment law 
· shall mean projects established under the provisions of the said law in the following 
fields: 
1) Agricultural projects, in both plant and animal production fields, as well as all 
ancillary, connective or complementary activities, such as construction of 
greenhouses, refrigerated storage facilities, fruit and vegetable sorting, packing and 
wrapping facilities (whether or not the goods are produced by the same project). 
2) Agricultural products processing plants (whether plant or animal products). 
3) Industrial projects which may be established by private sector and by joint (public 
and private) sector enterprises. 
4) Transport projects. 
5) Projects approved by the Council in other fields. 
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Grounds and Criteria to be Applied by Council for Granting Approval 
Article 4 
The council shall grant approval to a specific project, in order to benefit from the 
provisions of investment law, on the basis ofthe following considerations: 
- Being in line with the objectives of the State development plan. 
- Extent of use of locally available resources and of sharing in growth of national 
product and increase in employment opportunities. 
- Capabilities of the project in the field of increasing export and import 
rationalization. 
- Use of modern, up-to-date, machinery and techniques, suitable to the needs of the 
national economy. 
-Value of fixed assets (plants, machinery, tools, equipment, instruments, installations, 
instruments, utility, means of transport touristic' and other means of production 
definitely, not temporarily imported from abroad) invested for use exclusively in the 
project shall not be less than ten million Syrian pounds calculated on the basis of 
current exchange rate in neighboring countries, as published in the Foreign Currency 
Exchange Bulletin issued by the Commercial Bank of Syria. The Council of Ministers 
may amend this minimum and such amendment shall be promulgated by order of the 
President of the Council of Ministers. 
Supreme Investment Council 
Article 5 
a- The council shall meet periodically, at least once every two months, at the 
invitation of its chairman. 
b- Invitation to the meeting shall be addressed at least three days in advance and shall 
be accompanied by the meeting agenda and copies of papers and documents 
pertaining to the subjects which shall be discussed. 
c- The council shall lawfully meet if the majority of its members are present. 
Resolutions shall be adopted by majority vote of those present and entitled to vote. In 
case of equal vote, the chairman's side shall prevail. The council may form, among its 
members, specialized committees to study specific subjects and report thereon to the 
council. Such committee may seek the assistance of such experts and technicians as it 
may deem appropriate from the various ministries and public administrations from the 
public and joint sectors. 
d- The chairman may invite such persons as being specialized in or concerned with 
the subject which shall be discussed to attend the council meeting but without 
right to vote. 
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Powers of the Council 
Article 7 
In its quality as supreme authority in the field of investment, the council shall have the 
following powers: 
a- To study any request for establishing a project under the provisions of investment 
law, when such request is referred to it by the office in the form adopted by competent 
authorities, accompanied by all relevant documents and exhibits. The council shall 
issue its decision within thirty days as from reference of the request to the council by 
the competent authority. Such decision shall be duly notified to ministries and other 
concerned public administrations and to interested parties. Said ministries and other 
concerned administrations shall be under obligation to implement the council decision 
by taking the following actions: 
1 )Issue all required permits and authorizations (e. g. administrative permit, industrial 
permit...) 
2) Provide the project with all essential public utilities (electricity, water, fuel, 
telephone ... ) at the investor's expense. The investor shall also, if necessary, bear 
additional infrastructure expenses required to connect the project to such utilities. 
In case of approval, the council decision shall generally contain the following 
information: 
- Beneficiary's name 
-Legal form of the project 
- Project capital 
- Objects, nature of Production and capacity of production 
- Period necessary for Project establishment 
- Investment costs 
- Sources of financing from abroad 
In case Of refusal, the decision shall state the grounds of such refusal and the council 
may review such decision should the interested party submit new data justifying the 
project or refuting the grounds for its refusal. 
b- To determine the percentage participation of the state in the capital of projects 
taking the form of joint sector companies (corporations or limited partnerships) and 
the nature of such participation (in cash or in kind) 
c- To approve draft by-laws of joint sector companies and such approved by laws 
shall be promulgated by order ofthe president ofthe Council of Ministers. 
d - To ratify the value of foreign capital invested in the project as assessed by the 
competent authority .. 
e - To approve the number of transport means of various types, required by the 
project, as determined by the competent authority. 
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f- To approve requests for assignment, merger, or conveyance of projects. 
g- To decide upon requests for disposal of some of the project imports through sale in 
the local market or through export to foreign markets, or upon requests for use of such 
imports for purposes other than the project needs, as required by article 12 of 
investment law. 
h - To issue implementorv instructions about how permission shall be given to non-
resident Syrian investors and to investors from Arab and foreign countries to 
retransfer abroad the net worth oftheir shares in approved projects, on the basis of the 
actual value of the project, provided that the retransferred amount shall not exceed the 
value of foreign capital brought by them from abroad in foreign currencies, such 
retransfer to take place at least five Years after the beginning of the project operation. 
i- To approve retransfer abroad of foreign capital, in the same form in which it had 
been brought in, six months after its original transfer to Syria should its investment in 
Syria he prevented by circumstances beyond the investors control, to be appreciated at 
the council discretion, and in certain cases, to approve retransfer abroad of such 
foreign capital without abiding by the above-mentioned time-limit. 
j- To cancel the approval decision if the project owner does not take, within one year 
as from the date on which such decision has been notified to him, serious measures to 
implement the project, unless he justifies such delay on grounds acceptable to the 
council which shall thereupon grant an extension of time. In all cases, conclusion of 
binding contracts, according to the usual generally accepted and adopted forms, for 
the project implementation shall be deemed a serious measure towards such 
implementation. 
k- To grant extension of the exemption period, in accordance with the provisions of 
article 15 of investment law, if the return from project exports of goods and services, 
duly transferred in foreign currency to Syria through its banking system, exceeds 50% 
of total project production during the initial exemption period. For this purpose, the 
council shall rely upon official banking documents issued by the Central Bank of 
Syria or the Commercial Bank of Syria and upon the project balance sheets and profit 
and loss accounts. 
m- To suspend exemptions and other advantages and facilities granted to the project, 
in whole or in part, in case the project owner does not fulfill, in whole or in part, its 
obligations under article 28 of investment law, concerning the keeping of records, 
books and accounts and the provision of information and data to the council or to the 
competent authority, such suspension to remain in force until the project owner shall 
have remedied his failure. The suspension period shall remain a part of the exemption 
period granted to the project. 
n- To decide upon requests submitted by owners of enterprises and projects existing 
before the promulgation of investment la,w, seeking to benefit from some advantages 
and facilities provided for in the said law, except tax exemption, on the condition that 
the owners of such enterprises and projects undertake to comply with all obligations 
prescribed in the investment law. The council decision in this matter must state in 
details advantages and facilities granted to the existing enterprise or project, the 
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period during which such advantages and facilities shall remain in force and the 
conditions and obligations with which the project owner should comply. 
o- To entrust to competent authorities the task of preparing economic and technical 
studies for a number of investment projects having special priority in order to propose 
such projects to would-be investors. 
p- To direct the organization, of conferences and meetings and to invite to seminars 
held in the country or abroad for the purpose of promoting investment in the country 
and publicizing opportunities for such investment. 
q- To study the development and modernization of investment legislation in the 
country, and to adopt plans aiming at creating a suitable climate for investment. 
r- To study and decide upon all matters and questions relating to investment. 
Investment Office: Creation of the Office 
Article 8 
An office, known as "the investment office", is hereby created and attached to the 
Vice-President of the Council of Ministers for Economic Affairs. It shall be headed by 
a public servant having the rank of vice- minister. 
Article 9 
The office shall be staffed by a number of civil servants having the required 
qualifications and practical experience, especially in the following fields: 
- Administrative and legal affairs 
-Financial affairs 
- Economic affairs 
- Technical affairs 
- Public relations, 
together with the necessary clerical personnel and assistants. 
The office staffing shall be determined by order of the President of the Council of 
Ministers. 
Duties of the office 
Article 10 
Within the scope of its Purposes, the office shall carry out and perform the following 
duties: 
a - To receive and register investment requests referred to the council by competent 
authorities, to complete information and data concerning each request in close co-
operation and co-ordination with the competent authority, to prepare a file for each 
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request and to distribute copies of such file to the chairman and members of the 
council at least three days before the day of the meeting on which such request shall 
be discussed. 
b - To keep a special record of foreign capital, brought from abroad in foreign 
currency or in the form of tangible or intangible assets after approval of its valuation 
by the council. The office may issue certificates of foreign capital registration, in the 
form of transcripts from the said record, showing the share in foreign capital 
belonging to each investor, such certificates shall be issued under the signature of the 
office manager and on his responsibility. 
c- To record minutes of meetings held by the council and resolutions adopted at such 
meetings, to follow up the implementation of the said resolutions by competent 
authorities, to submit to the council reports on the progress of each approved project, 
stating the stage it has reached, the difficulties and problems encountered in the 
course of its implementation and proposing suitable solutions for such difficulties and 
problems in co-operation with the said competent authorities. 
d -To receive complaints from investors, investigate and remedy such complaints, to 
assist them to obtain from competent authorities the necessary permits and 
authorizations, to help such investors in the establishment of their projects and in 
overcoming any difficulties hindering the implementation of such projects, and to 
refer to the council any proposals or opinions submitted by the investors concerning 
any matters related to investment and project implementation. 
c- To keep records and registers as necessary for the performance of the office duties 
in the field of applying the provisions of investment law, in such a manner as to 
ensure that the said provisions are duly and correctly applied and in addition, to 
collect, co-ordinate, sort out and study all reports and data concerning approved 
projects, balance sheets and profit and loss accounts, and to submit reports thereabout 
to the council. 
f- To prepare studies about draft by-laws of joint sector companies, having the form 
of corporations or limited liability partnerships, created in accordance with the 
provisions of investment law, and also about draft amendments to such by-laws and to 
refer such drafts and studies to the council for discussion and approval. 
g- To publish and issue leaflets, booklets and other publications containing 
information about investment in the Syrian Arab Republic, both in Arabic and in 
various foreign languages, according to the council directives. 
h- To co-operate with organizations belonging to the private, public and joint sectors 
in organizing advertisement campaigns abroad, among Syrian immigrants and among 
nationals of Arab and foreign countries, for the purpose of informing them about 
investment opportunities in the Syrian Arab Republic within the framework of the 
investment law, according to the council directives. 
i- To carry out all other tasks entrusted to it by the Council. 
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Article 11 
All public authorities, administrations and establishments shall be under obligation to 
extend all possible help and assistance to investors in the field of accomplishing all 
required formalities and deciding upon all outstanding matters without any delay. 
They shall also be under obligation to reply to all questions and inquiries submitted to 
them by the office within one week, at the latest, as from the date of registration of 
such questions or inquiries. 
Article 12 
All data and information submitted by investors to any official authorities, including 
banks, concerning the establishment and implementation of their projects shall be 
considered as confidential and will not be divulged. 
Exemptions, Advantages and Facilities 
Foreign Currency Account 
Article 13 
a- The investor may open, for the benefit of his project duly approved under die 
provisions of investment law, an account in foreign currency with the Commercial 
Bank of Syria. Such account shall be credited with: 
1) 100% of project capital paid in foreign currency and ·of loans obtained in foreign 
currency. 
2) 75% of project income in foreign currency resulting from export of goods and 
services. The remaining 25% shall be sold to the Commercial Bank of Syria at the 
exchange rate referred to in article 4 of these instructions. 
The said account shall be debited with all amounts required to cover all foreign 
currency charges, needs and requirements of the project, including but not limited to: 
-Value of plants, machinery, equipment, vehicles, materials and supplies necessary for 
the establishment, operation, exploitation, development and/or extension of the 
project. 
- Raw materials, semi-processed materials and auxiliary materials required for 
production process. 
- Spare parts and replacement of fully depreciated machinery. 
- Reimbursement instalments and interests due on loans obtained by the project in 
foreign currency. 
- Interests, profits and dividends permitted to be transferred abroad each year by non-
resident Syrian investors and investors from Arab and foreign countries, as well as 
earnings permitted to be transferred abroad by non-Syrians or assimilated employees 
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of approved projects. Such transfers shall be made through the Commercial Bank of 
Syria, after due confirmation by the office. 
- Any amounts due by the project in foreign currency, as proved by authenticated 
papers and supporting documents, after checking by the office and approval by the 
Exchange Office. 
- Expenses which must be paid in foreign currency in the Syrian Arab Republic. 
- Insurance premiums which the project is under obligation to pay in foreign 
currency. 
- Indemnities and bonuses of non-Syrian company directors. 
b- The project shall bear complete responsibility for ensuring all its requirements in 
foreign currencies by lawful means. No official authority in the Syrian Arab Republic 
shall bear any liability to ensure any amount in foreign currency for the benefit of the 
project or of the project owners. 
Article 14 
The investor may invest any amounts in foreign currency being in his possession 
inside the country or held by him abroad and brought to the country by lawful means 
through financing projects duly approved under the provisions of the investment law 
or through participating in the capital of or buying shares in such projects without 
being held criminally liable under the provisions of any existing penal law. 
Article 15 
a- The bank shall keep investors' monies, deposited with it in accordance with the 
provisions of article 16, paragraph "a", of investment law, at their disposal upon first 
request and shall take all necessary measures to ensure the same. 
b- The bank shall pay interests on amounts deposited in the project account in foreign 
currency at a rate in line with current interest rates. 
c- The investor may deposit some of its assets in foreigncurrency in a time account 
with the Commercial Bank of Syria. 
d- A special type of cheque books shall be remitted to investors having deposits in 
foreign currency and such cheques shall be used only for the benefit of the project. 
e- The Commercial Bank of Syria shall ensure the transfer abroad of all charges, 
needs and requirements of the project in foreign currency according to rules contained 
herein. 
Article 16 
The investor may obtain loans in local currency for the benefit of his project from 
state-owned banks, under the guarantee of his personal assets located in the Syrian 
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Arab Republic, in accordance with rules applied by the said banks for granting such 
loans. 
Other Exemptions, Advantages & Facilities 
Article 17 
Each project shall be considered as an independent economic enterprise, without 
regard to the persons of its owners, and shall benefit, as such, from all exemptions, 
advantages and facilities provided for in the investment law and detailed herein. 
Article 18 
a- Notwithstanding any legal provlSlons to the contrary, concerning prohibition, 
restriction or monopolization of imports or concerning direct import from the country 
of origin, and not withstanding any foreign exchange regulations to the contrary, the 
project may import the following: 
1) All its requirements of plants, machinery, equipment, instruments, installations, 
tools, vehicles (including buses and micro-buses used for the service of the project) 
and other materials and supplies required for the establishment, development and/or 
extension of the project. 
2) Tourist vehicles for the service of the project. 
3) All materials and supplies required for the operation and exploitation of the project 
(raw and primary materials, semi-processed and processed materials and all other 
materials necessary for the production process and entering in the composition of the 
final product manufactured by the project). The competent authority shall determine 
the number and types of all transport means required by the project according to 
criteria adopted by the council. 
b- Project imports specified in item 1 of the preceding paragraph shall be exempted 
from all fiscal and municipal taxes, custom duties and other taxes and duties provided 
they are used exclusively for the purposes of the project. 
c- The project may not dispose of any imports specified in item 1 of paragraph "a" 
here above without obtaining the prior approval of the council and only after payment 
of all taxes and duties due and payable on them in their current state at the time of 
disposal, including capital gain tax mentioned in article 32 of investment law, 
according to laws and regulations being in force. Similarly, the project may not 
dispose of any imports specified in items 2 & 3 of paragraph "a" here above or use 
them for purposes other than the project purposes without obtaining the prior approval 
of the council on the basis of grounds justifying such disposal acceptable to the 
council. The above provisions do not apply to packing materials (pallets, drums, etc.) 
or to manufacturing wastes according to internationally acceptable proportions. For 
the purpose of applying the provisions of article 12, paragraph a", of investment law, 
imports shall mean all plants, machinery, equipment, instruments, tools, vehicles, 
service buses and micro-buses and other imported materials and supplies necessary 
for the establishment, extension or development of the project and which shall be 
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disposed of, in whole or in part, to third parties on an individual basis, either before or 
after their use, with the prior approval of the council. As to disposal by assignment or 
transfer of property of the project, in whole or in part, after due approval by the 
council, it shall be governed by the provisions of article 32 of investment law. 
Article 19 
a- Projects belonging to individuals or to companies other than joint sector 
companies, their profits and dividends shall be exempted from all taxes on income as 
well as from taxes on real estates and fixed assets (including machinery) in respect of 
real estates and fixed assets owned by them and used exclusively for their own 
purposes. Such exemption shall be for a period of five years as from the beginning of 
actual production or actual exploitation according to the nature of the project. 
b- Joint sector projects established under the provisions of investment law, in which 
the public sector participation is not less than 25% of their capital, shall take the form 
of corporations or limited liability partnerships. Such joint sector companies, their 
shares, funds, profits and dividends shall be exempted from all taxes on income as 
well as from taxes on real estates and fixed assets (including machinery in respect of 
real estates and fixed assets owned by them and used exclusively for the purposes of 
their projects, such exemption shall be for a period of seven years as from the 
beginning of production or of exploitation, according to the nature of the project, of 
each project duly licensed under the provisions of investment law. 
c - For the purpose of applying the provisions of paragraph "a" and "b" of this article, 
beginning of actual production or exploitation shall mean the date on which 
commercial production or exploitation will start. 
d - For the purpose of applying the provisions of article 14 of investment law, the 
establishment period shall begin on the day immediately following the date on which 
the order issued by the competent authority giving permission to establish the project 
shall have been published in the official gazette. 
Article 20 
By resolution of the council, the exemption period provided for in article 13 of the 
investment law shall be extended by two additional years if the return from the project 
exports of goods and service, actually transferred in foreign currency to the Syrian 
Arab Republic through its banking system, exceed 50% of the total project production 
during the exemption period, calculated at the end of the said period. 
Article 21 
Joint sector companies established under the provisions of the investment law in the 
form of corporations shall be exempted from stamp duties on the issue oftheir shares. 
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General Provisions Concerning Establishment of Joint Sector Companies 
Article 22 
The founders shall prepare a draft of the joint sector company by-laws, taking into 
consideration its legal form, and such by-laws shall be promulgated by order of the 
President of the Council of Ministers after approval by the council. 
Article 23 
Joint sector, companies established under the provisions Of investment law shall be 
considered as private sector companies and provisions and restrictions contained in 
laws and regulations governing public sector companies shall not apply to them 
whatever high may be the participation of the state and public sector enterprises in 
them. 
Article 24 
a- Without regard to the provisions of law No. 134 for the year 1958 and of legislative 
decree No. 49 for the year 1962, the board 'of directors shall prepare a draft of 
personnel regulations for each joint sector companies, with due regard to the 
provisions of Labor Law No. 91 for the year 1959. Such personnel regulations shall 
be promulgated by order of the President of the Council of Ministers. 
b- The board of directors of each joint sector company shall ratify and promulgate the 
financial regulations and the accounting regulations of the company with due 
reference to models prepared by the Ministry of Finance. Other internal regulations of 
such company shall he promulgated by resolution of the board of directors. 
Article 25 
a- The joint sector company shall be managed by a board of directors whose number 
shall be determined in the company by-laws. Directors representing the public sector 
shall be named by order of the President of the Council of Ministers upon proposal of 
the concerned minister. 
b- The general manager shall be named by resolution of the board of directors. He 
may not be at the same time a director of the company. 
Special Provisions Concerning the Establishment of Joint Sector Companies Taking 
the Form of Corporations Whose Shares are to be offered for subscription by the 
General Public 
Submission of Request for the Establishment of the Corporation 
Article 26 
a- The founders shall submit to the concerned ministry a request to establish a joint 
sector corporation, accompanied by a preliminary economic feasibility study and 
stating its purposes, objectives, capital, projects to be undertaken, names of founders, 
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percentage of capital to be subscribed by each founder and percentage of capital to be 
offered to public subscription. The request may also contain an authorization given to 
one or more persons to sign the draft by-laws and the final text of the by-laws after 
their approval. 
b- The concerned ministry shall give its opinion about the economic feasibility of 
such corporation and its conformity to the objectives of economic development in the 
country within 30 days at the latest as from the day of submission of the request, 
accompanied by all required documents, and shall refer the same to the council, 
through the office, proposing at the same time the public sector enterprise which will 
participate in the corporation. The concerned ministry may ask the investors to submit 
such information and documents as it may deem necessary to help it study the matter, 
provided that such demand will not delay reference of the request to the council 
beyond the said thirty days. 
c- The council shall decide upon the request referred to it within thirty days as from 
the date of its registration at the office. In case of approval, the President of the 
Council of Ministers shall issue an order creating the corporation according to the 
attached form. 
d-· In case the projects to be undertaken by the proposed corporation are varied and 
concern several ministries, the request shall be submitted directly to the council which 
will refer it to the various concerned ministries so that they may give their respective 
opinion about the projects which concern each of them on the basis of the economic 
feasibility study and compatibility with the state economic and social development 
plan of each project. Each ministry shall give its opinion to the council within thirty 
days as from the date of registration of the referred request with it. The council shall, 
thereafter, decide upon the request according to the same procedure prescribed in 
paragraph "c" ofthis article. 
Procedure for Establishing a Joint Sector Corporation 
Article 27 
a- The Private sector founders, in co-ordination with the public sector enterprise 
which will Participate in the corporation capital, shall organize and control public 
subscription operations in the corporation founders in accordance with the provisions 
of Syrian Commercial Law No. 149 for the Year 1949, as amended. 
b- A notice inviting the Public to subscribe in the corporation shares, containing all 
information required by the Commercial Law, shall be prepared and published in the 
Official Gazette and in at least two daily newspapers appearing in the town where the 
main office of the corporation is located as well as in one newspaper at least in each 
town in which a subscription centre is located. 
c- Shares may be subscribed during two months as from the date of publication of 
such notices. 
d- If the shares are over .. subscribed, the number of shares subscribed by each person 
shall be proportionally reduced, with preference given to small subscribers. 
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c- If the subscribed shares, including the state participation, do not reach three 
quarters of the total capital shares, subscription may be extended for a similar period 
by order of the concerned minister. If, after the elapse of the new period, the 
subscribed shares still do not cover at least three quarters of the total capital shares, 
Provisions of article 112 of Commercial Law shall be applied, unless the competent 
authority, with the council approval, accepts to cover the unsubscribe shares. 
f- If the total capital shares are not subscribed in full, but the subscribed shares Cover 
three quarters or more of the capital, including the state participation, formalities for 
the establishment of the corporation shall be pursued as if all the shares have been 
covered in full. 
g- Subscription shall be made at one or more Syrian banks inside the country and at 
banks approved by the Commercial Bank of Syria outside the country. 
h- 50% of the nominal value of each share shall be paid at subscription and the 
balance shall be settled within the period or periods specified in the by-laws. The 
value of shares subscribed by non-resident Syrians and by nationals of Arab and 
foreign countries shall be paid in foreign currency on the basis of current exchange 
rates in neighbouring countries as published in the Exchange Rate Bulletin issued by 
the Commercial Bank of Syria. 
i- In all matters not specifically dealt with in investment law, joint sector corporations 
shall be governed by the provisions of Commercial Law promulgated by legislative 
decree No.l49 for the year 1949, as amended by their own by laws and by the present 
instructions. 
Special Provisions Concerning the Establishment of Joint Sector Corporations Whose 
Shares are not to be offered for Subscription by the General Public and of Joint Sector 
Limited Liability Partnerships 
Article 28 
Establishment of joint sector corporations whose shares are not to be offered in public 
subscription and of joint sector limited liability partnerships shall be governed by the 
provisions of investment law, their own by-laws and articles 20, 21, 22, 23, and 24, of 
the present instructions. In matters not specifically dealt with in the above references, 
they shall be-governed by the provisions of <;::ommercial Law promulgated by 
legislative decree N' 149 for the year 1949, as amended, in respect to establishment 
procedures, notices and management. 
Special Provisions Concerning Establishment of Projects by Individuals and by 
Companies not belonging to the Joint Sector 
Article 29 
a- The investor, or his duly authorized representative, shall submit to the competent 
authority a request, according to the form elaborated by the said authority for this 
purpose, asking for permission to establish a project owned by an individual or by a 
company not belonging to the joint sector. Such request shall be accompanied by all 
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required documents. It shall be registered, on the date of its submission in a special 
record kept for this Purpose and a receipt, showing the number and date of 
registration, shall be remitted to the concerned party. 
b- The competent authority shall study the submitted request and refer it, together 
with its own opinion thereabout, to the council within thirty days as from the date of 
registration. 
c- The council shall study the request at its first meeting after receipt thereof. It may 
ask the competent authority and/or the investor to submit further data, explanations or 
documents as it may deem necessary to decide upon the request. 
d- The council shall issue its decision within one month as from registration at the 
council of the request. In case of approval, such decision shall prescribe grounds and 
rules for the project establishment, including its legal form, purposes, capital, 
investment costs, value of plants, equipment and materials to be imported from 
abroad, and sources of financing. 
e- In case the request for establishment of the project is not approved, the concerned 
party may submit a petition directly to the office and the council shall review its 
decision on the light of new documents or explanations accompanying or contained in 
such petition. 
Foreign Capital 
Article 30 
Foreign capital shall include the following 
a- Foreign currencies transferred from abroad by Syrian nationals or nationals of Arab 
or foreign countries through one of the banks operating in the Syrian Arab Republic, 
or by any other means approved by the exchange office, and deposited in a special 
investment account opened in the name of the investor with the Commercial Bank of 
Syria. Funds thus transferred and deposited shall be registered in the special record 
kept by the office in accordance with the provisions of article 10 paragraph "b", 
hereof on the basis of a certificate issued by the concerned bank. 
b- Plant, machinery, equipment, installations, vehicles, buses, microbuses and other 
materials and supplies necessary for the establishment, extension or development of 
projects benefiting from the provisions of investment law, as well as material and 
supplies needed for the operation of such projects if they are imported from abroad. 
Numbers, quantities and specifications of such imports shall be determined by the 
competent authority, which issued the permit to establish the project. Their value shall 
be registered in the special record kept by the office on the basis of official invoices 
and vouchers issued by the exporters and duly checked, under its own responsibility, 
by the competent authority. 
c- Intangible assets used in the projects, such as patents and trade-marks duly 
registered in a country member ofthe International Union for the Protection of 
Industrial Property or in accordance with international registration rules specified in 
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international conventions concluded for this purpose. The value of such intangible 
assets shall be assessed on the basis of international usages by a committee having as 
chairman the office manager and as members the Director of the Department of 
Protection of Industrial Property at the Ministry of Supply and Internal Trade, the 
Director of Industrial Testing and Research Center, a financial expert named by the 
Ministry of Finance, a member named by the Union of Chambers of Commerce and 
Industry and an expert named by the project owner. 
d- Profits, returns and reserves resulting from the investment of foreign capital in 
development projects, whether they accrue in foreign currency or in local currency, 
provided they are used to increase the capital of the concerned project or, invested in 
other projects approved under the provisions of investment law. 
Investor's Obligations 
Article 31 
The owner of an approved project shall: 
1) Keep all accounting books and trade records required by the Commercial Law. 
2) Submit, for each fiscal year, a balance sheet and a profit and loss account, duly 
approved by a certified auditor, within four months as from the end of the said fiscal 
Year, to the competent authority and to the council investment office. The subm~ssion 
of such balance sheet and profit and loss account to the said authority and office shall 
not exempt the project owner from the legal obligation to submit end-of-the-year 
financial statements to the tax authority in accordance with the provisions of income 
tax law issued by legislative decree 85 for the year 1949. 
3) Keep a special record in which shall be registered all details concerning the project 
funds which benefit from exemptions, advantages or facilities under the provisions of 
investment law as well as all operations and disposals carried out on such funds. The 
said record shall remain open for inspection by concerned authorities at all times. 
4) Provide the council and the competent authority with all information, data and 
explanations requested by them about the project. 
Article 32 
Should the property of an approved project be transferred, in whole or in part, the new 
owner shall succeed the precedent owner in all his rights, obligations and duties under 
the investment law and the present instructions. Capital gain accrued from the sale of 
fixed assets shall be subject to capital gain tax in accordance with laws and 
regulations being in force. No capital gain shall be deemed to have accrued in case of 
transfer of property through inheritance and such transfer shall not be subject to 
capital gain tax. The provisions of law No. 101 for the year 1952 shall, however, 
apply to transfer of property through inheritance. 
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General Provisions 
Article 33 
Investors having the nationality of Arab and foreign countries may insure their funds 
invested in projects approved under the provisions of investment law with the Arab 
Establishment for Investment Insurance or with any other insurance establishment 
against non-commercial risks with the approval of the Ministry of Economy and 
Foreign Trade. 
Article 34 
a- All Public administrations and agencies shall give top pnonty to formalities 
undertaken by investors in accordance with the provisions of investment law. Each 
concerned ministry shall entrust to a public servant of a rank not inferior to the rank of 
sub-director the task of following up investors' matters and affairs and of extending to 
them all possible help in bringing to completion the required formalities with his 
ministry and with other concerned authorities. 
b- The investor may at any time submit a complaint to the office, explaining the 
difficulties and problems he is encountering. The office shall immediately investigate 
the complaint, take the necessary measures with the concerned authorities to find 
suitable solutions to such problems and difficulties and follow up the matter, within a 
period not exceeding two weeks as from the date of registration of the complaint at 
the office. 
Article 35 
Legislative Decree No. 10 for the year 1986 shall remain applicable to joint sector 
agricultural companies. Such companies, whether existing or to be formed in the 
future, shall not be governed by the provisions of the investment law. 
Article 36 
Provisions of existing laws and regulations concerning touristic projects shall 
continue to apply to such projects which shall not be governed by the provisions of 
the investment law, whether they are already existing or will be established in the 
future. 
Article 37 
Provisions of legislative decree No. 348 for the year 1969 shall continue to apply to 
projects established under them before coming into force of the investment law, They 
shall not be governed by the provisions of the investment law. 
Article 38 
Projects approved under the provisions of the investment law shall be governed, in ill 
matters not specifically dealt with in the said law, by the provisions of Commercial 
Law No. 149 for the year 1949, as amended. -
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Article 39 
Experts, technicians and workmen being nationals of Arab or foreign countries, who 
are employed in projects approved under the provisions of investment law shall be 
permitted to transfer abroad, in foreign currencies resulting from the project activities, 
50% of their net wages, salaries and allowances and 100% of their end-of-service 
indemnities. 
Article 40 
The council shall, by resolution, issue regulations governing the dealing in the shares 
of corporations formed under the provisions of investment law. Such regulations shall 
aim at encouraging individuals to invest their savings in the said shares, to facilitate 
the dealing in them and to make available basic information about the said 
corporations, their business and their activities. Such resolutions shall be considered 
as an integral part of the present instructions. 
Article 41 
The present instructions shall be published and notified to whom it may concern for 
their implementation. They shall come into force as from the date here below. 
Damascus, 10.6.1991 
President of the Council of Ministers sign. 
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Law No. (7): Promulgates Investment Law No. 10 
President of the Republic 
Pursuant to the provisions of the Constitutions 
And what was adopted in the People's Assembly 
Promulgates the Following: 
Article 1 
To amend the provisions of Articles (6, 13, 14, 15, 16, 19, 22, 24, 26 and 31) of 
Investment Law No. 10 issued on 41h May 1991 as follows: 
(1) The paragraph f of the following texts shall be added to Article 6 thereof: 
f- To license for the Arab and foreign investor to own and lease the lands and real 
estates necessary for the establishment of the investment projects or expansion thereof 
within the limits of the area and period of lease estimated in light of the actual need of 
the project and excess of the ownership ceiling defined in the laws and regulations in 
force according to the proposal of the concerned authority contrary to any text in 
force. 
- Upon the cancellation of the project or its final liquidation, the investor shall have to 
relinquish to others, according to the laws and regulations in force, his property in 
excess of the ceiling defused legally. In this case, the Arab and foreign investor shall 
have to relinquish to others his ownership of the lands of the project and the buildings 
constructed thereon provided that he obtains a prior approval from the Council if the 
relinquishment is for the interest of a non-Syrian person, period of two years shall be 
defined for this execution of said waiver process. 
(2) Paragraph c of the following text shall be added to Article 13 of said law: 
c- The investment project licensed according to the provisions of this law, after the 
elapse of the two exemption periods stipulated in paragraphs a & b of this article, 
shall be subject to the taxation exemptions and other privileges stipulated in the laws 
and regulations relevant thereto which are applied to the non licensed similar projects 
according to the provisions of this law namely the following: 
- Provisions of the Legislative Decree No. 174 of 16 February 1952 that exempt the 
natural persons and jurisdictional persons who deal with the Marine Transportation 
from the tax imposed on income of profits. 
- Paragraph 3 of Article 4 of the Legislative Decree No. 85 for the year 1949 and its 
amendments applied to the establishments, companies and the agriculture projects. 
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(3) Article 14 of said Law shall he amended and become as follows: 
a- Where the initiation period of the project licensed according to this law exceeds 
three years, the period in excess shall be deducted from the taxation relief period 
stipulated in paragraph a & b of Article 13 of this law. 
b - The Higher Investment Council - in exceptional cases up to its discretion - may 
grant the investment projects a period or additional consecutive periods so that the 
initiation period of the project licensed under this law provisions doesn't exceed five 
years. Not be deducted from the original tax exemption period stipulated in paragraph 
a & b of Article 13 of this law. 
(4) Article 15 ofthe Law shall be amended and become as follows: 
By a decision from the Council, an additional exemption period shall be added to the 
two taxation exemption periods stipulated in paragraph a & b of Article 13 of this law 
for the new project that will be licensed by the Council according to the provisions of 
this law as follows: 
a- Two years if the total commodity or service project exports, the value of which 
actually transferred to SAR, whether in cash on in kind, exceeds 50% according to the 
currency regulations in force, of the total production value during the original 
exemption period. 
b- Two years if the project is one deemed by the Council that it is of basic importance 
to the national economy in light of its capital investments or the extent of its 
contribution to the development of the national product, export promotion, increasing 
work opportunities and its employment of a high standard of the scientific technology 
and technical one or its contribution in the maintenance of environment as maritime 
transport projects, heavy industries, fine instruments of high technology, fertilisers 
etc. 
c- Two years if the industrial or agricultural investment project is established in one of 
the developing govemorates: Raqqa, AI Hassakah, Deir Ez Zor. 
(5) The following paragraphs c, d and e shall be added to Article 16 ofthe Law 
c- It shall be permissible, by a decision from the Council, to exceed the percentage 
allowed for the exporter to retain from the outcome of foreign currencies generated 
from the export returns according to foreign currency regulations in force. 
d- It shall be permissible, by a decision from the Council, according to the 
requirements of the project's nature of activity, to allow the companies and projects 
licensed under this law to open banking accounts abroad to secure their requirements, 
settle their obligations and collect their dues provided that the amounts deposited in 
these accounts do not exceed 50% of the capital paid in foreign currency. 
e- It shall be permissible, by a decision from the Council, to allow the projects and 
companies licensed under this law provisions to transfer upon need part of their assets 
in foreign currencies deposited duly at the Syrian banks to the Syrian currency to 
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cover their needs and local liabilities through these banks at the prevailing exchange 
rate in the neighbouring markets. 
(6) Article 19 ofthe Law shall he amended and become as follows: 
a- The joint projects licensed under this law, in which the public sector contributes by 
a percentage not less than 25% of their capital, shall take the form of a closed 
shareholding company or a company of limited liability. It shall be permissible when 
needed, upon a decision from the Council, to have the public sector participation 
either in cash, or in kind in the form of real estates, accessories, and equipment, new 
or second hand machinery. 
b- The funders shall set the charter of the joint company in a way consistent with the 
nature of its work and form of its structure. It shall he permissible to specify in this 
charter the nationality of the chairman, and board members, their number, ages, their 
bonuses, remuneration, method of their election or recruitment, ratio of the non-
Syrian representation in the board of directors, mechanism of work in the board, 
defining the company's capital, value of the share in the Syrian currency and its 
equivalent in foreign currency without abiding by the laws and regulations in force 
namely the Trade Law No. 149 for the year 1949 - This charter shall be issued by a 
decision from the premier after the Council's approval thereof. 
c- It shall be permissible to the Council following their decision, to apply the 
provision of paragraph (b) of this article to the shareholding or limited liability 
companies which are non joint and created under this law to execute projects licensed 
according to its provisions, in light of their importance in terms of its varwus 
objectives, projects, volume of their capital or the nationality of the founders. 
(7) Article 22 ofthe Law shall he amended and become as follows: 
a- The joint companies licensed under this law shall be exempted from the stamp fee 
due on the issue of the shares according to the provisions of Law No.15 for 1993. 
b- The new non-joint closed shareholding companies that launch their shares for the 
public writing by a percentage of not less than 50% of their shares, which will be 
licensed under this law, shall be exempted from the stamp fee due on the issue of their 
shares according to Law No .15 for 1993. 
c- The holding companies that launch stocks of their projects and companies for the 
public writing at the ratio of not less than 50% oftheir stocks and that will be licensed 
under this law, shall be exempted from the stamp fee due on the issue of their stocks 
according to the provisions of Law No. 15 for 1993. 
(8) Provisions of paragraph a Article 24 shall he amended and become as follows: 
Investors of Syrian expatriates and citizens of the Arab and foreign countries, after the 
elapse of five years of project investment, shall be permitted to retransfer the value of 
their net share in the project in foreign currency abroad, on basis of the actual project 
value on the date of relinquishment according to the executive instructions issued by 
the Council in this respect. 
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(9) Article 26 thereof shall he amended and become as follows: 
a- Projects and investments licensed under the provisions of this law shall enjoy non-
confiscation, expropriation or limitations in the disposal of the investment ownership 
or its returns unless it is for the purpose of the public interest for a fair indemnity. It 
shall also be impermissible to put them under seizure except by a jurisdictional 
decision. Disputes in all of these cases shall be settled by resorting to the competent 
Syrian jurisdiction. 
b- Investment disputes between investors of Arab and foreign countries cttlzens 
whose projects are covered under the provisions of this law and the public Syrian 
bodies and institutions shall be settled according to the following: 
-Through amicable solution 
-Should both parties fail to reach an amicable solution within six months as of the 
date of submitting a written notice for the amicable settlement by either parties of the 
dispute, either of them shall have the right to resort to one of the following methods: 
i) Resort to Arbitration 
ii) Resort to the Syrian jurisdiction 
iii) Resort to Arab Investment Court formed under the Corporate Agreement For The 
Investment of Arab Capital in the Arab Countries in 1980. 
iv) Or that the dispute is settled according to the provisions of Investment Protection 
and Guarantee Agreement concluded between S.A.R. and country of the investor. 
c- Investors of the Arab or foreign countries citizen may insure their money invested 
in the approved projects with The Arab Establishment For Guarantee of Investment or 
with any other establishment through the approval of the competent authority. 
( 1 0) Article 31thereof shall he amended and become as follows: 
a- It shall be permissible, by a decision from the Council, to grant the privileges and 
facilities stipulated in this law in the exemptions from the taxes and fees relieving to 
any of the projects existing prior to its date of effectiveness or those that are 
established after date of effectiveness and which are not licensed under it. All 
commitments stipulated therein shall be applicable to it including the tourist projects 
and Article 34 of this law shall be considered amended ipso facto, in line with the 
provisions of this article. The holding companies shall be added to the companies 
stipulated in the Trade Law. They shall be subject to the provisions applicable to the 
closed shareholding companies stipulated in said law, provisions of the amended 
article 19 according to this law and provisions of article 21 of Law no.1 0 for 1991. 
b-Projects created by the holding companies stated in paragraph a of this article or in 
which they share in their capital by not less than 51 % may be covered by law No.l 0 
for 1991 and according to its provisions, They shall also be subject to the provisions 
of paragraph b of article 19, article 21 of Law No. 10 for 1991. 
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c-The license establishing these companies shall be issued through a decision from the 
Premier. 
d-Net profits registered to the accounts of the holding companies from their newly 
created projects or from the companies they are contributing therein according to the 
provisions of this article shall not be subject to the tax of industrial profits, 
commercial and non-commercial profits. 
Article 3a) provisions of items (1 ,2,3,5,8,9, 1 0) of first article of this law shall be 
applicable to the agricultural, industrial and marine transport investment projects 
licensed or to be licensed under Law No. 10 for 1991. 
Provisions of the two items ( 4&7) of article one of this law shall be applicable to the 
new projects that will be licensed by the Council as of the enforcement date of this 
law. 
The ratio of income tax on net profit realized by the shareholding companies that 
announce their shares for general writings in the private and joint sector that have 
their headquarters in Syria for all activities shall be determined for 25% inclusive 
contribution to the military effort. This tax shall be excluded from the addition to the 
interest of local administration. 
Provisions of Article 3 of Law No. 20 of 6 July 1991 concerning the definition of the 
income tax ratio on profit of said companies shall be definitely amended according to 
the provisions of this article. 
Provisions of paragraph a) of this Article shall be applicable as of tax impositions of 
2000 cycle. 
Article 2 
This law shall be published in the Official Gazette. 
President of the Republic 
Hafez al-Assad 
13May 2000 
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Executive Instructions No.6 dated 261h July 1998 For The Implementation of 
Investment Law No.1 011991 
Article 2: Beneficiaries from the Law 
Benefiting from Investment Law shall be projects of economic and social 
development that are to be approved by the Council and which are established with 
local or foreign capital, or both, by natural or juristic persons identified as follows: 
l.Syrian Arab citizens residing in the Syrian Arab Republic and those who are treated 
as such. 
2.Expatriate Syrian Arab citizens whether they retain their original nationality or have 
obtained the nationality of the host country. 
3.Nationals of Arab and foreign states. 
4.Juristic persons who will be licensed by the Council to launch enterprises under the 
rules of investment law. 
Article 3: Investment Fields 
Economic and social development projects mentioned in Article 3 of Investment Law 
shall mean those enterprises which are created under its rules in the following areas: 
!.Agricultural enterprises in both plant and animal production areas and all other 
activities and works related, connected or complementary thereto such as the 
construction of greenhouses, refrigeqtted storage facilities and facilities for the 
sorting, packing and packaging of fruits and vegetables whether those are the produce 
of the same enterprise or other enterprises. 
2.Enterprises for the processing of agricultural (plant or animal) products. 
3.Industrial enterprises that may be created by the private or joint sector. 
4. Transport enterprises. 
5.Projects that may be approved by the Council m areas other than the above-
mentioned. 
Article 4 :Basics and Criteria for the Council to Grant Approval 
For a project to benefit from Investment Law the Council shall decide its approval of 
it in light of the following considerations: 
l.The project must be in line with the state development plan. 
2.The extent of the project's use of available local resources, its contribution to the 
growth of Domestic Product and to the opening up of more job opportunities. 
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3.The project's potentials in promoting exports and rationalizing imports. 
4.The project's usage of modem up-to-date machinery and technology that meet the 
needs ofthe national economy. 
5.The value of the project's fixed assets (machinery, vehicles, instruments, 
equipment, tools, installations, non-touristic transport means and all other production 
means which are definitely, not temporarily imported) that will be invested solely and 
exclusively in the project must not be less than ten million Syrian pounds or the 
equivalent in foreign currency calculated at the exchange rate of neighboring 
countries as per the bulletin of exchange rates issued by the Commercial Bank of 
Syria. 
6.The Council of Ministers may change the afore-said minimum value by a decision 
signed by the Prime Minister. 
7.All machinery, instruments, tools, equipment, non-touristic transport means and all 
other production means imported solely and exclusively in favour of projects created 
under this law must be brand-new, not second-hand nor reconditioned. 
Article 10 :Powers of the Investment Bureau 
Within the extent of its specialization, the Investment Bureau has the following tasks 
to perform: 
l.It receives and registers applications for investment which are referred to the 
Council by the concerned authorities. It has to update the information and data 
required for every application in close cooperation and coordination with the various 
competent authorities, and to prepare a file for each application. Copies of such files 
must be handed out to the chairman and members of the Council three days at least 
before the meeting of the Council. 
2.It keeps a special record for the invested funds brought from abroad in the form of 
foreign currency or assets in kind or rights which are already adopted by the Council. 
On the basis of this record the Bureau may issue a certificate testifying each share of 
the invested capital in conformity with the registered data. Such certificate shall be 
signed by the Bureau Director who takes the responsibility thereof. 
3.It receives investors' complaints and seeks to remedy them. It helps the investors 
get the required permits and licenses from the concerned authorities for their 
enterprises and helps them follow up implementation. It receives investors' 
suggestions and opinions on investment issues and project implementation and refers 
them to the Council. 
4.It records minutes of the Council meetings and its decisions and follows up their 
implementation with the various authorities of concern. It must keep records of the 
Bureau's performance with regard to implementation of Investment Law in such a 
manner as to ensure the good and sound implementation. Besides, it must collect, 
classify and study report and data of the enterprises including their balance sheets and 
their profit-and-loss accounts and present to the council periodical report thereof. 
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5.1t must study the draft by-laws of joint-stock limited liability companies created 
under Investment Law. It must also study the draft amendments of those by-laws and 
transmit those drafts and studies to the Council to consider approval thereof. 
6.1t must publish leaflets, booklets and other publications in Arabic and a foreign 
language about investment in the Syrian Arab Republic according to the Council's 
directives. 
7.It has to co-operate with the various organizations in the public, private and joint 
sectors for the launching of publicity campaigns acquaint Syrian expatriates and 
nationals of Arab and foreign states with investment opportunities available in the 
Syrian Arab Republic under Investment Law, taking directives in this regard from the 
Council. 
8.In coordination with the Ministry of Economy and Foreign Trade and Ministry of 
Finance, it evaluates the foreign capital. 
9.It has the power to agree to the projects having the required touristic transport 
means as they deserve under the Council's Decision No.308 dated 05/08/1992 and 
amendments. 
1 O.lt has the power to agree to the projects having required communication means 
(telephone, telefax, telex) as they deserve under the Council Decision circulated by 
letter No.33/1/33 dated 15/02/1992 and the Decision circulated by letter No.404/1/33 
dated 13/06/1994. 
11.1t studies and handles the following cases: 
It studies and handles applications filed with it for an extension of the period of 
execution of the projects created under Investment law without prejudice to Article 13 
of the said law with regard to the period of exemption. 
It studies and approves applications filed with it concerning transfer of ownership, 
wholly or partly, of the approved projects in compliance with the rules of Investment 
Law and relevant Council decisions. 
It studies and handles applications filed with it for altering the legal status of the 
projects. It studies and handles applications filed with it for changing the projects' 
purposes and production capacity, which if carried out do not entail any change in the 
projects' costs in the light of the study made by concerned ministry. All measures 
taken in this respect shall be incorporated in a decision to be signed by thePrime 
Minister, chairman of the Higher Investment Council, and notified by the Bureau to 
the concerned party. 
12.The Bureau Director invites Investment Directors in the various concerned 
ministries to periodical meetings in order to follow up implementation of investment 
projects created under Investment law and to observe stages of execution of each and 
to exchange opinions on the manner of handling investors' issues referring those 
which require decisions to respective ministries or to the Council for the adoption of 
the necessary procedure. 
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13.It performs any other tasks assigned to it by the Council. 
Article 12 
All public authorities, departments and establishments shall have the obligation to 
extend all possible assistance and facilitate things to investors for the purpose of 
accomplishing formalities without delay. They also have the obligation of providing 
answers to questions and queries posed by the Bureau within one week from the 
Department of Finance filing the questions or queries. 
Article 14 -Exemptions, Advantages and Facilities 
On the opening of bank accounts in foreign currency: 
A. in addition to the facilities provided for by the currency laws and regulations in 
force, the investor has the right to open in favour of his project created under 
Investment Law an account in foreign currency with the Commercial Bank of Syria 
which will have to be credited with : 
1.100% of the project capital paid in foreign currency and loans obtained in foreign 
currency as well. 
2.75% of the revenues obtained in foreign currency as a result of exportation and 
services, the remaining 25% of those revenues shall be sold to the Commercial Bank 
of Syria at the exchange rate specified in Article 4 above. 
This said bank account shall be debited with the sums of money inforeign currency 
paid to cover the burdens, needs and requirements of the project such as: 
l.Value of the machinery, vehicles, equipment, cars and all other materials needed for 
the creation, operation, development and expansion of the enterprise. 
2.Value of raw and semi-processed materials and other auxiliary materials required 
for production. 
3.Value of spare parts and costs of reconditioning worn-and-tom machinery. 
4.The instalments of paying back loans and interest rates due on loans borrowed in 
foreign currency in favour of the enterprise. 
5.The due interest rates and profits authorized for transfer abroad each year in favour 
of expatriate Syrians and nationals of Arab and foreign states who have transferred 
into the country in foreign currency the value of their shares and stakes through a 
bank based in the Syrian Arab Republic or by any of the means approved by the 
Currency Bureau in conformity with the regulations in force. 
6.Also to be debited in the said account are the dues authorized for transfer abroad 
through the Commercial Bank of Syria in favour of workers in the project who are not 
Syrian nor treated as Syrians. 
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?.Sums of money due on the project which have to be paid by transfers abroad in 
foreign currency through the CommercialBank of Syria on the basis of authentic 
documents. 
8.The expenses that have to be paid in foreign currency in the Syrian Arab Republic. 
9.1nsurance premiums which the enterprise must pay in foreign currency. 
10.Remunerations due to members of companies' boards of directors who are not 
Syrian nor treated as such. 
11.The Bureau must be notified by the Commercial Bank of Syrianof the sums of 
money that are being transferred. 
12.The enterprise bears full responsibility towards making available the foreign 
currency that meets its needs by lawful means and no official party in the Syrian Arab 
Republic can have the obligation of providing any sum of money in foreign currency 
in favour of the enterprise or its owners. 
Article 15 
The investor has the right to invest the foreign currency he possesses inside the 
country, or the foreign currency existing abroad which he lawfully brings into the 
country in financing the projects created under Investment Law, or in contributing to 
the capital of enterprises or in purchasing shares. For such investment the investor is 
kept safe from any liability that falls under any clause of criminal law in force. 
Article 16 
l.The bank where the investors' funds are deposited in conformity with Article 16-A 
of Investment Law shall have the obligation of placing those deposits at their disposal 
upon demand and it shall take all necessary measures that ensure such action. 
2. The bank shall calculate interest on the sums of money deposited with it in foreign 
currency for the account of the enterprise on the basis of current interest rates. 
3. The investor may deposit some of his foreign currency assets in a frozen account at 
the Commercial Bank of Syria. 
4. The bank shall deliver to the investor a cheque book special for investors which 
must be used solely and exclusively in favour of the enterprise. 
5.The Commercial Bank of Syrian shall transfer all the project's burdens requirements 
and needs in foreign currency in harmony with these instructions. 
6. The investor who opens a foreign currency account with the Commercial Bank of 
Syria in conformity with the currency regulations in force in favour of his project that 
is created under Investment Law may recover the balance of the money which was 
lawfully brought into the country and deposited in an account opened at the 
Commercial Bank of Syria after his project has been completely executed and all its 
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needs and operation costs as well as cost of its raw material, spare parts and operating 
capital have been paid in full in foreign currency. 
The investor, moreover, may have this balance transferred abroad if he is a Syrian 
living abroad or a non-resident national of an Arab or foreign country provided that 
the project owner remains under the obligation of ensuring the availability of the 
foreign currency needed to cover futureneeds of the project through lawful bank 
channels. 
Article 17 
l.For the benefit of his enterprise, the investor may borrow loans in local currency 
from state-owned banks against the guarantee of his private money existing in the 
Syrian Arab Republic in conformity with those banks' regulations. 
2.The investor shall bear all material and legal consequences resulting from foreign 
and local loans which he has taken or will take upon himself including payment of 
both instalments and interest in harmony with the laws and regulations in force and 
neither the state nor any other public body shall have the obligation of providing 
guarantees of whatever kind to any party whatsoever be it local or foreign. Such loans 
shall not be insured by the Arab Organization for Investment Guarantee or any other 
organization. 
Article 19 
Without being restricted to rules of prohibiting, restricting and monopolizing 
importation and rules of direct importation and rules of Currency Regulations, the 
enterprises may import: 
l.All required machinery, vehicles, equipment, hardware, working cars including 
buses and minibuses destined to service the enterprises and other materials needed for 
the creation, development and expansion of the enterprises. 
2.Touristic service cars. 
3.All materials and requirements needed for the enterprise operation (raw materials, 
processed and semi-processed materials and all materials needed for production 
operations which can be considered part of the final product and one of its 
components). 
The enterprise imports specified in item 1 of this Article shall be exempted from 
taxes, fiscal fees and municipal rates, customs duties and other fees provided that 
those imports are solely and exclusively used for the purposes of the enterprise. The 
enterprise may not relinquish any of the imports specified in A-1 above without a 
prior approval from the Council. Subject to this approval, those imports can be 
abandoned after the payment of all taxes and fees assessed on them in their current 
condition including the tax on capital profits as stipulated in Article 32 of Investment 
Law and in compliance with the regulations in force. 
Furthermore , non of the imports mentioned in A-1 and 2 above may be 
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relinquished, nor may they be used in other than the enterprise purposes unless the 
Council agrees thereto and accepts justified reasons for this action. 
Excluded from the rules of this Article are the packing materials of the 
imports(pallets, drums, .. etc) the left-overs, wastes and exhaust of the manufacturing 
process in harmony with the internationally recognized rates. 
In implementing the rules of Article 12-A of Investment Law, imports shall mean all 
imported machinery, vehicles, equipment, hardware, working cars, buses and mini-
buses required to service the enterprises and all other materials needed for the 
creation, development and expansion of the enterprises. 
Article 20 
!.Enterprises belonging to individuals or companies other than joint sector companies 
and their profits and dividends shall be exempted from all taxes levied on income, and 
from real estate and vacant plots of land taxes (including the tax on machinery 
revenues) occurring on the enterprises properties possessed for accomplishing 
thepurposes and tasks for a period of five years as from the date of actual production 
or date of exploitation according to the nature of the enterprise. 
2.Joint-sector companies in which the public sector possesses not less than 25 % of 
whose capital created under Investment Law shall take the form of Societe Anonym 
joint-stock company or limited liability company. Such companies and their shares 
profits, dividends and monies shall be exempted from all taxes levied on income and 
taxes (including taxes on machinery revenues) occurring on the enterprises properties 
possessed for accomplishing their purposes and tasks for seven years as from the date 
of actual production or date of exploitation according to the nature of each of its 
projects created under Investment Law. 
3.1n the process of implementing clauses A and B of this Article, the date of actual 
production or exploitation shall mean the date when commercial investment or 
production commences. 
4.For the purpose of implementing Article 14 of Investment Law, the period of 
creating an investment project commences on the date when the decision providing 
for the creation of a joint-sector company, joint-stock company or limited liability 
company is issued. For enterprises belonging to other natural or legal persons the 
period of founding the enterprise commences on the date when the Higher Investment 
Council gives its approval mandating the creation of such enterprises. 
Article 21 
By a decision from the Council an additional period of two years shall be added to the 
exemption period stated in Article 13 of Investment Law if the total revenues 
resulting from exports of the enterprise's commodities and services actually 
transferred into the Syrian Arab Republic through Syrian Banks exceed 50% of its 
total production achieved during the original exemption period calculated at the end 
ofthe period. 
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Article 22 
Joint sector companies created under Investment Law excluding all other companies 
shall be exempted from the stamp fees required on the issuance of its shares. 
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Appendix 5: Free Trade Zones 
1. Damascus Free Zone: 
Situated in the centre of the city, behind the General Directorate of Customs. 
Activities carried out in this zone cover commercial activity (storage in private 
facilities), general warehouses, industrial activity, retail sales to transit passengers and 
to diplomats according to tax-free regulations. All investment areas were occupied 
during a site visit in 1998. 
2. Adra Free Zone: 
It is situated on the Damascus-Baghdad highway 35km to the north-east of Damascus. 
It has a dedicated railway spur. Certain small-scale cottage industries have been set up 
in this zone and there are storage units and two market places for the trade of foreign 
cars. All the sections are tenanted, although in 1998 there were a number of spaces 
which had not been occupied. A number of warehouses and yards are placed at the 
disposal of the Customs Directorate for the storage of goods awaiting clearance. 
3. Damascus Airport Free Zone: 
It is located at the western end of the airport. All facilities assigned to investment are 
apparently used for both commercial and industrial activities. It was not possible to 
carry out a site inspection. 
4. Lattakia Free Zone: 
Situated about 7 km from the port of Lattakia on the road junction, it has an area for 
investment with a number of generally adequate facilities and services. Both 
commercial and small-scale industrial activities are carried out here and at the time of 
the site visit in 1998 there were still a number of spaces available. 
5. Aleppo Free Zone: 
It lies 18 km to the north of Aleppo near the village of Musellemieh with direct access 
to a railway line for the transport of cargo. Commercial and industrial activities are 
practised in the zone although when inspected in 1998 there were still wide areas that 
were not utilised. A number of its warehouses and yards are used by the customs 
authority for storage of goods that await clearance. 
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6. Tartous Free Zone: 
Situated on the Tartous-Lattakia highway, the free zone is adjacent to Tartous port, 
with a dedicated gate for the admission and exit of goods and cargo. It is provided 
with all facilities and services. Investment is geared towards commercial activity as a 
large part of the area in 1998 was being used for storage of cars, iron and timber. 
Close proximity to the port ensures that clearance and movement of goods ts 
straightforward. The greatest parts of areas assigned for investment were occupied. 
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Abbreviations: 
BJMES: 
EIU: 
UMES: 
MEED: 
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